History of the Information Control Division

OMGUS
1944 to June 30, 1946

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PART I -- POLICIES AND PROGRAM

1. Introduction

The various media of public expression, such as radio, press, publications, films, theater, and music, were among the most highly Nazified enterprises in Hitler Germany. The Nazi doctrine of *Kunstpolitik*, “to make art serve politics and to make politics serve art,” was implemented to the highest degree possible by the Third Reich through its Propaganda Ministry under Dr. Joseph Goebbels. Thus the elimination of the influence of Nazism and militarism from German information media initially required an equally strict program of control and supervision on the part of the Allies.

The Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), which became the Information Control Division (ICD) after the defeat of Germany, was a special staff division of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). Unlike other divisions of SHAEF, however, PWD had both staff-planning and operation functions. In general, its activities could be grouped into four categories:¹

a. To wage psychological warfare against the enemy;
b. To use the various media available to psychological warfare to sustain the morale of the people of friendly nations occupied by the enemy and to cause the people of these countries to acquiesce in the wishes of the Supreme Commander;
c. To conduct so-called Consolidation Propaganda operations in liberated friendly countries, and
d. To control information services in Allied-occupied Germany.

With the defeat of the *Wehrmacht*, the objectives of the first category were accomplished. This was also true in large measure of the second and third categories,

¹ SHAEF, Operation Memorandum No. 8, 11 Mar 44.
so that VE-Day was the signal for PWD to assume its ultimate task— that of assisting the military occupying authorities in controlling German thought and expression as the first step in the eventual reeducation of Germany through control of all its information services. Prior to VE-Day, most of the work accomplished by PWD in the last category had been in the preliminary and planning aspects of this mission.

2. Definition

The term “information services” as used here, denotes the following media of news and opinion dissemination in Germany: Press, news agencies, publications (including periodicals and books), posters, radio broadcasting, wired radio transmission over telephone lines (Drahtfunk), television, films, musical performances, mechanical and electrical recordings, opera, theatrical, and other public entertainment.\(^2\)

“Information services” did not include such services as post, telegraph, and telephone, or messages carried by such media. The activities of War Correspondents and the problems incident to the transmission of their copy to Allied countries also were not considered within the scope of the Information Control Division.\(^3\)

3. Psychological Warfare Phase Policies

Basic information control policies for the occupied areas of Western Germany were formulated in the PWD, based on directives from the U.S. Office of War

\(^2\) SHAEF, “Directive for Psychological Warfare and the Control of German Information Services” (AG 091.412-1 PWD-AGM), 16 Apr 45, Annex D, 3.

\(^3\) SHAEF, “Manual for the Control of German Information Services,” 12 May 45, I, 3.
Information (OWI) and the British Political Intelligence Department (PID) and Ministry of Information (MOI), and a working agreement signed by Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Director of PWD, and Mr. Elmer Davis, Director of OWI, and approved by the Chief of Staff, SHAEF. These policies were applied under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. Most of the controls, in their broad aspects, were basic, and were generally continued after the occupying Powers assumed individual responsibility for their respective occupation areas.

Inasmuch as the control of information services in Germany was to further military and political objectives, the task had both short-term and long-term characteristics. The responsibility for the short term task, which was primarily military, was that of the Supreme Commander through his Army Group Commanders. The long-term task, which was primarily political, was to be the responsibility of the multi-partite Allied Control Council (ACC). It was the mission of Information Control to assure that the foundation laid in the period of responsibility of the Supreme Commander provided a sound basis for the work of the Allied Control Council.

During its short-term task, that of facilitating the military occupation of Germany, Information Control was charged with the immediate prohibition of all German information services and in setting up such other information services that would assist the military commanders in maintaining order by:

a) Publicizing rules and regulations,

b) Countering rumors with announcements and information,

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4 SHAEF, Directive for Psychological Warfare and Control of German Information Services, (AG 091, 412-1 PWD-AGM), 16 Apr 45.
5 SHAEF, “Manual for the Control of German Information Services,” 12 May 45, I, 1.
c) Supplying a selected world news and information service that would clarify the relation of the individual German to the occupying forces, to the community, and to the world at large, and
d) Supervising the resumption by Germans of cultural and non-political activities, such as music and theater, which the military situation permitted.

The long-term task, to eliminate Nazism and German militarism from any influence on German information media, was to be accomplished by the eradication of all that remained of the Nazi and militarist influence, and by the re-establishment of German information services completely purged of both these influences.

The procedure under which PWD began its task, and under which the Information Control Division (ICD), U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET) and the Information Control Service (ICS), U.S. Group Control Council (USGCC), continued it, was divided into three distinct phases:

In the first phase, all media of public expression in Germany were shut down. This prohibition was accomplished piece-meal as the Allied armies advanced across Germany. The authority for prohibiting the operation of all German information services was provided by Military Government Law No. 191, issued under the authority of the Supreme Commander in January 1945. This was amended in June to include television broadcasts and the sale and distribution of publications and sound recordings.

The second phase required the overt operation by Allied Forces of certain selected instruments of public information. These instruments, mainly radio transmitters and newspapers, were under complete control of the Allies and were the

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6 SHAEF, “Manual for the Control of German Information Services”, 12 May 45, I, 8.
7 These two decrees became known as “Law No. 191 Amended (1).”
instruments of Military Government and no attempt was made to cause the German people to believe otherwise.

The *third phase* called for the gradual return of the various instruments by means of licenses to carefully selected anti-Nazi, democratic-minded Germans.

Once the first phase had been completed, the Allies were faced with the necessity of filling the void they had created. Clearly-labelled overt weekly newspapers were published by Psychological Warfare (PW) teams of Army Groups to fulfill the immediate need for disseminating news and information in Germany and for transmitting Military Government (MG) instructions and regulations to the populace. The German radio likewise was operated as an instrument of Military Government.

The third phase, during which control and operation was to be gradually returned to the Germans, was itself divided into three stages:

In the first stage, which contemplated the issuance of conditional licenses, PWD retained the right of *pre-publication* scrutiny of all material published by such licensee.\(^8\)

In the second stage, the licensee was to be subjected only to *post-publication* scrutiny of his material.

The third stage called for ultimate removal of all such restrictions and controls.

By the end of PWD, which came with the dissolution of SHAEF,\(^9\) the information control program had entered its second, or overt phase, all along the line, and in one instance, the newspaper at Aachen, it had entered the third phase. Since Aachen fell in

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\(^8\) In actual practice the conditional licenses were never utilized.

\(^9\) 13 July 1945.
the British Zone when Germany was ultimately divided into Zones of Occupation, PWD's successor in the U.S. Zone took up the task of information control with all media still in the second phase.

4. Licensing and Registration

Military Government Information Control Regulation No. 1, together with Law No. 191 Amended (1), laid down the procedure by which Germans would be allowed to operate information services under Allied supervision. Information Control Regulation No. 1 set forth the conditions under which certain of the activities prohibited by Law No. 191 Amended (1) could take place and provided for the licensing and registration of Germans desiring to operate information services. Licenses were required of Germans who exercised financial or executive control over production functions. By categories, licenses were required for:10

a. Publishing of newspapers, magazines, periodicals, books, posters, pamphlets, printed music, and other publications.

b. Operation of a news service, news or photographic agency, radio broadcasting or television station or system, wired radio transmission or audio-frequency distribution system.

c. Production of a film or sound recording, or the production or presentation of any play, concert, opera, fair, circus, carnival, or other performance using actors or musicians.

Where a license was not required, Germans wishing to engage in information services were required to register with the local Military Government office.

The authority for granting licenses and for their revocation was first lodged with SHAEF, and later with the Military Governors of the three Western zones of occupation.

10 SHAEF, “Information Control Regulation No. 1” (9 Jun 45), 2.
SHAЕF reserved for itself the authority to grant licenses to publishers of newspapers; publishers of books, pamphlets, periodicals, and journals; producers of films; executive directors or operators of radio broadcast stations or networks, and producers of mechanical reproductions such as phonograph records or sound tapes. Licensing authority was delegated to District Information Service Control Commands (DISCCS) to issue on behalf of Army Group Commanders, local licenses to producers of plays, “live” presentations, musical performances, and opera in established places of public entertainment.

The responsibility for granting licenses that required SHAЕF approval was that of the Chief of PWD. An Information Control Licensing Board, composed of representatives of PWD, the Political Adviser (British), and the Political Adviser (U.S.), was established to study applications forwarded to SHAЕF by DISCCS, and to make recommendations for granting or denying the applicant a license. Licenses were issued only to “natural” persons which ruled out corporations and associations, the purpose being to hold individuals responsible for any breach of Military Government law.

Information Control Regulation No. 1 also provided for the registration of those Germans who wished to engage in information services but of whom no license was required. After proper registration with the Office of Military Government, permission was granted such persons to engage in any of the following activities for which they qualified:

1. Distributing, selling, or lending commercially newspapers, magazines, periodicals, books, pamphlets, posters, printed music, and other publications.
2. Printing of newspapers, magazines, periodicals, books, posters,
pamphlets, printed music and other publications for licensed publishers thereof.

3. Providing to licensed producers the facilities of theaters, concert halls, opera houses, outdoor stadia, and other places of public entertainment.

4. Distributing or exhibiting approved films, provided that a Film Exhibition Certificate was annexed to each print distributed or exhibited, and that in the case of a distributor, he had been so approved.

5. Processing or printing of motion picture film obtained from licensed film producers.

6. Distributing, selling, or lending commercially sound recordings.

When any violation of policy regulations or operating instructions occurred, a penalty was imposed upon the licensee or registrant. Penalties ranged from warnings and reprimands for minor infractions, to fines, suspension of license or right to engage in the activity for periods ranging up to three months, revocation of license or permanent suspension, and when warranted, to criminal prosecution of the registrant.

The onus of responsibility for adhering to policy instructions was placed upon licensees and registrants, and where violations occurred stern enforcement of the law was encouraged. Germans without a license, who engaged in activities in Information Services which required a license, were subject to criminal prosecution regardless of what they published, produced, or exhibited.

5. Problem of Personnel

One of the principal objectives of the war against Germany as enunciated by the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR at the Yalta Conference, was “to destroy German militarism and Nazism” and “to remove their influences from the cultural and

12 MG Law No. 191 Amended (1), 6.
economic life of the German people.” It thus became the task of Information Control to apply this principle in its own field by removing from office the numerous categories of personnel that could not be licensed or employed, and to place the control of opinion-forming instruments in the hands of those who would best advance the aims of the Allied nations.

In practice the selection of licensees and employees was a difficult one. Germans chosen for policy, editorial, and major executive positions, not only had to be technically and professionally qualified, but had to possess certain democratic ideals including a belief in the freedom of speech, religion, and thought; faith in the dignity of the individual against preeminence of the State, and a conviction that crimes against civilized standards or morals and humanity are as intolerable when committed in the name of the State as when committed by a private citizen.

Licensees were required to be individuals of good character, possessing sound business judgment, and having sufficient acumen to select qualified subordinates. Above all they had to be capable of suppressing any Nazi, militaristic, or other undesirable political tendency from creeping into their enterprises. In actual practice Information Control found acceptable German leadership pitifully small in numbers and woefully weak in influence and self confidence. As a result it was found necessary to maintain strict Allied control in some media for a considerably longer period than SHAEF planning had anticipated.

The responsibility for finding suitable Germans and assisting them in applying for licenses, and for submitting to the licensing authority a detailed report on the suitability
of each applicant and the needs of the area, was that of the DISCCS. The services of the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and the Public Safety Branch were utilized as these had primary responsibility for screening Germans to eliminate Nazis and Nazi sympathizers.

6. Use of German Property

In order to operate German information media it was frequently necessary to acquire existing German facilities. Property and equipment, as well as cash and securities, belonging to the German State and the National Socialist Party and its affiliates, were subject to confiscation by the Allies. Other property was subject to requisition as a military necessity against reimbursement at some future time. In general, confiscated or requisitioned wealth was used by the Allied authority for itself. Information Control, however, was an exception.

In order to build up the German press, radio, and theater, it was often found necessary to rely upon licensees and registrants who were unable either to provide or to acquire the necessary plants and equipment. In such instances Information Control provided the needed facilities either through direct requisition for overt use or through Property Control channels for private use. The licensee was thus established in business by Information Control.

The use of buildings, real estate, and printing facilities were obtained only for newspaper publishers. If other licensed publishers needed printing facilities they

\[13\] MG Law No. 52, “Blocking and Control of Property,” Art. 1.
normally made a contract with a registered printer. Where no private printer existed, but there was available a German State or Nazi Party plant, the DISCCS requisitioned the property and through Property Control had a custodian appointed, after which the licensee made a contract with the custodian. The latter procedure was followed by film producers in acquiring studio facilities and by theatrical producers in acquiring theater facilities.

Licensees and registrants were required to pay a fair rental for the use of non-consumable property, such as buildings, printing equipment, and the like, and to pay for all consumables such as newsprint and ink. Rentals were determined by the DISCCS. In the early planning, provision was made to place rental payments in special blocked accounts with various branches of the Reichsbank. Such accounts could be released only by permission of the Director of Information Control, or a special deputy so authorized by him.

Later instructions, issued 12 December 1945, provided that the licensee or registrant for whose use property had been designated, should execute a lease or contract with the custodian. The lease or contract was subject to the approval of Property Control and Information Control, and included the following provisions:

a. That the licensee or registrant pay a fair rental from the time he assumed use of the property;
b. That the licensee or registrant be given first option on purchase of the property, if such option was valid, and
c. That the lease could be amended or cancelled with the agreement of Property Control and the Information Control unit concerned.

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14 “Administration of Property Utilized in Information Control,” AG 014.1 BIC-AGEd (12 Dec 45).
15 Any funds previously paid into a blocked account in lieu of rent were retuned to the licensee or registrant.
The procedures set forth in this new instruction applied both to real property, and any other property such as copyrights, contracts, and trade names, the use of which would further the mission of Information Control.

7. Directives One to Four

The first in a series of directives marking the changeover in psychological warfare from activities calculated to reduce the enemy's will and capabilities to resist the Allied armed forces, to operations designed to assist the military, political, and economic operations of the occupying forces, was issued by PWD 22 May 1945. This was known as “Directive No. 1 for Propaganda Policy of Overt Allied Information Services” and covered all media except those expressly excluded. It outlined the immediate objectives of overt allied information services as being:

a. To maintain and deepen the mood of passive acquiescence and acceptance of orders now prevalent; and so to facilitate the completion of the occupation of Germany.

b. To stimulate food production and to undertake any other special campaigns required by Military Government.

c. To take the first steps in re-education by (1) arousing a sense of collective responsibility for Germany's crimes, and (2) providing the facts which expose the fatal consequences of Nazi and militaristic leadership and German acquiescence therein.

The destruction of German administration, communications, and information
services had been even greater than was anticipated; hence the necessity for military authorities to start emergency Allied information services functioning was of vital importance. In many areas of Germany a complete informational blackout still existed at the time this directive was issued. While long-term plans for newspaper production got underway, various types of short-term expedients such as posters and wall sheets were used to bring news and instructions not only to main centers of the population but also to remoter regions.

Directive No. 1 was followed closely by Directive No. 2, issued 28 May 1945. Whereas Directive No. 1 had prescribed a short term policy which limited Allied information services to a generally negative attitude designed to deepen passive acquiescence to Allied authority, the second directive authorized a certain amount of relaxation, medium by medium, in the program laid down by Directive No. 1. It aimed at stimulating and re-awakening among anti-Nazi writers and journalists a sense of their duties and a feeling of self-confidence by providing them with limited facilities for formulating and for expressing their opinions on non-political matters. Cultural activities were also encouraged, particularly in music.

The second directive also attempted to differentiate between the active war-guilt of the criminal Nazi, to be atoned for by punishment, and the passive guilt of the German people as a whole, which could be atoned for by hard work, national restitution, and a change of heart.

On 28 June 1945, a third phase was entered upon with the issuance of Directive No. 3, which set forth the policy that would enable acceptable non-Nazi Germans to
secure licenses for the publication of German-language newspapers. The directive pointed out that

“while at the moment Germans are intensely preoccupied with personal matters, such as food, housing, and work, it is inevitable, as the Allied occupation continues, that their minds will turn more towards their general future. In this connection, a series of newspapers run by licensed Germans are likely to be more effective in producing upon the German mind the effects we seek than if we proceeded slowly by means or overt Allied newspapers. In addition, sufficient evidence is now available through Information Control reconnaissance, to indicate that desirable groups of potential German licensees are emerging in various parts of Germany.”

The immediate purpose of licensing selected Germans to publish newspapers under Allied supervision was threefold:

a. To take the first step in the establishment of what should subsequently become a free, independent, and democratically inclined press;
b. To enable anti-Nazi and sincerely democratic Germans...to present to their fellow German citizens the basic facts and themes of Allied aims in the past war and the future peace; and
c. By allowing Germans to speak directly to Germans, to provide a corrective to the present unhealthy state of mind of the civilian population which combines bewilderment and political apathy with a general non-recognition of war guilt and crimes committed under the Nazi regime...

In selecting and proposing potential licensees, Directive No. 3 stipulated that “at this stage, as far as large cities are concerned, groups of acceptable Germans who will collectively publish and edit a newspaper are preferable to a single individual who, however acceptable personally, would inevitably be resented by equally reputable leaders and sections of the community having different political or religious beliefs.”

It also added two restrictions, (1) that “each group should, within the limits of experienced newspapermen available, be representative of the main anti-Nazi groups in the community, but should not be allowed to consider themselves as spokesmen for
any particular political party or religious beliefs”, and (2) that “shortage of newsprint made it impractical to license more than one newspaper in each city…”

Directive No. 4, issued 4 September 1945, was intended as the first step toward giving full effect to the Potsdam Agreement\(^{16}\) in the field of Information Control. By this date the supervision and policy direction of public expression in the U.S. Zone had been taken over by the Theater Commander following the dissolution of SHAEF on 13 July 1945. The Potsdam Agreement, signed 2 August 1945 by President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee, and Generalissimo Stalin, had been published\(^{17}\) as an agreed Allied policy, and constituted the overriding directive for the control of German information services.

Pertinent to the field of Information Control, the Potsdam Agreement stated:

3. The purpose of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are:
   (ii) to convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

   (iii)...to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda...

   (iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.

6. All members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal

\(^{16}\) The Potsdam Agreement in the main restated and gave Tripartite interpretation and implementation to JCS 1067/6, ADirective to the Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany.”

\(^{17}\) Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin
participants in its activities, and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes, shall be removed from public and semi-public office and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press, and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected...

This was further reinforced by General Eisenhower's statement to the German people on 6 August 1945, in which he told them:

Our aim is not merely a negative one. We do not desire to degrade the German people. We shall assist you to rebuild your life on a democratic basis...You can redeem yourselves, both at home and in the eyes of the world, through your own efforts. It lies in your power ultimately to build a healthy, democratic life in Germany and to rejoin the family of nations...

These statements indicated that the time had come to take a long step forward from Directive No. 3, which commenced the shifting of emphasis. Under Directive No. 4, increased freedom was given to information services. In all media of information operated by German licensees, all types of news, information, and editorials could now be published which did not violate military security, constitute Nazi or militarist propaganda, incite to riot or resistance to Military Government, or create a situation of physical jeopardy to the occupying troops. Military security censorship was confined to safeguarding military intelligence and the lives and property of occupying troops. The directive further stipulated that there would be no critical discussion of announced Military Government policies, no criticism of Allied Military Government officials, and no attempt to create division between or to further disrespect for the Allied occupying powers or the United Nations.
Specifically within the above limits, the licensed German information services could discuss local, regional, or national German issues as a means of preparing Germans for full democratic freedom, to engage in political activities, and to establish free trade unions. The directive required that editorials and commentary must be signed, or their origin otherwise indicated.

As a corollary to the increased freedom of expression granted to Germans by the Potsdam Agreement, the function of recruiting and establishing completely trustworthy and competent Germans became critical to the success of the operations of the control program. In both U.S. operated media and in media operated by German licensees or registrants, no person could be employed who had:

a. Held office or otherwise been active in the Nazi Party and its subordinate organizations, or in organizations which furthered militarist doctrines;
b. Authorized or participated affirmatively in any Nazi crimes, racial persecutions or discriminations;
c. Been an avowed believer in Nazism or racial and militaristic creeds; or
d. Given voluntarily substantial moral or material support or political assistance to the Nazi Party or Nazi officials or leaders.

No person could be employed in a policy-making or creative capacity or as a personnel officer, who had ever been even nominally a member of the Nazi Party, unless he could offer conclusive proof that while a member of the Party he had worked actively against the Party and its principles. Such cases were decided by ICD.

Since material shortages and other limitations did not permit all German groups or factions to establish their own newspapers or other media, the directive stipulated that “insofar as practicable, licensed German information services would afford equitable access to all important groups and points of view within the area they
served.” The DISCCS, in conducting licensing and registration operations, were guided by the principle that there should be “opportunity for fair expression of all important points of view on controversial topics.”

8. Political Parties and the Press

Under existing military law all information activities, including publication of political matter by authorized parties, was governed by Information Control Regulation No. 1 which specified that publications could be produced only under license. In order not to restrict unduly the activities of authorized political parties, it became desirable that certain party publishing activities be exempted from the licensing procedure and that parties be given opportunities to communicate with the electorate through licensed papers. On recommendation of ICD, Information Control Instruction No. 2 titled “Use of Information Media by Authorized German Political Parties”, was issued 2 November 1945 by USFET. It granted an automatic license to each authorized political party to publish handbills and posters for distribution in its permitted area of activity, provided the following conditions were fulfilled:

a. Printing to be done by a registered printer, and if a commercial distributor is employed, he likewise be duly registered;

b. Prior to distribution, three copies of each publication be filed with the local MG detachment with which the party had registered;

c. Handbills were no larger than 15.25 by 21.5 centimeters and did not total more than one handbill for every ten persons in the authorized area in any one month, and posters were no larger than 61 by 43 centimeters and did not total more than one for every 100 persons in the area in any one month;\footnote{Shortage of newsprint, a constant factor in all Information Control activities, made necessary the restrictions placed on the number and size of handbills and posters.}
d. Material appearing on posters and handbills be limited to time and place of political meetings, names of speakers and party officials, officially adopted party platforms, proclamations, slogans, and programs, and exhortations to attend a meeting or to support the party concerned.

Local and international news and advertising was specifically prohibited from appearing on handbills and posters. Each handbill or poster published was required to indicate clearly the political party sponsoring it, the specific individual or individuals assuming responsibility for its publication, and their addresses, the printer producing it, and the number of copies printed. A party's license to publish handbills and posters could be suspended or revoked for any violation of the above conditions, and the persons responsible for the publishing activities of the party were subject to any penalties which a Military Government court determined. Affixing of posters was limited to duly authorized places.

If a political party desired to publish magazines, books, pamphlets, or other publications, it was authorized by Information Control Instruction No. 2, to appoint a representative to be responsible for such literature who could apply to the DISCCS in his area for a license to publish under the provisions of Information Control Regulation No. 1.

9. Policy at Quadripartite Level

Efforts of the four Powers to agree upon firm Information Control policies at quadripartite level had achieved only a modicum of success by 30 June 1946. This was due in large measure to their failure to establish an Information Control Directorate on the Allied Control Council (ACC) level. While consideration was being given to forming a
Directorate, the Information Control Services Group, composed of the Directors of Information Control in the four zones of occupation, functioned as an informal quadripartite body. This body had no official standing until April 1946 when it became the Information Control Committee of the Political Directorate, but even then its actions and recommendations were subject to approval at higher levels.

Considerable work had been accomplished by media subcommittees during the period when the Information Control directors were serving as an unofficial body. Agreements had been reached on inter-Allied principles for censorship of German films, the exchange of Allied films to be shown in Germany, the establishment of an inter-Allied Music library, the interzonal exchange of newspapers, the utilization of the German press to combat rumors, the interzonal circulation of news bulletins, news files, books, and medical periodicals, and the limitation of Reichspost participation in radio broadcasting. These agreements, however, were not ratified when the Information Control Committee met officially on 29 April 1946, due to the refusal of the Soviet representative to accept the agenda.

Some unanimity in principle was achieved by the four Powers in the matter of eliminating Nazi and subversive literature from circulation in Germany, the banning of certain Germans from holding positions in information services, and broad general principles for the censorship of German films, but these were promulgated on a unilateral rather than a quadripartite basis.
PART II - ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

1. Introduction

The Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), predecessor of the Information Control Division (ICD), was the agency which controlled and coordinated psychological warfare operations within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Allied Commander. It functioned as a special staff division, but unlike other staff divisions of SHAEF, PWD had both planning and operating responsibilities.

The closest lineal ancestor of PWD (SHAEF) appeared in November 1942 when at the orders of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, a joint military-civilian Anglo-American Psychological Warfare Unit was attached to the Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) after the Allied landings in French North Africa. This agency was known as the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB), and it was in PWB/AFHQ that much of the trial-and-error involved in the new field of combat psychological warfare operations was experienced.

Certain of the personnel from PWB later became a part of PWD/SHAEF, notably Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, chief of the Information and Censorship Section of AFHQ, of which PWB was a branch. On 13 November 1943, Brigadier General McClure became chief of the Publicity and Psychological Warfare (P and PW) Division, with offices in London. Three months later, 14 February 1944, he was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6, the new designation for the P and PW

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1 SHAEF, Operation Memorandum No. 8, (11 Mar 44), 4b.
Division. However, on 13 April 1944, G-6 was discontinued as a general staff division of SHAEF and in its place two special staff divisions were announced: The Public Relations Division (PRD), under Brigadier General Thomas J. Davis; and the Psychological Warfare Division, under Brigadier General McClure. The latter remained chief of PWD throughout the combat phase of the war in Europe and continued as director of Information Control for two years after VE-Day, guiding and developing both organizations through their critical periods.

2. PWD Organization Following VE-Day

Although the internal organization of PWD/SHAEF changed through the months prior to VE-Day, PWD's relationship to other staff divisions and to the Supreme Allied Commander remained substantially the same until the dissolution of SHAEF on 13 July 1945. With the end of hostilities in Europe, however, the structure of PWD organization was altered considerably:

a. The Leaflet Section was abolished, there being no further need for its activity.

b. The Film Section which, in effect, had not existed at all after the Allied Information Service (AIS) returned the distribution of films in liberated countries to civilian agencies, was revived as the Film-Theater-Music Control Section, and was given added responsibilities.

c. The Liberated Areas and Special Liaison Office, which had been set up in the last days of AIS, was abolished.

d. The Directive Section and the Plans and Organization Section were combined into a single section called Plans and Directives.

e. The Displaced Persons and Prisoners of War Section was formalized.

f. With the appointment of two Deputy Chiefs, one in charge of Operations and the other in charge of Administration, what remained of the older system of four civilian deputies, each primarily responsible for one or more of the operating sections, disappeared.

g. The field force for German Information Control took the form of
District Information Service Control commands (DISCCs).

On 15 June 1945, when SHAEF (Main) moved from Paris to Frankfurt, PWD moved its headquarters to Bad Homburg. Information Control Service (ICS), which had been activated 15 March 1945 as an agency of U.S. Group Control Council (USGCC) for planning at Allied control Authority (ACA) level, set up its headquarters at Hoechst.

As a result of these moves and changes, PWD's organizational plan shortly after VE-Day showed PWD continuing as a special staff division under SHAEF, with Brigadier General McClure as division chief. Serving under him were two Deputy Chiefs, Col. William S. Paley (U.S.) in charge of Operations, and Col. Victor W. Roche (British) in charge of Administration.

Under the Deputy Chief for Operations were eight operating Sections: Plans and Directives (Lt. Col. Charles A. Thompson, chief), Intelligence (Lt. Col. Murray I. Gurfein, chief), Radio (Lt. Col. Adrian Murphy, chief), Films-Theater-Music (Davidson Taylor, civilian, chief), Displaced Persons (Fernand D'Auberjonois, civilian, chief), Publications (Major Douglas Waples, chief), Press (Luther Conant, civilian, chief), and Reports and Historical (Richard Hollander, civilian, chief).

Under the Deputy Chief for Administration were four administrative Sections: Administration (John P. Walsh, civilian, chief), Supply and Transportation (Lt. Col. Henry L. C. Morley, chief), Personnel (Lt. Col. Homer Shields, chief), and Headquarters Commandant (Major Richard R. Bairstow, chief).

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2 ETOUSA, GO No. 36 (15 Mar 45).
3. **ICD Organization under USFET**

While planning was still in progress at SHAEF for the organization of a United States Theater Headquarters to follow the cessation of hostilities, it was considered advisable to have a separate staff division for the control of German information media. Thus on 12 May 1945, the Information Control Division (ICD) was established as a special staff division of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA). On 1 July 1945, ETOUSA was redesignated Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater (USFET), and ICD became a special staff division of USFET. Prior to the dissolution of SHAEF, however, information control functions were the responsibility of the Psychological Warfare Division.

With the dissolution of the Supreme Allied Headquarters on 13 July 1945, the Anglo-American aspect and operation of PWD ceased. On the British side, an organization known as the Information Services Control Branch, Control Commission for Germany, came into being. On the U.S. side, the successor to PWD was a dual organization designated as the Information Control Division (ICD/USFET) for operations, and the Information Control Service (ICS/USGCC) for policy and planning. Brigadier General McClure, chief of PWD, was named chief of both ICD and ICS.

Despite changes in designation and the separation of British and U.S. functions, the activities of the successors to PWD continued separately in much the same manner and with much the same personnel as they had functioned jointly prior

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3  ETOUSA, GO No. 90 (12 May 45).
4  ETOUSA, GO No. 130 (20 Jun 45).
to the dissolution of SHAEF. Most of the work accomplished by PWD in its task of controlling German information services was in the preliminary and planning aspects of its mission only.

4. Basic Functional Organization of ICD

Although minor changes in organization took place during the first year of its operations, the Information Control Division resolved itself into two main groups--a staff group and an operating group.  

The staff group included three branches:

a. Plans and Directives, which was responsible for policy formulation, implementation and coordination of directives, staff studies, public relations, and liaison with other Zones and agencies.

b. Intelligence Branch, which was responsible for field operations involving interrogations, studies, and public opinion surveys; analysis, correlation and publication of intelligence material; investigation and classification of German applicants for positions in information media; and special studies on social groups or communities.

c. Administration and Personnel, which was responsible for administrative and personnel matters of the division.

The operating group was composed of four branches responsible for the control of various German information media:

a. Press Control, which was responsible for control and reconstitution of the German press; dissemination of information to the civilian population; the preparation of policies and directives and supervision of German activities relating to the press.

b. Publications Control, which was responsible for the control and

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5 OMGUS Organization Plan (5 Dec 45).
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
reconstitution of German publications; dissemination of information to the civilian population; preparation of plans and directives and supervision of German activities relating to publications.9

c. Radio Control, which was responsible for control and reconstitution of the German radio as a media of entertainment, culture and public information; dissemination of information to the civilian population; preparation of plans and directives and supervision of German activities relating to radio.10

d. Film, Theater and Music Control, which was responsible for control and reconstitution of German film, theater and music; dissemination of information and entertainment to the civilian population; preparation of plans and directives and supervision of German activities relating to film, theater and music, including production, distribution and exhibition.11

Since newsprint, paper stocks and printing facilities were a constant and acute problem in Information Control, a Paper and Printing Coordinating Section functioned with the operating Branches. This Section was responsible for coordination of all paper and printing requirements, and the allocation of paper for the licensed German press, German publishers and Information Control publications.

In addition, a Fiscal Section, which later became the Business Management Branch, was responsible for receiving and maintaining records of all receipts from the sale of overt newspapers, periodicals, translations of books, royalties of plays, rental of films, and the like, and for providing for payment of overhead expenses for these undertakings. This section functioned under the Deputy Director for Administration.

In carrying out its functions, Information Control was required to perform operations normally not the responsibility of a military staff division. It therefore

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
became necessary to provide a separate, self-contained unit to carry out technical operational responsibilities associated with the restoration of German information services. This unit was ICD's Information Control Detachment located at Bad Nauheim. This Detachment was staffed by technicians and professional people, both Allied civilian and military, for all media of information.

The responsibility for carrying out information control policies and operations in the field was placed with two District Information Services Control Commands (DISCCs). The 6870th DISCC, commanded by Col. Bernard B. McMahon with headquarters in Munich, served the Eastern Military District, and the 6871st DISCC, commanded by Lt. Col. John Stanley with headquarters in Wiesbaden, served the Western Military District, including Bremen. An Information Control Unit under Lt. Col. Frederick M. Leonard served a similar purpose in the U.S. Sector of Berlin.

Like ICD, each DISCC consisted of corresponding sections and sub-sections in charge of intelligence, plans and operations, press, publications, radio, and films, theater and music. Smaller units composed of specialist personnel under the jurisdiction of the DISCCs were stationed in ten of the largest cities in the U.S. Zone and in Bremen. For administration, each DISCC was under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General of the Military District to which it was assigned.

5. ICD as a Division of Military Government

12 SHAEF Letter AG 091.412-1 PWD-AG, M, (9 Jun 45), App. AB.

13 Ibid.
On 11 December 1945, the Information Control Division entered a new stage of its operations when it was discontinued as a separate staff division of USFET and its responsibilities were transferred to the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone).\textsuperscript{14} The transfer, on the surface, was purely administrative and involved no change in information control mission or method. However, it did mark the beginning of the long term policy for Germany when the functions of Military Government would be separated from those of the security forces, and information media gradually would be turned over to the Germans.

The organization chart of ICD at this time\textsuperscript{15} showed Brigadier General McClure as Director of the Division, with Col. C. R. Powell as Deputy Director. Deputy Director for Administration was Col. J. H. Hills and Deputy Director for Operations was Lt. Col. W. H. Kinard, Jr. Plans and Directives (Arthur Eggleston, chief) and Intelligence (Albert Toombs, chief) continued as staff Branches.

Under the Deputy Director for Administration was a Personnel Branch (Capt. R. L. Robinson, chief), Fiscal Section (T. B. Lyon, chief), Civilian Administration Section (J. P. Walsh, chief), Historical Section (Capt. Albert Norman, chief) and Library Section (W. C. Headrick, chief).

Under the Deputy Director for Operations was the Press Control Branch (Luther Conant, chief), Radio Control Branch (G. F. Maulsby, chief), Publications Control Branch (Lt. Col. Douglas Waples, chief), a Paper and Printing Coordination Section (A. F. Chell has, chief), and the Films, Theater, and Music Control Branch (E. T.

\textsuperscript{14} USFET, GO N. 331 (11 Dec 45), Sec. II.

\textsuperscript{15} ICD Organizational Chart, 10 Dec 45.
Clark, chief), the latter sub-divided into a Film Section (1/Lt. N. T. Nilson, chief), and a Theater and Music Section (B. D. Frank, chief).

Meanwhile, the Information Control Services (USGCC) had moved in August 1945 from Hoechst to Berlin in order to participate at Allied Control Council level. In January 1946, when USGCC became the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), ICS was redesignated the Office of the Director of Information Control (ODIC/OMGUS). At the same time this change took place, a main echelon of ICD moved from Bad Homburg to Berlin and became a part of the Information Control headquarters in OMGUS, leaving a rear echelon at Bad Homburg under OMG (U.S. Zone). The Berlin headquarters established policy for information control in the U.S.-occupied area, correlating it with the other occupation powers, while the rear echelon was primarily charged with the execution of those policies.

The gradual and piecemeal moving of the ICD staff from Bad Homburg to Berlin culminated in a fusion of the two organizations as ODIC/OMGUS on 1 April 1946 when OMG (U.S. Zone) was closed and its functions transferred to OMGUS. This consolidation brought certain organizational changes:

a. Liaison with USFET was maintained through an Information Control Officer on the staff of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.\(^{16}\)
b. The DISCCs disappeared and control of German information services was effected by Information Control Divisions in each Land Office of Military Government, with sections and subsections corresponding to those in ODIC.\(^{17}\)
c. Information Control in the U.S. Sector of Berlin was accomplished by a similar division in the Office of Military Government, U.S. Sector, Berlin

\(^{16}\) MGR Title 21, C-2, 12 May 46, 21-101.
\(^{17}\) Ibid, 21-102.
d. Information Control matters in the Bremen area were administered by the Information Control Division of the Office of Military Government for Bremen Enclave (U.S.), subject to any agreements with the British.19

e. An Information Control Committee, composed of the Directors of Information Control of the four occupying powers, was established as a committee of the Political Directorate, “to discuss and to recommend to the Control Council policies with respect to information services in all Zones of Germany and to serve as a channel of communication between the Information Control agencies of the four powers.”20

Dissolution of the Military Districts and separation of the functions of Military Government from the U.S. Army resulted in the reorganization of Information Control units. The new designation of the several units and their areas of responsibility were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Designation</th>
<th>New Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6870th District Information Services Control Command</td>
<td>Information Control Division, Office of Military Government for Bavaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6871st District Information Services Control Command</td>
<td>Information Control Division, Office of Military Government for Wuerttemberg-Baden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6840th Theater Information Services Control Command</td>
<td>Information Control Division, Office of Military Government for Greater Hesse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6871st District Information Services Control Command, Bremen Detachment</td>
<td>Information Control Branch, Office of Military Government Bremen Port Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Services Control Section, U.S. HQ Berlin District</td>
<td>Information Services Control Section, Office of Military Government (Berlin), U.S. HQ Berlin District</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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18 Ibid, 21-103.
19 MGR Title 21, C-2, 12 May 46, 21-104.
20 MGR Title 21, C-2, 12 May 46, 21-105.
21 The 6840th Theater Information Services Control Command (TISCC) was primarily responsible for information control activities which were of a zonal nature and which were operated directly by the Army. The discontinuance of TISCC and the assumption of information control responsibilities for Greater Hesse by its personnel necessitated the redistribution of those functions which were conducted outside that Land. As a result, the Offices of Military Government for Bavaria, Wuerttemberg-Baden, Greater Hesse, Bremen and Berlin became...
responsible for the following activities previously performed by TISCC, to the extent these activities were located within their areas: (1) Intelligence, (2) German News Service (DANA), (3) American Libraries, (4) German Newsreel (Welt im Film) and (5) official U.S.-published newspapers and periodicals.
PART III -- PROBLEMS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

CHAPTER 1 -- PRESS CONTROL

1. Introduction

One of the first steps taken by the National Socialists when they came into power in Germany was to silence the opposition press. The Nazis then systematically investigated all personnel on German newspapers -- many they persuaded to adopt Nazi ideas, and the rest they forced into retirement, exile or the concentration camp. New editors were chosen only from the ranks of loyal party members.

At the same time, the National Socialist Party acquired either direct or indirect financial control of almost every newspaper in Germany. World news was furnished only by Government or semi-official press agencies, and every item was examined by the Propaganda Ministry in Berlin before it could be published. The Propaganda Ministry dictated the position in the paper where the material was to be placed, and even the headlines under which it was to appear.

As a result of these policies, few uncompromised journalists were left in Germany by 1945, and almost none of these was democratically minded. The German public had lost both confidence and interest in a press which gave little straight news, and whose reports were doled out by official propaganda sources. By 1945, almost the whole population had become accustomed to being told what to think. The concept that a man should acquaint himself with the facts and then form his own opinions was totally foreign to the German newspaper reader.

Thus when Information Control officers arrived in Germany, they found it
necessary to clear away ideological as well as physical wreckage in order to start building again. For this reason MG Law No. 191 was promulgated, requiring all German information services to cease operations and prohibiting any German newspaper, publication or other medium of information from functioning again until it had received permission from Military Government. Copies of MG Law No. 191 were posted in every German city as soon as it fell to the Allied forces.

2. The Aachen Experiment

The first German city of any size which the Allied armies captured was Aachen, located near the Belgian border. As soon as it had been taken, a team made up of two British and two U.S. press control officers was sent to Aachen by the Psychological Warfare Division (SHAEF) to determine whether a German newspaper could be published there. In spite of the fact that Aachen had been subjected to intense bombing and artillery fire, the team was able to locate a newspaper plant in operable condition. However, finding a German publisher was a much harder task. In planning the reconstruction of the German press it had been agreed at high policy level\(^2\) that in view of the importance of the press to the reeducation and denazification program, no Nazi, even a nominal one, would be allowed a position of influence in any newspaper.

Press Control officers systematically interviewed every newspaperman who could be found in Aachen, but were unable to find a single candidate who was

\(^{22}\) Potsdam Agreement
technically qualified and had a clear political past. This testified to the thoroughness of the Nazi Propaganda Ministry in exterminating the opposition. Finally, an elderly printer\textsuperscript{23} was found who said he would be willing to try his hand at publishing a newspaper. Although he was some 70 years of age at the time, and required considerable assistance and guidance from British and U.S. newspapermen on the press control team, he and his German staff were able within a few months to publish a fairly good newspaper, the \textit{Aachener Nachrichten}. His vigorous editorials and straight news reporting were welcomed by news-hungry citizens of the Rhine Valley.

Press Control officers learned much from the Aachen experiment in the reestablishment and control of the German press. They found that German newspapermen were not accustomed to writing straight news. News was mixed with opinion and slanted to fit the character of the paper in which it was published. Editorials were so scattered through the paper that readers often were unable to tell which was news and which was opinion. This mixing of news and editorial opinion had been the custom in Germany even before 1933. Furthermore, German newspapers often gave such prominence to short fiction, art critiques and general cultural material that little space remained for news.

From the beginning, every effort was made by Press Control officers to persuade the new German newspapermen to report objectively, to separate news from opinion, and to include literary material only after sufficient space had been given to news reports. Every effort was made to rebuild the Germans' faith in news

\textsuperscript{23} Heinrich Hollands
reporting, something which had long been lost to the German press.

3. **Mission and Principal Tasks**

Press Control, as defined by Military Government Regulations, included the “control of the management, production, contents, and distribution of all newspapers, wall sheets, news posters, news leaflets, and news picture displays, as well as the control of the activities or operations of all news and photographic services and agencies.”

The principal tasks of Press Control were “to find and recommend suitable Germans to be licensed as newspaper publishers and operators of news and photographic services, and to control and guide the reconstitution of the German press.” These tasks were divided operationally into three phases:

a. In the first phase, no German newspapers or other forms of information media were permitted to operate. This prohibition was effected through MG Law No. 191.

b. In the second phase, overt newspapers were published by the military to fill the void created by the first phase. These overt publications were used to issue official orders and instructions to the Germans, to counter rumors with facts, and to provide the populace with news.

c. The third and final phase was the long-term task of reconstructing a democratic German press as an essential element in reeducating the German people. The first step in returning the press to German control was the selection and licensing of suitable Germans as newspaper publishers and operators of news and photographic services and agencies.

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24 MGR Title 21, C-2 (12 May 46), 21-300
25 MGR Title 21, C-2 (12 May 46), 21-301
26 Psychological Warfare staffs of the 6th, 12th and 21st Army Groups under the overall supervision of PWD/SHAЕF.
4. *Overt Newspapers*

On 14 July 1945, when the U.S. Army took over its areas of occupation in Germany and the Supreme Allied Headquarters was dissolved, the official Army newspapers published by PWD/SHAEF became the responsibility of the Information Control Division of USFET. At that time, eight such newspapers\(^{27}\) were being published with a combined circulation of 3,139,500 copies. Two more overt publications, the *Allgemeine Zeitung* in Berlin\(^{28}\) and the *Stuttgarter Stimme* in Stuttgart were added in August 1945.

By late September 1945, however, there were only five official newspapers extant -- in Augsburg, Bamberg, Berlin, Munich and Straubing. Conforming to U.S. policy, the others had ceased publication when licensed German newspapers appeared in the areas they served. Mid-November saw the end of all official newspapers with the exception of *Die Neue Zeitung* which had been established in October for circulation throughout the U.S. areas of occupation as the official voice of Military Government.\(^{29}\)

Of the overt newspapers, the *Allgemeine Zeitung* in Berlin had led the field with a circulation of 600,000 copies. Two others, the *Bayrischer Tag* in Bamberg and the *Muenchener Zeitung* in Munich, were not far behind this figure. Originally the chain of overt newspapers was edited from Bad Nauheim by Information Control officers. News copy was written and assembled centrally and then dispatched to the

\(^{27}\) Augsburger Anzeiger in Augsburg, Bayrischer Tag in Bamberg, Weser Bote in Bremen, Frankfurter Presse in Frankfurt, Suddeutsche Mitteilungen in Heidelberg, Hessische Post in Kassel, Muenchener Zeitung in Munich and the Regensburger Post in Straubing.

\(^{28}\) Published three times weekly, alternating with the British *Der Berliner*.

\(^{29}\) See par. 10 for further discussion of *Die Neue Zeitung*. 
larger German cities under U.S. and British control where the actual printing and distribution was made. In the beginning, distribution was free, but as facilities were established a changeover to a pay basis was gradually accomplished. These official papers were modest four-page and six-page affairs, normally appearing but once a week. Despite the adverse conditions under which they were published, these Army-operated papers fulfilled their functions well, and on the whole were better than anything the Germans had seen for many years. At one time their paid circulation was nearly eight million copies.

Obeying a cardinal Military Government principle that Germans could best be educated by other Germans, the press was returned to German operation as rapidly as democratically minded editors could be located in the principal cities, and facilities could be provided for publishing a newspaper. Authorization to begin publishing was granted by licensing.

5. Licensed German Newspapers

During the first two months of its operational existence, ICD reserved for itself the exclusive right to grant newspaper licenses to applicants recommended by the DISCCs. However, in order to facilitate the program, a move was made to decentralize the licensing procedure. On 11 September 1945, licensing authority was delegated to the commanders of the Military Districts with the reservation that cities in which newspapers were to be licensed must have the approval of ICD. The policy

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of licensing but one newspaper in any one city was continued in effect.

The first German newspaper to be licensed in the U.S. Zone was the *Frankfurter Rundschau* on 31 July 1945, the first issue appearing on the streets of Frankfurt-am-Main on 1 August. Seven men,\(^\text{31}\) representing various shades of democratic political thought, composed the board of publishers to which Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, chief of ICD, officially presented the license. The paper was authorized to appear twice weekly, on Wednesdays and Saturdays, with a circulation of 400,000 copies. This circulation figure enabled the Frankfurt paper to cover a large part of Greater Hesse.

The *Rundschau* was published in the basement of the bomb-damaged building that once housed one of Germany's greatest newspapers, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. The first edition was a four-page paper carrying five columns of news to the page. A brief statement by the local Military Government office stated that the edition represented a major step in instituting a democratic Germany and was an indication of the rehabilitation of Frankfurt. The leading front page article was devoted to the British elections and the victory of the Labor Party there. Beneath this was a report from Washington, D.C. announcing the ratification of the United Nations charter by the U.S. Senate. The front page also carried pictures of President Truman and British Prime Minister Attlee. An editorial on page two, entitled “The Symbol of Democracy,” pointed out that something new had been achieved in German journalism: The coalition of various political groups, united for the common purpose of cooperation.

The licensing of other newspapers in the U.S. Zone soon followed that of the *Rundschau*. The *Rhein-Neckar Zeitung* was licensed in Heidelberg on 5 September and appeared on the following day with an initial circulation of 200,000 copies. It also served the neighboring cities and towns of Darmstadt, Mannheim, Dieburg, Schwetzingen, Mosbach and Hockenheim. The first issue offered evidence that the paper would become a strong instrument for democracy in Germany. In a front page article Dr. Theodore Huess, one of its three licensed editors, described the moral disintegration of the German press under the Nazis, and hailed the opportunity to restore the people's faith in a free press.

The *Marburger Presse*, the third U.S. licensed newspaper in Germany, made its initial appearance in Marburg on 14 September and was published twice weekly. Two days later, the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* was licensed in the Wuerttemberg capital. Published in the plant of a former local Nazi newspaper, the *Zeitung*'s circulation was 400,000 copies. Circulation figures were allocated by ICD on an estimate of one copy for each five residents in the area served by the newspaper.

On 15 September, Hans Hackmack received a license to publish the *Weser Kurier* in Bremen, to serve the U.S. Enclave with a twice-weekly newspaper having a circulation of 125,000 copies. This was the first license to be issued outside the U.S. Zone, and was followed on 27 September by the licensing in Berlin of *Der Tagesspiegel*, a daily newspaper that was to become the object of a great deal of controversy and a target for the Soviet-controlled press.

Likewise in September, the *Hessische Nachrichten* began publication in
Kassel, a license having been issued 26 September to five co-publishers for the Kurhessen area. It was followed on 1 October by the *Wiesbadener Kurier* in Wiesbaden. The Kassel paper had an initial circulation of 220,000 copies, while the paper at Wiesbaden was authorized 90,000 copies.

The first U.S. license for a newspaper in Bavaria was presented by Colonel B.B. McMahon, Commanding Officer of the 6870th DISCC, to three Germans authorizing them to publish the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* in Munich. The ceremony took place on 6 October in the bomb-damaged Gothic Rathaus in Munich. The circulation for the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* was set at 410,000 copies. Two days later the *Hochland Bote* was licensed in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, and three days after that the *Nuernberger Nachrichten* received its license in Nuremberg. The former was authorized a circulation of 21,000 copies and the latter 50,000 copies.

October 1945 saw six more newspapers licensed. On 12 October, two publishers were licensed to publish the *Hof Frankenpost* in the Upper Franconia border town of Hof, and on 23 October a license was issued to Karl Esser to publish the *Mittelbayerische Zeitung* in Regensburg. Three licenses were issued on 30 October, for the *Schwaebische Donau Zeitung* in Ulm, the *Schwaebische Landeszeitung* in Augsburg, and the *Fuldaer Volkszeitung* in Fulda. The paper at Ulm was authorized a circulation of 90,000 copies, the Augsburg paper 100,000 copies and the Fulda paper 35,000 copies.

After the *Darmstaadter Echo* in Darmstadt, the *Main Echo* in Aschaffenburg

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32 Of Centrist, Social Democrat and Farmers' Union (*Bauernbund*) political leanings.
and the *Main Post* in Wuerzburg had been licensed in November 1945,\(^{33}\) it could be said that all main cities in U.S.-occupied areas of Germany were being covered by German newspapers and that all overt publications, with the exception of *Die Neue Zeitung*, had given way to licensed German publishers.

By the end of 1945, three more licensed papers were added to the list to bring the total to 23 newspapers having a combined circulation of over 3,000,000 copies.\(^{34}\) The December additions were all in Bavaria and included the *Donau Kurier* in Ingolstadt, which received its license on 11 December; *Der Allgaeuer* in Kempten, licensed on 13 December; and the *Frankische Presse* in Bayreuth, licensed on 18 December. Authorized circulations were 60,000 copies for the Bayreuth paper and 40,000 copies each for the Ingolstadt and Kempten publications.

Between 1 January and 30 June 1946, only 12 additional papers were given licenses. Five of these were issued in January: The *Wetzlarer Neue Zeitung* in Wetzlar, the *Giessener Freie Presse* in Giessen, the *Fraenkischer Tag* in Bamberg, the *Neue Presse* in Coburg and the *Isar Post* in Landshut. The Wetzlar and Giessen papers had an initial circulation of 20,000 copies each, Bamberg 60,000 copies, Coburg 45,000 copies and Landshut 50,000 copies.

On 5 February, a license was granted the *Passauer Neue Presse* in Passau permitting it an initial circulation of 60,000 copies. Two more licenses were issued in March, for the *Badische Neueste Nachrichten* in Karlsruhe and *Die Heilbronner Stimme*

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\(^{33}\) The *Darmstadter Echo* was licensed on 17 November, and the *Main Echo* and *Main Post* on 24 November.

\(^{34}\) Figure does not include *Die Neue Zeitung*. 

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in Heilbronn. The former was authorized to print 100,000 copies and the latter 35,000 copies. In March also, circulation figures for the 31 U.S. licensed German newspapers reached 4,293,600 copies.35

In April, a change was made in ICD’s policy of licensing but one newspaper in each city when a second paper was established in Frankfurt. On 15 April the Frankfurter Neue Presse, with an initial circulation of 50,000 copies, began publishing twice weekly in competition with the Frankfurter Rundschau. The new policy called for licensing second newspapers in all cities with populations of 100,000 or more. However, Frankfurt was the only city to have two such newspapers by the end of June 1946.

In addition to the Frankfurter Neue Presse, the Fraenkische Landiszeitung in Ansbach also received its license in April. It began publishing on 24 April with a circulation of 60,000 copies.

Two more newspapers, both in Bavaria, were added to the list in May to bring the total number of U.S. licensed newspapers to 35 by 1 July 1946, at which time ICD considered the first phase of the licensing program virtually completed except for second newspapers in Munich and Stuttgart. The Suedost Kurier in Bad Reichenhall received its license on 10 May and started with a circulation of 60,000 copies. While Der Neue Tag in Weiden received its license on 31 May, actual publication did not begin until June. Its initial circulation was set at 55,000 copies.

While all U.S. licensed German newspapers were considered potentially as

35 Figure does not include Die Neue Zeitung.
daily papers, the constant factor of short supply in newsprint prevented all except *Der Tagesspiegel* in Berlin from appearing more than two to four times a week. The roster of licensed newspapers in the U.S.-occupied areas of Germany on 30 June 1946 showed 19 newspapers in Bavaria, 9 in Greater Hesse, 5 in Wuerttemberg-Baden, and 1 each in Bremen and Berlin, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Name of Newspaper</th>
<th>Licensed</th>
<th>Circulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAVARIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Ansbach</td>
<td>Fraenkische Landeszeitung</td>
<td>24 Apr 46</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Aschaffenburg</td>
<td>Main Echo</td>
<td>24 Nov 45</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Augsburg</td>
<td>Schwaebische Landeszeitung</td>
<td>30 Oct 45</td>
<td>199,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bad Reichenhall</td>
<td>Sudost Kurier</td>
<td>10 May 46</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Bamberg</td>
<td>Fraenkischer Tag</td>
<td>08 Jan 46</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Bayreuth</td>
<td>Fraenkische Presse</td>
<td>18 Dec 45</td>
<td>73,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Coburg</td>
<td>Neue Presse</td>
<td>25 Jan 46</td>
<td>65,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Garmisch-Partenkirchen</td>
<td>Hochland Bote</td>
<td>08 Oct 45</td>
<td>42,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Hof</td>
<td>Frankenpost</td>
<td>12 Oct 45</td>
<td>106,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Ingolstadt</td>
<td>Donau Kurier</td>
<td>11 Dec 45</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Kempten</td>
<td>Der allgaeuer</td>
<td>13 Dec 45</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Landshut</td>
<td>Isar Post</td>
<td>15 Jan 46</td>
<td>70,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Munich</td>
<td>Suddeutsche Zeitung</td>
<td>06 Oct 45</td>
<td>410,000</td>
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<td>14. Nuremberg</td>
<td>Nuernberger Nachrichten</td>
<td>11 Oct 45</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Passau</td>
<td>Passauer Neue Presse</td>
<td>05 Feb 46</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
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<td>16. Regensburg</td>
<td>Mittelbayerische Zeitung</td>
<td>23 Oct 45</td>
<td>200,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Rosenheim</td>
<td>Oberbayerisches Volksblatt</td>
<td>26 Oct 45</td>
<td>40,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Weiden</td>
<td>Der Neue Tag</td>
<td>31 May 46</td>
<td>60,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Wuerzburg</td>
<td>Main Post</td>
<td>24 Nov 45</td>
<td>103,100</td>
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<td>1. Darmstadt</td>
<td>Darmstaedter Echo</td>
<td>17 Nov 45</td>
<td>70,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Frankfurt</td>
<td>Frankfurter Neue Presse</td>
<td>15 Apr 46</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Frankfurt</td>
<td>Frankfurter Rundschau</td>
<td>31 Jul 45</td>
<td>250,000</td>
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<td>4. Fulda</td>
<td>Fuldaer Volkszeitung</td>
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<td>5. Giessen</td>
<td>Giessener Freie Presse</td>
<td>02 Jan 46</td>
<td>20,000</td>
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<td>6. Kassel</td>
<td>Hessische Nachrichten</td>
<td>26 Sep 45</td>
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<td>7. Marburg</td>
<td>Marburger Presse</td>
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<td>40,000</td>
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<td>8. Wetzlar</td>
<td>Wetzlarer Neue Zeitung</td>
<td>02 Jan 46</td>
<td>22,500</td>
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<td>9. Wiesbaden</td>
<td>Wiesbadener Kurier</td>
<td>01 Oct 45</td>
<td>92,500</td>
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<td>WUERTTEMBER-BADEN:</td>
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<td>Rhein-Neckar Zeitung</td>
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<td>2. Heilbronn</td>
<td>Heilbronner Stimme</td>
<td>28 Mar 46</td>
<td>38,600</td>
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<td>3. Karlsruhe</td>
<td>Badische Neueste Nachrichten</td>
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<td>92,000</td>
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<td>4. Stuttgart</td>
<td>Stuttgarter Zeitung</td>
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<td>5. Ulm</td>
<td>Schwaebsiche Donau Zeitung</td>
<td>10 Nov 45</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Berlin</td>
<td></td>
<td>27 Sep 45</td>
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<td>2. Bremen</td>
<td>Der Tagesspiegel</td>
<td>15 Sep 45</td>
<td>153,000</td>
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<td>35 [Newspapers]</td>
<td>Weser Kurier</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,177,20</td>
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</table>
6. Policy

Information Control never imposed pre-publication censorship on the German press. Each licensed publisher was required to conform with instructions laid down in Information Control Policy Instruction No. 2, issued 4 September 1945. These instructions were broad in aspect and were based on the Potsdam Agreement which stipulated that “subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted.”

The only restrictions placed on the Germans by Policy Instruction No. 2, therefore, were those which prohibited “the propagation of National Socialist or related Völkisch ideas including racism and race hatred; any Fascist or anti-democratic ideas; any militarist ideas, including pan-Germanism and German imperialism; or any attempt to create division between or to further disrespect for the Allied occupying powers or the United Nations.”

Likewise, no “critical discussion of announced Military Government policies, and no criticism of Allied Military Government officials” was permitted. Nothing could be published that violated military security, incited to riot or resistance, or jeopardized the safety of the occupying troops. These instructions required that all material published, except purely objective or factual material, bear the name of the author, and that the source of all news, except local reporting, be clearly identified. Due to the shortage of printing facilities and printing supplies, licensed publishers were instructed to insure that fair opportunity was given to the principal political groups in
their localities for the expression of their various points of view.

While pre-publication censorship was not practised in the U.S. areas of occupation, post-publication scrutiny was imposed by Press Control officers for the purpose of correcting journalistic errors, improving standards, and insuring that licensed newspapers stayed within the bounds of policy directives. Violations during the first year of operation were minor ones for the most part, and usually concerned failure to separate news reports and editorial comment, failure to indicate the source of a news item, or failure to identify political hand-outs as such. Most mistakes could be attributed to poor judgment rather than wilful intent on the part of the publishers. Press Control officers frequently found it more necessary to advise on news policy and news treatment, and particularly on space allocation and make-up.

U.S. Military Government preferred an independent press in its areas of occupation and as a policy was opposed to the establishment of a political party press. Information Control, therefore, took steps to insure that all political parties recognized on a Land level were given opportunity for expression in the licensed press. Steps also were taken to protect publishers and the new German press from pressure groups and thus help insure against a resurgence of Nazism, militarism or racism. Political parties in the U.S.-occupied areas had been given automatic licenses to publish handbills and posters under Information Control Instruction No. 2, issued 2 November 1945 by USFET.36

While German publishers and editors were screened carefully by ICD to

36 See Part I, par. 7.
insure that they were anti-Nazi and pro-democratic, their publications by 30 June 1946 were beginning to reflect emerging differences of political thought. The majority of the licensed papers maintained a moderate tone, but both left-of-center and right-of-center newspapers were becoming recognizable. This was considered an indication of coming maturity rather than a criticism of the new German press.

From the very beginning of the licensing program, plans were made to institute measures which would insure the financial and operational stability of the licensed newspapers. After long negotiations with Property Control, agreement was finally obtained early in 1946 for approval of 15-year leases on plants occupied by the newspapers where no voluntary agreement could be reached between owners of the plants and the licensees. At the same time, ICD set up a fund into which the licensed papers paid 20 percent of gross receipts to provide funds which eventually would be used to replace presses and other printing equipment and provide plants which licensees could own.

7. Press Organizations

On 20 October 1945, some 45 licensed publishers and editors representing 11 newspapers in the Western Military District held a conference at Marburg.³⁷ At this conference plans were made for the reestablishment of publishers' and editors' associations such as existed in Germany prior to Hitler's rise. This was a significant event for the German press as it marked the first time in 12 years that German

³⁷ Although Press Control officers had called the meeting, they attended it only as spectators and advisers.
newspapermen had assembled to discuss freely their mutual problems and policies.

On the second day of the conference, the group was joined by representative publishers from the Eastern Military District and attention was devoted to ways of developing the German news service, DANA, and to training of young journalists.

Following the Marburg conference, Bavarian newspaper publishers met at Garmisch-Partenkirchen on 17 November to discuss with U.S. Press Control officers plans for a Land press association. This resulted two days later in the Bavarian Publishers Association whose constitution and by-laws were approved by Military Government on 5 December.

Similar associations were formed in April and May 1946 by publishers of newspapers in Greater Hesse and Wuerttemberg-Baden. The League of Greater Hesse Newspaper Publishers was formalized 9 May at Fulda, after a preliminary meeting had been held on 7 April to draw up by-laws. Publishers in Wuerttemberg-Baden formed their association on 6 May at Stuttgart. By the end of June, these three publishers' groups had assumed responsibility for dealing with a number of matters which formerly had been referred to Military Government. Each association held meetings at intervals to which Information Control officers were invited to participate, and as a result the German press was increasingly able to solve many of its own problems.

8. The German News Service (DANA)

On 29 June 1945, two U.S. Army lieutenants and four enlisted men,
along with seven OWI civilians, were sent to Bad Nauheim\textsuperscript{38} by PWD/SHAEF to lay the foundation for a German news service. The development of this news service is comparable to the development of the German press as its mission was to provide news for both overt and licensed newspapers in Germany. The news service's first licensed client was the \textit{Frankfurter Rundschau}.

Although service to newspapers was slow and incomplete at first, hampered as the news agency was by insufficient personnel, transportation and communications, by mid-August a German Desk had been established parallel to the English Desk and was translating the news file into German and servicing it by courier to German newspapers. Correspondents had been sent to Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich and Wiesbaden to open bureaus, and to find and train German staffs.

From the start DANA sought to recruit young people with a family or personal background of anti-Nazi activity and to train them in news operations, in preference to employing veteran journalists who, although not Party members, had worked on Third Reich newspapers and perhaps compromised political principles in order to retain jobs. Thus DANA became as much a journalism school as a news agency, with on-the-job study of news techniques, economics, history and related subjects. The average age of the DANA staff was only 26.5 years.

Until early September, processed world news reached Germany through the Allied Press Service in London, but with the dissolution of SHAEF the Allied Press

\textsuperscript{38} Bad Nauheim was selected because it was a communications center where teletype circuits and other communications equipment had been centered by the Nazi Ministry of Propaganda following the severe bombing of Berlin. It was also the location of the central office for the U.S. Army-published (overt) newspapers, and of press and radio facilities of the 12th Army Group.
Service was discontinued on 6 September and its functions assumed by the U.S. Press Service in Luxembourg. At the same time the German news service adopted the name DANA (*Deutsche Allgemeine Nachrichten Agentur*) and began full-fledged operations with its own *Hellschreiber* transmissions to licensed and overt newspapers and radio stations in U.S.-occupied areas of Germany and Austria. A file of world news in German was received by DANA from Luxembourg by teletype, and in turn DANA's English file was sent to Luxembourg for transmission to the OWI news bureau in New York. A by-product of DANA's news file was *News of Germany*, a small four-page newspaper in English, published three times a week for official use.

When the U.S. Army returned Radio Luxembourg to the Duchy of Luxembourg on 11 November 1945, Bad Nauheim and DANA became the center of news operations. In addition to staff reporters writing for DANA directly, local copy flowed in from the various licensed newspapers and operating radio stations. Wherever a newspaper was licensed, the DISCC representative with that newspaper was instructed to make firm arrangements with whatever communications existed in the area for filing news copy to Bad Nauheim.

In addition to its news bureau in Bad Nauheim, ICD also established a photo section in Frankfurt. News pictures in Germany were covered by German staff photographers, and in addition photos taken by U.S. Signal Corps cameramen were also made available to the section. Pictures of world-wide interest were procured

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39 German-type radio teleprinter. A mobile 20 kilowatt long-wave *Wehrmacht* transmitter was first used by DANA for *Hellschreiber* transmissions of news to DANA clients. Oddly enough, this was the same transmitter used by the Nazis to “jam” Radio Luxembourg after that station had been taken by the Allied Forces. The transmitter was captured from the Germans by the 12th Armored Division near Stuttgart.
from New York, London and Paris in addition to the OWI and PWD photo files.

By the end of December 1945, DANA was employing some 180 persons of whom about 130 were Germans who had been hired and trained by DANA. It had permanent bureaus set up in Frankfurt, Munich, Stuttgart, Wiesbaden and Nuremberg, all linked by teletype with the main office in Bad Nauheim. Arrangements had been made also with British, French and Soviet authorities for an exchange of news with all Zones of Germany, and with US authorities in Salzburg for news of Austria. In addition to supplying its 34 customers, including both newspapers and radio stations, with an average of 15,000 words of world and domestic news daily, DANA's feature desk was producing an average of four features daily, and its photo section was processing over 2,000 prints and approximately 50 negatives each week.

The goal of DANA news writing was defined as presenting an accurate, concise, swift and non-partisan factual report with the principal facts clearly stated at the outset in “lead” style. With this departure from traditional mixtures of news and commentary, the expression of opinion on news events was left exclusively to the editors of individual newspapers.

During December also, an interim arrangement was made with the three major U.S. press services 40 whereby DANA received a world news file from each agency in exchange for DANA's file of German news. A similar exchange of news coverage was arranged also with the overseas edition of the *New York Times* and *Herald Tribune*. The U.S. press services agreed that so long as DANA was operated

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by ICD, they would furnish their services directly to DANA and would not enter into any negotiations or contracts with individual German newspapers.

With the dissolution of the Military Districts in January 1946, the administration of DANA passed from the 6840th Theater Information Services Control Command (TISCC) to the Information Control Division of OMG Greater Hesse. In this same period of change, the emphasis of the DANA press control staff shifted from the preparation and supervision of the daily news file to readying DANA for operation by Germans. ICD's plans from the beginning had been to operate the German news services only until such time it could be turned over to German control by licensing. On 20 October 1945, representatives of each of the licensed newspapers that DANA served met at Marburg and selected a provisional board of directors for DANA. On 10 November, these representatives met at Heidelberg and elected an executive committee of three members to plan the organization and draft a charter.

At this point it appeared that licensing DANA as a German controlled and German operated cooperative enterprise could be accomplished within a comparatively short time. However, a number of legal and technical problems arose which prevented such a license being issued during DANA's first year of operation.41 It developed that some amendment to the US. Trading with the Enemy Act would be necessary to permit DANA to subscribe to non-German news agencies; that some arrangement would have to be made for accrediting German news correspondents; that new interpretations would have to be given to existing German law to govern a

41 DANA licensed 26 October 1946.
cooperative news gathering agency, which was something new in Germany; and that some method of transferring U.S. Army equipment to DANA would have to be worked out, and that special teletype circuits would have to be installed by the German Deutsches Post for the exclusive use of DANA, replacing U.S. Signal Corps lines.

By 30 June 1946, most of these difficulties had been resolved, and licensed publishers had made arrangements to assume collective responsibility for DANA and to operate it as a voluntary, cooperative news gathering enterprise along the lines of the Associated Press in the United States. A charter, based on principles of similar press associations in the United States, Holland and France, had been submitted to OMGUS authorities for approval. Communications had been transferred from Signal Corps to Deutsches Post, and U.S. equipment had been replaced by German equipment to the extent that less than 15% of DANA's communications were being handled through Army channels; in fact, plans were complete for early establishment of German facilities exclusively. However, DANA was still under direct supervision of U.S. Press Control officers and was still subjected to pre-transmission scrutiny.

As the first half of 1946 ended, DANA was faced with the possible loss of its prime sources for world news. Under special licenses issued by the U.S. Treasury Department, U.S. individuals and firms selling news could now offer their services direct to licensed newspaper publishers in Germany. German newspapers received their first news under this arrangement on 29 June from the Associated Press. DANA was still in a strong position, however, having made purchase agreements with the International News Service and the British Reuters for their world news files, and had
a professional and technical staff of some 320 Germans providing DANA's 35 newspaper clients, five radio stations and *Die Neue Zeitung* with more than 22,000 words of news daily, supplemented by 20 features and nearly 10,000 photo prints weekly.

9. Newspapers for Displaced Persons

When the Allies liberated the many displaced persons in Germany, some means of supplying them with information was considered essential. At first, during the SHAEF period, multi-lingual leaflets were distributed by the Psychological Warfare Division. These were later replaced by a quadri-lingual42 newspaper called *SHAEF*.

When the Information Control Division assumed from PWD/SHAEF the responsibility for newspapers for displaced persons, most of ICD's efforts were concentrated upon newspapers published in Polish. *SHAEF* had been discontinued on 10 July 1945, and during its brief existence, more than 2,500,000 copies had been distributed. French displaced persons and prisoners of war had received their news through a French language newspaper, *Retour*, which began publication on 13 May 1945 and, like SHAEF, was discontinued in early July 1945.

ICD's concentration on Polish weekly newspapers was due to the fact that the Poles constituted the largest single national group of displaced persons in the U.S. Zone. Most of the effort of the Displaced Persons Section, which published these papers, was directed to the *Maly Polak* and the *Tygodnik Polski*. The *Maly Polak* was

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42 English, French, Russian and German.
primarily for the 20,000 Polish children scattered throughout the U.S. Zone, many of them separated from their parents. The *Maly Polak* began publication on 21 July 1945 and its pages contained instructional reading matter, children's poems, comic drawings, fables and other suitable material for the huge task of rehabilitating these children, most of whom had been denied access to schools with the result that their education was retarded. The *Tygodnik Polski*, for adults, had a weekly circulation of 85,000 copies, while the children's weekly circulated about 20,000 copies. Responsibility for the actual distribution of the papers was assumed by UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration). The copies were delivered by ICD to the four big UNFFA centers at Hanau, Munich, Karlsruhe and Nuremberg.

Interest in newspapers for displaced persons was indicated by the large number of requests received by the DISCCs from various groups requesting authorization to publish newspapers, magazines and pamphlets. Military Government officials in charge of DP camps frequently emphasized the need for such publications. However, ICD had neither the linguists nor the staff necessary to supervise the operations of such publications, nor to scrutinize the personnel and printed products of such groups. ICD was faced also with the necessity of safeguarding the available supply of newsprint, of which there was a constant shortage.

As a result, ICD disclaimed any responsibility for the DP areas other than issuing the necessary policy directives, leaving it to the military commanders of such camps, UNRRA officials, G-2 and other interested agencies to screen the publishers, scrutinize their products for violations of Military Government policies and to control
10. Die Neue Zeitung

Die Neue Zeitung was established in October 1945 for circulation throughout the U.S. occupied areas of Germany as the official voice of Military Government. Published twice weekly, it was directed to bring the American point of view to German readers and to serve as an example of the best in American journalism for the new German press.

Die Neue Zeitung, an outgrowth of the Psychological Warfare activities of the U.S. Twelfth Army Group, was founded by Major Hans Habe,\textsuperscript{43} former managing editor of a Viennese newspaper. It occupied a unique place among the overt newspapers established by the U.S. Army as it was never intended that Die Neue Zeitung should suspend publication when German newspapers were licensed; rather it was to continue as a medium through which Military Government could address the German people. Its aims and policies as enunciated by General Dwight D. Eisenhower in the first issue were:

First: As distinguished from those German newspapers which are now published by German publishers and which represent the beginning of a free press in Germany, Die Neue Zeitung will be an official organ of the American authorities. Its circulation will not be restricted to any given area; rather, it will be circulated throughout the U.S. occupied zone, thus linking all sections.

Second: Die Neue Zeitung, as an American newspaper published in

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\textsuperscript{43} Later succeeded by Major Hans Wallenberg, formerly on the staff of the Berlin \textit{Vossische Zeitung} and a member of the Ullstein Verlag, largest publishing house in Germany prior to 1933. Major Wallenberg came to \textit{Die Neue Zeitung} from another U.S. Army overt newspaper, the \textit{Allgemeine Zeitung} published in Berlin.
German language, will set an example for the new German press through the objectivity of its reporting, through unconditional devotion to truth in its articles, and through high journalistic standards.

Third: Through its emphasis on the affairs of the world, *Die Neue Zeitung* will widen the view of the German reader by giving him facts which were suppressed in Germany during the twelve years of National Socialistic rule.

Fourth: *Die Neue Zeitung* will be a factor in demonstrating to the German people the necessity of the tasks which lie ahead of them. These tasks include self-help, the elimination of Nazism and militarism from the German mind, and the active de-Nazification of German government and business.

The first issue appeared on 18 October, the masthead proclaiming it the “American Newspaper for the German people.” For the first few issues the circulation was 500,000 copies. Its reception by the German readers was termed “enthusiastic” by many dealers, most of whom had waiting lists of those who desired copies. By the end of December 1945, the circulation of *Die Neue Zeitung* reached 1,300,000 copies, and in January 1946, an additional 200,000 was added for Berlin where the demand outran the supply.

In February 1946, *Die Neue Zeitung* reached its greatest circulation, 1,600,000 copies. At this point its circulation was restricted to approximately 1,500,000 copies because of the newsprint shortage. At this figure all copies were usually sold within the first day it appeared on sale. Reports from dealers indicated

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46 OMGUS, ICD Functional Annex to the Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No. 7 (20 Feb 46), Press, p. 3.
that *Die Neue Zeitung* could sell 3,000,000 copies without any solicitation if circulation restrictions were lifted. Distribution of the paper was made through some 54 main dealers located in the larger cities of the U.S. Zone, Berlin, and Bremen. Selling for 20 pfennigs a copy, it grossed approximately 2,000,000 RM per month for the U.S. Army. *Die Neue Zeitung* was published by the Publishing Operations Branch of ICD (OMGB), and like the overt magazine, *Die Amerikanische Rundschau, Heute*, and *Neue Auslese*, was printed in Munich. The editor of *Die Neue Zeitung* also acted as chief of the Publishing Operations Branch.

In its early period, *Die Neue Zeitung* received its international news through the Allied Press Service, the British Broadcasting Company, and OWI. The use of U.S. news services such as the Associated Press, the United Press, and the International News Service, was excluded at that time. To accomplish its mission, the Publishing Operations Branch established and maintained a net of special correspondents in centers of Military Government activity for the purpose of insuring proper coverage for its overt publications. Even after DANA, the German news agency, was well established for the collection and dissemination of news in Germany, this net of special correspondents was continued.

*Die Neue Zeitung* itself maintained a monitoring section which covered all main sources of news available to Europe such as Associated Press, United Press, Reuters, Radio Moscow, and Tass, among others, and was thus able to balance its own coverage against what Germans might learn from other news sources. While *Die Neue Zeitung* did not officially employ correspondents in countries outside Germany, it
frequently carried articles written especially for its pages by writers in the United States and Great Britain.

*Die Neue Zeitung* did not compete economically with U.S. licensed German newspapers since it carried no advertising. Relieved of this economic responsibility, the paper was able to devote its entire energies to fulfilling its primary mission in the field of Information Control, that of assisting in the reestablishment of a strong, free and democratic press in Germany. It was also relieved of the responsibility of attempting to be popular with its German readers. General Eisenhower, in outlining the mission of *Die Neue Zeitung*, stated:

> While popularity with the German readers is desirable, it is not the chief test whether *Die Neue Zeitung* is carrying out its mission. As the official newspaper of the American Government in Germany and as spokesman for the American point of view on German and world affairs, it may be desirable and necessary at times to risk unpopularity.\(^48\)

Public opinion surveys conducted by ICD's Intelligence Branch showed that *Die Neue Zeitung* was popular with its German readers and was being widely read. Of those sampled in January 1946, approximately 50% indicated they read this newspaper, and it was known that copies were passed from person to person, a single copy often being read by as many as five readers. Many readers said they considered *Die Neue Zeitung* qualitatively better than other newspapers being published in the U.S. occupied areas, and a majority indicated they were satisfied with its balance and presentation of the news. By the end of June 1946, the proportionate number of readers decreased as the number of licensed German newspapers

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increased. Where German readers read more than one newspaper, *Die Neue Zeitung* was usually their choice after their desire for local news had been met by the local newspaper.
CHAPTER 2 -- PUBLICATIONS CONTROL

1. Introduction

Military Government regarded the field of publications as a highly important means of reeducating Germany. Generally, it was considered that books exerted a greater influence in Germany than in the United States, and did more to mold public opinion than newspapers and periodicals. The Germans were always avid readers and books had long played an important part in German life among all classes. Extensive private libraries were owned by many middle-class families, and few German homes were without their shelves of books. Normally, Germany published more books, both titles and number of copies, than the United States.

Book selling and book publishing were highly organized in Germany long before the Nazis came into power. Leipzig was the center of the entire German book trade, while Stuttgart was the regional center for Southwestern Germany. Berlin, with its many governmental departments and educational institutions, was also an important center. Unlike U.S. publishing firms, general publishers were the exception in Germany; most German publishers specialized in definite fields, such as fiction, art, politics, philosophy and religion, history, science and the humanities, law and economics, medicine, and children's books.

In addition to books available through book publishers and book dealers, there were also some 2,650 lending libraries in Germany, about 21,000 people's

49 Before the war, the average number of different titles published annually in Germany was 17,000, as against an average of about 9,000 in the United States with twice the German population.
libraries (*Volksbuecherein*) and some 15,000 factory libraries, as well as a large number of scholarly and scientific reference libraries under State and municipal control.

In the Nazi control of the German book trade, all important features of the pre-1933 structure were maintained. Both State and Party apparently found it a convenient and smooth-functioning organization. However, all personalities objectionable to the National Socialist regime on political and racial grounds were eliminated and replaced by Nazis. Information Control thus faced the same difficult problem of finding acceptable Germans for licensing as publishers and registering as printers, book dealers, publications distributors and operators of lending libraries, as it experienced in reviving other German information services, particularly the German press.

Normally about 500 publishers were located in that part of Germany which became the U.S. Zone of occupation. About half of these published trade organs, telephone directories, railroad guides, calendars, and other items for which the immediate postwar need was far below normal. The remaining 250 publishers were engaged in meeting the demands of the general reader for informational and inspirational books, magazines and pamphlets, and the demands of others for scientific, professional and educational publications, including textbooks. The immediate postwar demand for publications of the general type was far above normal because of the enormous losses which public and private book collections had suffered during the war.
The number of qualified German publishers with clear political records was exceedingly small at the beginning of the occupation. Other factors arising from bomb-damage and war-destruction to printing plants and equipment and to existing stocks of books and printing paper greatly complicated the task of reestablishing the publishing industry in Germany. The most serious difficulty was the serious shortage of book papers.

2. Mission and Principal Tasks

Publications Control, according to Military Government Regulations, included “control of the management, production, contents, and distribution of all books, pamphlets, magazines, and periodicals, and the control of the activities or operation of all commercial lending libraries” in the U.S.-occupied areas of Germany. Its principal tasks were “to find and recommend suitable Germans to be licensed as publishers, to prevent the circulation of objectionable literature, and to control and guide the reconstitution of the German publishing industry.”

Information Control officers charged with the control of publications faced six major responsibilities: (1) Preparation and execution of policies governing German periodicals and book publishing activities; (2) control of the constitution of German book trades and publishing agencies; (3) policy and supervisory functions incident to the publishing of magazines by U.S. Military Government for German readers; (4) policy and guidance functions involved in the translation and publication

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50 MGR, Title 21, C-2 (27 May 46), 21-400
51 Ibid, 21-401
52 A Basic Information on Publications Control Branch,” prepared by Chief of Publications Control Branch for Director of ODIC (21 Nov 46)
in Germany of books and magazine articles by U.S. authors, and in the commercial
distribution in Germany of approved U.S. magazines, in either English or German
language; (5) guidance of German publishers in the production of books and
magazines considered effective in the democratic reeducation of Germany; and (6)
stimulating German publishers of items considered essential to Military Government.

As with all other German information media, the task of Publications Control
was divided into three phases. In the first phase, the publication of books,
magazines, pamphlets and the like, was prohibited. In the second phase, Allied
publications such as overt magazines and approved books were distributed to help
meet the need for reading matter, and at the same time existing stocks of German
publications were screened to purge them of Nazi and militaristic items. In the third
and final phase, publications were to be returned to German control as rapidly as
acceptable Germans were found for licensing and registration.

3. Licensing and Registration

Policies governing the licensing of publishers in the U.S., British and Soviet
Zones varied considerably. The U.S. procedure emphasized the selection of
politically pure, democratic-minded Germans upon whom responsibility could be
placed for producing publications that would meet the approval of Military
Government. The British placed about equal stress on the applicant's political record
and his ability to produce desirable publications; while the Soviets stressed

53 Military Government Law No. 191
production only, and permitted almost any type of applicant to publish if his
publications passed the censor before being released to the public.

As a result of these differences in policy, publishers in the Soviet Zone were
well ahead in the matter of initial production, but were faced with the problem of
constant inspection and censorship. In the U.S. Zone production was slow to start,
but once started the U.S. policy proved increasingly justified by the greater self
reliance and initiative shown by the German licensees. The British program held a
middle position between the U.S. and Soviet plans.

The first publishing license issued in the U.S. Zone was granted in Bavaria
on 13 July 1945 to representatives of four religious denominations in the Munich
areas, authorizing them to publish catechisms, hymnbooks and other religious
literature. On 16 July 1945, the first license in Wuerttemberg-Baden was issued to
a Heidelberg publisher who desired to publish works of general interest. The
second licensee was G. K. Schauer, publisher of the Boersenblatt (see par. 7,
below).

By October 1945, only 10 licenses had been granted to German publishers
in the U.S.-occupied areas, but some 300 applications in the Eastern Military District,
about 450 in the Western Military District, and nearly 200 in the U.S. Sector of
Berlin, were being processed. Stringent application of denazification policies made
the number of acceptable applicants small.

54 Information Control functional Annex to the Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No. 1 (20
Aug 45), Publications, p. 5.
55 Hermann Meister
56 High on this list was the "Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin."
57 Boersenblatt für den deutschen Buchhandel, official book trade paper for German bookdealers and
publishers in the U.S. Zone.
Registration of book dealers also was started soon after the occupation began, and by July 1945 a considerable number of book shops had opened. By mid-August approximately 1200 had been registered in the Western Military District, while registration in the U.S. Sector of Berlin was considered practically complete, with lending libraries outnumbering book shops three to two. A shortage of application forms in the Eastern Military District had slowed registration there.

By the end of September 1945, over 3,000 book dealers had been registered in the U.S. Zone and Berlin. However, when their shelves had been cleared of Nazi literature, there was little left. Intensification of the denazification program at this time withdrew a number of registrations already granted. In Frankfurt alone, over 100 lost their registrations for political reasons.

In October 1945, after licensing authority had been delegated to the DISCCs,\(^{58}\) processing of applications was speeded up and 25 licenses were issued that month to bring the total to 35, a figure slightly higher than that reported in the British Zone. Registration of book dealers neared completion with over 4,000 receipts issued by this date.

During November, the number of U.S. licensed publishers jumped from 35 to 69, and a small but promising stream of magazines and books now began to come from the German presses. Registration of printers, book dealers and distributors of publications totalled 4,483. By the end of 1945, the total number of licensed publishers in the U.S. Zone, Berlin and Bremen was 91.

\(^{58}\) Letter, HQ, USFET, File AG 014.1 BIC-AGO, subject: Decentralization of Newspaper Licensing (11 Sep 45).
In the first quarter of 1946, licensing and registration continued more rapidly. The number of U.S. licensed book and magazine publishers reached 132 in January, and by the end of February the total was 168. Some 227 publications, including 47 periodicals, had been published and approximately 250 additional books and pamphlets were in type awaiting paper stock on which they could be printed.

In March 1946, the continued shortage of book paper caused Information Control to limit the licensing of publishers to certain categories. Field units were instructed to recommend only publishers who planned to concentrate on primary educational subjects such as current German problems, science and religion, and in particular those applicants who would consider the needs of women, youth, workers and intellectual groups. However, despite these restrictions, 47 new licenses were issued in March.

By 30 June 1946, Information Control had issued 243 publishing licenses, and 7,827 registrations had been acted upon or were pending. As far as production was concerned, 729 books and pamphlets had been published by this date, and 128 periodicals were being printed in the U.S.-occupied areas of Germany.59

In June also, recognized labor unions in the U.S. Zone received permission to publish pamphlets and trade journals without being licensed.60 This authorization did not include the publication of newspapers containing other than trade union news, and thus was similar to publishing permits automatically granted to recognized political parties and to religious organizations. In view of the critical

60 Letter, File AG-ODIC 461. (PuB), subject: Trade Union Journals (29 May 46)
shortage of paper, limitations as to size, circulation and frequency of issue were imposed upon all such publications.

4. Overt Magazines

Because the number of acceptable German publishers was so small at the beginning of the occupation, many of those licensed during the first few months were both inexperienced and slow to produce periodicals of good quality and effectiveness. To help fill the partial vacuum caused by the immediate suspension of all German publishing activities and the lag in new production, three overt publications were issued under U.S. and Allied auspices for distribution in Germany.

The first of these to appear was Die Amerikanische Rundschau (American Review), a magazine devoted to presenting American life to the Germans. The first issue went on sale in Berlin on 20 August 1945. One hundred thousand copies were printed for the U.S.-occupied areas, and an additional 50,000 copies were exchanged with the British for an equal number of their magazine Ausblick.61

The Rundschau carried material by U.S. authors only, and the articles were general in character. The first issue carried contributions by Archibald MacLeish, Stephen Vincent Benet, and Joseph Wood Krutch, among others. German readers of high intellectual levels praised the Rundschau and welcomed it as the first uncolored presentation of trends in American cultural life they had been permitted to read in more than a decade.

61 Published by the British for prisoners of war in the United Kingdom.
The second issue which appeared in October 1945, carried an article on Thomas Paine by Ralph C. Roper, a story by William Saroyan, an essay on Carl Schurz by the late Wendell Wilkie, and Arthur M. Schlesinger's “The American Character.” On the whole, the *Rundschau* was sober in tone and calculated to appeal to the German intellectual elite. The material was prepared by the Office of War Information (OWI) in New York and transmitted to Information Control. The first two issues were both prepared and published in New York, but beginning with the third issue, which appeared in December 1945, the material was forwarded to Germany in English and there translated and published, the actual printing taking place in Munich.

The British *Ausblick* was lighter in tone than the *Rundschau*; its articles were shorter and the subject matter more topical. Humor and cartoons were used to balance the heavy articles. However, the *Ausblick* was short-lived, and after its third issue merged its efforts with the joint U.S.-British publication, *Neue Auslese* (New Digest).

The *Neue Auslese* was planned as a *Reader's Digest*-type of magazine. It had a much wider appeal than the *Rundschau*, and carried articles not only by U.S. authors, but also by French, British and Russian writers. The first issue appeared in October 1945 and featured George Bernard Shaw, Justice Robert H. Jackson, John Lardner and the poet Paul Valery among its contributors. Several drawings by Kaethe Kollwitz were included.

The second issue appeared in November 1945 and contained articles
reprinted from *Harper's, Saturday Evening Post, New Statesman, Nation* and *La France Libre*. British Prime Minister Attlee, D.W. Brogan and J.B. Priestley were among the contributors to this issue. The third issue, December 1945, contained short stories by the Soviet writer Valentin Katajew, William Saroyan and Irwin Shaw, as well as an essay on the Church by the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Material for *Neue Auslese* was prepared in London by a joint Anglo-American editorial board, consisting on the U.S. side of members of OWI’s London staff. After the first issue, Information Control took steps to have the material brought to its Bad Homburg headquarters for discussion and policy clearance. By the end of 1945, an American Zone edition of *Neue Auslese* was being printed by the Publishing Operations Branch in Munich and a British Zone edition was printed in Hamburg, although the publication continued as an Anglo-American enterprise with its main editorial office in London.

The third overt periodical was *Heute* (Today), an illustrated magazine somewhat like *LIFE* or *LOOK*, which stressed the American point of view in its articles and pictures. Conceived and planned by the Publications Division of OWI, the first number was produced in London early in the summer of 1945. However, distribution in Germany was delayed until mid-September by a lack of transport facilities between London and Germany. It first went on sale in Berlin on 14 September and the supply was exhausted almost within the first hour. It sold for one mark per copy and the initial circulation was 50,000 copies.

62 First editor was Robert Hatch, publisher of OWI’s magazines *Voie* and *Kijk*, succeeded by Heinz Norden in May 1946.
The first issue carried articles dealing with concentration camps, the labor movement, German destruction in Holland, U.S. lend-lease, the role of British women in the war, and the Crimea Conference held during the preceding February. Illustrations included President Roosevelt shaking hands with British Prime Minister Churchill aboard the Prince of Wales where the Atlantic Charter was drawn up in August 1941; the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1943; fighting in Stalingrad, and pictures of the war with Japan in the Pacific. All reflected the “austerity” directive under which OWI was operating at the time.

The second edition, which was also prepared and printed in London, was placed on sale in October and had as its central theme the end of the war, the Potsdam Conference and the United Nations meeting in San Francisco. Other articles dealt with penicillin, the threat of hunger in Europe, and the atomic bomb. In a lighter vein was an article on the new opera “Peter Grimes” by the young English composer Benjamin Britten.

A preliminary survey of public reaction to *Heute* indicated that more than half its German readers were disappointed by the stressing of war themes, while many objected to the fact that most of the material was already familiar through the newsreel and the press. The excellent format, attractive appearance, and modern make-up rather than the contents appeared to explain *Heute*’s sales appeal.

The third issue showed a remarkable improvement when it appeared in December 1945. The staff meanwhile had moved to Bad Nauheim and brought the material prepared in London. Printing of the third and subsequent issues was done
in Munich. In the third issue the themes were not so austere, the contents more timely, and the general tone was brighter. Highlighted was the meeting of International Congress of Trade Unions, the 1945 Salzburg Music Festival and the new Labor Government of Great Britain.

Circulation figures for all three periodicals were determined by the available supply of paper rather than reader-demand. At the end of June 1946, Heute was being published twice monthly with a circulation of 400,000 copies per issue; Neue Auslese was appearing monthly with a circulation of 260,000 copies, and Die Amerikanische Rundschau was being published once every two months with a circulation of 150,000 copies. None of the overt publications carried advertising and in that sense were not in competition with the licensed German publications; all sought to be self-sustaining through sales. Except for the first few issues, Heute was published and all three periodicals were printed in Munich, the printing being done in the plant formerly used by the Nazis for their Party organ, Der Voelkische Beobachter.

While overall policy for overt publications was determined by the Information Control Division of OMGUS, actual preparation, printing and distribution of these official periodicals was the responsibility of the Publishing Operations Branch of the Information Control Division OMGB (Office of Military Government for Bavaria). In addition to Heute, Neue Auslese and the Rundschau this Branch also published Die Neue Zeitung, the official newspaper of U.S. Military Government (see Chap. 1, Press Control, par. 10).
5. German Magazines

The first license for a German periodical in the U.S. Zone was awarded to Dr. L. Schneider and Dr. D. Sternberger authorizing them to publish a literary magazine, *Die Wandlung* (Change). The license was presented with special ceremonies in Heidelberg on 23 October 1945, and the magazine made its first appearance on 1 December with a circulation of 20,000 copies. The first issue contained the complete text of the Potsdam Agreement, a diary account of a 1945 trip through Germany, an article denouncing Nazi racial theories, the translations of two poems by T.S. Eliot, and the first of a series of philological articles explaining Nazi corruptions of the German language.

By the end of 1945, there were 20 German licensees publishing 22 magazines in the U.S. Zone and the U.S. Sector of Berlin. Fifteen of these periodicals were religious publications, three were youth magazines, two were for women, and two were for general readers. Information Control made every effort to find competent publishers of periodicals for women and for youth, and also encouraged illustrated magazines and “thought” magazines.

Two periodicals licensed late in 1945 in the U.S. Sector of Berlin were considered of great value to the publications program: *Sie* (She), an illustrated magazine for women, and *Horizont* (Horizon), a magazine for youth. The first issue

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63 Editorial board was composed of Dr. Karl Jaspers, philosopher; Dr. Werner Krauss, professor of Romance languages and literature, University of Marburg, and Dr. Alfred Weber, Heidelberg, University of Heidelberg.

64 Figure does not include weekly church bulletins for which no license was required.

65 Originally licensed under the title *Die Frau.*
of *Horizont* appeared on 9 December 1945 and indicated that its aim was to reorient German youth by the gradual inculcation of new ideas. The contents of the first issue included a short story by Mark Twain, articles on astronomy and chemistry, poems and quotations from the German classics. Among the special articles was an account by the 18-year old assistant editor, Eduard Grosse, of his experiences in a concentration camp. A section titled “Heroes without Weapons” suggested the substitution of new kinds of heroes for the military hero.

*Sie* also made its first appearance in December 1945. In tabloid format, it devoted its front page to the readjustment of the returning veteran, while inside pages carried an article on the Nuremberg trial and notes on clothes and care of infants.

Other important periodicals to appear by the end of 1945 included *Der Bogen* (The Bow),¹⁹ an art magazine published in Wiesbaden; *Frauenwelt* (Woman's World), a magazine for women published in Nuremberg; and two youth magazines, *Jung Wort* (Word of Youth) and *Der Start* (Beginning), both published by Hartmuth Fuchs at Stuttgart and Karlsruhe.

Along with the great increase in the number of licenses issued to publishers during the first half of 1946, there was a comparable increase in the number of German magazines. Eleven were added during January to bring the total to 33 periodicals. Of particular interest were *Ulenpfigel*, a satirical magazine published in the U.S. Sector of Berlin and conceived by Herbert Sandberg, well known German

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¹⁹ Editor’s Note: This may be a mistaken translation. While the translation that the American author uses is technically correct, it can also mean a sheet of paper or a gradual turn. It might be that there was a subtle playing with the words intended by the authors.
artist and cartoonist and a long-time inmate of Buchenwald concentration camp; 
*Das Neue Wort* (The New Word), an all-party magazine appearing in Stuttgart; *Volk und Zeit* (People and Time), a Social Democrat organ published at Karlsruhe; *Klinik und Praxis* (Clinic and Practice), a medical journal published in Munich and dedicated to improving medical standards.

During February 1946, 16 new periodicals appeared, making a total of 47 being published in the U.S. Zone, Bremen and the U.S. Sector of Berlin. *Radiowelt* (Radio World), published in Munich, and *Radio Spiegel* (Radio Mirror), published in Stuttgart, were designed to stimulate interest in the U.S.-operated German radio. Other important additions included *Der Standpunkt* (Point of View), a monthly cultural magazine of 50,000 circulation published in Stuttgart and containing articles on music, the fine arts, and the theater; the *Stuttgarter Rundschau* (Stuttgart Review), a monthly cultural magazine with a circulation of 50,000 copies; *Die Landtechnik* (Farm Methods), a semi-monthly farm journal published in Pfaffenhofen (Bavaria) with a small circulation of 3,000 copies; and *Das Jung Herz* (The Young Heart), a twice-monthly youth magazine published in Munich with a circulation of 25,000 copies.

Fourteen new periodicals appeared during March, the most outstanding being *Der Pinquin* (The Penguin), a youth magazine with a semi-monthly circulation of 50,000 copies; *Neues Abendland* (New Occident), a monthly magazine with a circulation of 15,000 copies describing the outlook for Germany in the fields of politics, economics and culture, and *Der Regenbogen* (The Rainbow), a new
woman's magazine published semi-monthly in Munich with a circulation of 25,000 copies. Of the 60 periodicals being published at the end of March 1946, 20 were religious, 17 were professional or occupational, 6 were for youth, 3 for women, 3 political, 3 illustrated and 8 cultural.

Among the new periodicals brought out in April 1946, two deserved special mention: the Frankfurter Hefte (Frankfurt Notebook), a magazine on culture and world and domestic politics published in Frankfurt, and Selbsthilfe (Self Help), published in Stuttgart and covering politics, economics and general culture from a non-partisan viewpoint.

During May and June, 49 new periodicals were issued to bring the total to 128 by 30 June 1946. This total was divided among seven categories as follows: Religious, 47; Professional or Occupational, 42; Literary and Miscellaneous, 13; Youth, 9; Political, 7; Women, 5; and Illustrated, 4.  

6. Books and Pamphlets

The publication of books and pamphlets was slow to get underway in the U.S. Zone. The program was complicated by a number of problems, among which were the necessity of eliminating objectionable books from existing stocks, a lack of good manuscripts for new publications, a shortage of paper on which they could be printed, a dearth of experienced and able authors, and a lack of experienced publishers who were politically acceptable for licensing. Even after a publisher was

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licensed, it normally required at least four to six months before he could produce a book or pamphlet and place it in the hands of bookdealers for sale. New writers had to be found, manuscripts written, and the product read carefully by the licensed publisher to see that it did not violate Military Government directives. Printers had to be employed to set the text into type, and in many places bomb debris had to be cleared and equipment repaired before printing plants could be operated. And, equally important, publishers had to find printing paper.

Allied Control Council Order No. 4 required the purging of all commercial book stocks and private and public libraries of publications containing material of a Nazi, racist or militaristic nature. Most of the provisions in this order were carried out under directives issued by Military Government. In the U.S. Zone, bookdealers, publishers and wholesalers were more or less honor-bound to carry out the provisions of the order since their future business opportunities depended upon how well they cooperated with Military Government. Owners of private libraries were encouraged to submit objectionable publications voluntarily.

Confiscated publications were destroyed by pulping to augment existing paper stocks. A few were turned over to special research libraries or the Library of Congress Mission. Strict orders were issued against “book burning” as reminiscent of Hitlerite methods. In an attempt to check the thoroughness of the book purge and to further cleanse book shelves and lending libraries of objectionable literature, Information Control conducted a series of “raids” between mid-February and the end of March in the Bavarian cities of Munich, Nuremberg, Fürth, Wuerzburg and
Augsburg. It was found that approximately one-third of the establishments checked actually had one or more objectionable books on sale or available for loan. Offenders lost their registration certificates, and in many cases their property was taken over by Property Control for disposition to custodians who could be relied upon to purge the stocks.

To meet the interim needs of German readers during the first six months of the occupation, OWI furnished 35,000 copies each of some 25 U.S. books in German translation, and some 40 carefully selected American books in the small paper-bound “overseas” edition were also imported. In September 1945, German translation rights for 20 U.S. books were purchased from American copyright owners and negotiations were underway to acquire 80 more to help alleviate the barren condition of the German book trade. The supply of non-Nazi reading matter was further increased by the establishment of U.S. Information Centers with public reading rooms (see par. 8, below).

The first eight books and the first eight pamphlets to be published by licensed firms in the U.S. Zone appeared in bookshop windows during October 1945. Because of the paper shortage, editions were small. All editions over 5,000 copies required approval by Information Control and few exceeded 20,000 copies. In November 1945, 24 books and pamphlets came from the German presses, and in December production figures jumped sharply so that by the end of 1945 nearly 100 books and pamphlets had been published. Sixty-nine new titles appeared during
December to bring the total to 92.\textsuperscript{20}

As the 1946 program got underway, 38 additional titles were produced during January to bring to 129 the number of books and pamphlets published since the occupation began. These were divided into the following general categories: Literature and the humanities, 38; science and social science, 22; current problems in Germany, 18; youth and children's books, 15; language books, 11; religious and church literature, 11; information calendars, 11; and miscellaneous, 3.

Some of the titles illustrating the type of problems being dealt with by these new books included: \textit{Gruen Oliven und Nackte Berge} (Green Olives and Bare Mountains), a story of the Spanish civil war by Eduard Claudius; \textit{Zum Gedenken des 200 Geburtstages von Heinrich Pestalozzi} (In Commemoration of the 200th Anniversary of Heinrich Pestalozzi), a memorial to the great Swiss educator interpreted in the light of reeducational problems; \textit{Wiederaufbau der Stadt} (Rebuilding the City), a serious study and plan for the rebuilding of Stuttgart; \textit{Stoffsammlung} (Collection of Information), a work offering an outline for the use of newly-elected mayors; \textit{Leitfaden fuer den Gemuesesamenbau} (Manual for the Seed Culture of Vegetables) and \textit{Gaerungslese Obst und Gemeuseverwertung} (Preserving of Fruits and Vegetables).

In addition, German translation rights to the following U.S. titles were sold to licensed German publishers: “Storm over the Land” by Carl Sandburg; “And Keep

\textsuperscript{20} Editor’s Note: Their math is incorrect here. Oct.=16, November=24, which make for a total of 40. Then 69 new titles in Dec. brings the total to 109. They may have forgotten to add October to the Dec and Nov. figures, but the math would still be incorrect. This is demonstrated in the next paragraph where the number is corrected, but the October publications are still missing.
Your Powder Dry” by Margaret Mead; “Ten Years in Japan” by Joseph Grew; “The American Character” by Dennis Brogan; “Growth of the American Republic” by Morrison and Commager; “Horse and Buggy Doctor” by Arthur Hertzler; “The World of Washington Irving” and “The Flowering of New England” by Van Wyck Brooks; “American Political Parties” by Wilfred Binkley, and “The Just and the Unjust” by James Cossens. All translations were checked by the Publications Branch of ICD prior to publishing.

During January also, a series of conversations was conducted by publications officers with book publishers throughout the U.S. Zone regarding their publishing program as it related to the needs of Germany. The consensus was that books, pamphlets and magazines in addition to attacking political problems, should lay stress upon fundamental ideals, humaneness, right and decency as important factors in reeducation. This could be accomplished, the publishers felt, by appropriate emphasis upon certain classical works as well as new writings. They also suggested that more publications be specifically designed to meet the needs of workers whom they felt had not been reached effectively up to this time.

During February 1946, 51 new books and pamphlets appeared bringing the total to 180 since the occupation. In addition, some 250 books and pamphlets were set in type awaiting paper on which they could be printed. A German translation of Justice Robert H. Jackson's opening speech at the Nuremberg war crimes trials was also published in Frankfurt during this month, and 200,000 copies were distributed throughout the U.S. Zone, Berlin Sector and Bremen Enclave. Information Control
considered Justice Jackson’s speech a most valuable document for the reeducation of the German people which accounted for the large number of copies distributed.

Translation rights for two more U.S. titles were sold to German publishers during the month, *The Heavenly City of the 18th Century Philosophers* by Carl Becker and *America’s Old Masters* by James J. Flexner. This brought to 12 the number of U.S. copyrighted books published in German at this time.

During March 1946, the number of books and pamphlets produced since the occupation and currently in circulation reached 255. A number of the new titles showed German writers still largely occupied with discussions of current German problems. Two books along this line were *Der neue Weg der deutschen Frau* (The New Path for German Women) by Gertrude Bäumer,21 one of the outstanding women in the Weimar era of Germany, and *Der alte und der neue Weg* (The Old and the New Way), a discussion of educational plans for the future of German youth. The attempt of anti-Nazi authors to clarify recent German history for German readers was continued with the publication of *Der Reichstagsbrand* (The Reichstag Fire), a factual exposé of Nazi crimes which was published in an edition of 200,000 copies. Also as a part of the reeducation program, several new pamphlets appeared containing selections from outstanding German poets, including Goethe, Uhland, Moericke and Eichendorff.

The majority of the books published during April 1946 likewise concerned themselves with current German problems as subject matter. Among the new books

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21 Editor’s Note: The original document spells the name „Beumer.“
were: *Zu Deutschlands Schicksalswende* (On Germany's Destiny), a series of seven lectures on current problems, including war guilt, delivered by Julius Ebbinghaus, Marburg University professor; and *Vormärz* (Before March), an exchange of letters written in 1843 describing efforts to develop a democratic constitution in Germany.

By the end of June 1946, the total number of books and pamphlets had jumped to 729, divided as follows: Religion, 271; fiction, poetry and drama, 147; children and youth, 44; philosophy and literary criticism, 34, textbooks, 32, reference books, dictionaries, etc., 31; National Socialism and other problems, 29; professions and occupations, 28; information calendars, 24; German social issues, 21; educational practice, 18; agriculture, 16; natural science, 12; architecture, 8; trade and industry, 5; fine arts, 3; women, 2; social issues in other countries, 2; law, 1; and sports, 1.

Among the important books to appear as the first year of the occupation ended were: Radbruch's *Der Geist des Englischen Rechts* (The Spirit of English Law); *Fuehrer und Verfuehrte* (The Leader and the Misled) by Hans Windisch, analyzing German social politics; *Zur Genesung des Deutschen Wesens* (The Rebirth of the German Spirit) by Karl Barth, Protestant clergyman, and *Die Idee der Universität* (The Idea of the University) by Karl Jaspers, German philosopher. Also by the end of June 1946, translation and publication rights for some 40 selected American titles had been sold to licensed German publishers. One of the titles, *The American Character* by Dennis Brogan, sold 10,000 copies within three weeks of its appearance in German translation.
7. Booktrade Organizations

The development of German booktrade associations played an important part in the program for reviving and reconstituting the German publishing industry. For over 100 years prior to 1933, German publishers, distributors and bookdealers were combined in the Boersenverein, a trade organization through which trade practices were regulated in the interest of all members. Membership was voluntary but included all but a small percentage of German publishers, distributors and bookdealers. Leipzig was the trade center, and the Boersenverein had its headquarters there.

Under the Nazi regime, most outward characteristics of the Boersenverein were retained, but the organization was utilized for party purposes. Leading personalities in the association were thus so politically compromised that Information Control did not consider it feasible to reorganize the Boersenverein as it formerly existed. However, some reliable and highly important publishers who had been largely responsible for the world-wide fame of Leipzig as a book publishing center were authorized to move to Wiesbaden, and Dr. G.K. Schauer was made editor of the reconstituted Boersenblatt fur den deutschen Buchhandel (Journal for the German Booktrade).

The Boersenblatt had been published for more than a century in Leipzig and had helped to make the German booktrade one of the most efficient in the world. Although the Nazis had sought to “coordinate” the journal into their program,
several of the more liberal members of its staff were able to maintain its old traditions which were revived under Dr. Schauer. A license to publish the *Boersenblatt* was issued to Dr. Schauer by Information Control in July 1945.

The importance of this publication to the German booktrade should not be underestimated. The *Börsenblatt* kept book publishers, distributors and bookdealers informed by publishing all Military Government regulations affecting the industry; printing lists of licensed publishers and authorized bookdealers in the U.S., British, and French Zones; reviewing new books and magazines as they appeared; giving news about personalities in the German publications world and about new associations of publishers and dealers in all Zones; and above all, acting as a powerful liberalizing and integrating influence in the book distribution and book publishing trades. Its columns contained many valuable suggestions on the rebuilding of free and democratic publishing in Germany.

In the reorganization of German booktrade associations, Information Control first encouraged the use of local committees or local representatives of the booktrade to aid publications control officers in the field. While a zone-wide revival of a *Börsenverein* for the over-all regulation of booktrade practices was considered favorably by Information Control, Military Government had adopted a policy that prohibited the establishment of any trade association above the Land level.\(^67\) As a result of this policy, Information Control encouraged regional booktrade associations (*Landesverbände*). The first of these was organized by book publishers and book

\(^{67}\) MGR, Title 4, Civil Administration, 4-616.
dealers in Bavaria. This was followed by similar associations in Greater Hesse, Wuerttemberg-Baden, and Berlin.

Early in the publications control program, booktrade organizations were utilized by Information Control to aid in the distribution of books and magazines, to inventory existing stocks of German books, to secure cooperation in purging shelves of unwanted items, and to help locate manuscripts worthy of publication.

As an example of some of the problems attacked by booktrade associations, a working committee of book dealers in Greater Hesse met on 13 December 1945 in Frankfurt with representatives from eight of the principal publishers in that Land. The discussion centered on the importance of keeping the number of bookstores in line with the supply of books for sale. At a meeting of booktrade officials held in Stuttgart on 16 and 17 February 1946, sub-committees were designated to deal with problems affecting the coordination of trade practices in the field of publications, particularly the selection of subject priorities for the production of books and pamphlets.

By 30 June 1946, strong book publishers and book dealers organizations had been established and were functioning in the three Länder and the U.S. Sector of Berlin,68 helping to cope with the many problems that beset book publishers, book distributors and book sellers in reviving Germany's publishing industry under the occupation.

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68 Book publishers and book dealers in the Bremen Enclave held membership in the Greater Hesse association.
8. U.S. Information Centers

American Libraries of Information, similar to the ones the U.S. State Department set up throughout the world, were established in key cities of the U.S. occupied areas of Germany. The original planning for such centers in Germany was done in the Psychological Warfare Division (SHAEF). Lists of desirable books were drawn up and placed on order through the U.S. Information Service in Paris to the Office of War Information (OWI).

These information libraries were designed to meet five needs:

a. To acquaint the German people, especially German writers, editors, publishers, radio personnel, artists, scientists, teachers and other professionals, with the published record of American life and intellectual development;
b. To enable these persons to acquire the best U.S. current literature, carefully selected and well-balanced, especially in the fields of politics, psychology, anthropology, social organization, economics, natural sciences, education, and art, emphasizing in particular information of the sorts denied the Germans by the Nazi Propaganda Ministry through its control of publications;
c. To bring to the attention of German educators and political leaders the textbooks, methods and educational psychology developed in the United States;
d. To present a full view of American culture to all interested German readers by liberal use of U.S. magazines and photographs; and
e. To provide Military Government officials with information needed in their work.

Each of the Information Centers established consisted of a large library room and several reference or other reading rooms. The reading rooms contained collections of American texts, non-fiction and general reference works on such varied subjects as history, natural science, art, literature, medicine, social science and agriculture, as well as catalogued reference pamphlets and numerous reprints of feature articles from American periodicals. Although much of the material, at the
beginning, was available only in English, efforts were made to supply German translations of American books and German newspapers. German newspapers were subsequently dropped because they were otherwise available to the German public. Books in German were also obtained from Sweden and Switzerland. As soon as adequate facilities were provided by any center it was thrown open to the public.

The original planning called for the establishment of eight of these centers during the first year. The first library to open was at Bad Homburg on 4 July 1945. It was soon evident that such libraries should be placed in large centers of population and made more accessible to publishers, writers, and other professionals. As a result, the Bad Homburg library was moved to Frankfurt in September and there became known as the American library. At the end of its first year of operation, this center contained some 3,000 books and received 100 U.S. periodicals and 10 U.S., British and Swiss newspapers. The Frankfurt library also served as a distribution center for quantity shipments.

The second library to open was in Berlin in November 1945. The early opening of this unit was made possible by Army Special Services, which released about 500 books. By 30 June 1946 this center also had nearly 3,000 volumes of selected materials and was receiving 151 American periodicals and 10 U.S., British and Swiss newspapers.

A third library was opened before the close of 1945, this one in Munich. Utilizing the former reading room of the University of Munich Medical School, it opened in December. An interesting feature of this library was a section devoted to
Nazi literature for use of U.S. officials. By the end of June 1946, the Munich library contained about 3,000 volumes, some 30 different American periodicals, and 9 U.S., British and Swiss newspapers. It also served as a distribution center for Bavaria.

Efforts had been made to open a center at Stuttgart during 1945, but suitable space was hard to find. Stuttgart had suffered severe bomb-damage and there was little available housing. A suite of rooms was finally located and the library opened in January 1946. The Stuttgart center was followed in February by one at Marburg. A month later a center opened at Erlangen in Bavaria. A third center for Bavaria opened in April at Regensburg, making seven in all for the U.S. controlled areas of Germany.

The eighth and last center to be established during this period was opened in Heidelberg in June 1946. The opening was attended by faculty members from the University of Heidelberg and other academic and professional representatives.

In addition to these large-scale libraries, small reference rooms were established in a number of other cities to provide a wider flow of U.S. magazines and newspapers to interested German readers. Rooms of this type had been opened at Augsburg and Nuremberg by February 1946.

A survey of the centers showed that the most read newspapers were the *Neue Zuericher Zeitung, Stars and Stripes*, the New York *Times* and the New York *Herald Tribune*. The most popular magazines, in order, were *Life, Readers’ Digest, Popular Mechanics, Harper’s, Time, Fortune, Popular Science, Saturday Evening Post* and *Economist*. Students and professional people made more than 75 percent of
the centers' clientele. The entire staff, headed from the beginning by Dr. W.C. Headrick, never numbered more than five U.S. employees and 75-80 German employees. A valuable feature of the U.S. Information Centers, in addition to the use of graphic displays and book exhibits, was the use of lectures and group discussions on American life and letters and other subjects of large interest to German audiences.

CHAPTER 3 -- FILM, THEATER AND MUSIC CONTROL

Section 1 -- Film Control

1. Introduction

After Hitler's assumption of power in Germany, Nazi control of films was established through Party and State. Party control was exercised through the film office (Amt Film) of the Reichspropagandaleitung, while State control was exercised through the Filmabteilung (film division) of the Propaganda Ministry. This control extended to subject matter, personnel and finances.

The Nazis produced a number of historical films with a political bias, featuring such heroes as Frederick the Great and Bismarck. Many propaganda films portrayed sufferings of German peasants in the border countries and the return of the peasant to his German home. Other films dealt with anti-Semitism and war themes. By far the most important of all German film productions during the war were the military documentaries, based on shots taken by the official propaganda companies. These films enjoyed great public success, and their barbarity did not
prevent them from appealing to crowded houses.

Addressing the Hitler Youth, Goebbels said, “National Socialism has always recognized the film as a first-rate medium of political guidance and education.” To overcome such indoctrination of the German Film industry was one of the tasks of Information Control.

2. Mission of Film Control

Film Control, according to Military Government Regulations, was charged with the “control of the activities of production, distribution, exhibition and processing of all motion picture film, including religious and educational subjects.” Its principal tasks were “to find and recommend suitable Germans to be licensed as film producers, to find and recommend suitable Germans for registration as film distributors and as film exhibitors, and to guide and control the reconstitution of the German film industry.”

The first step taken by Film Control in carrying out its mission was to instruct the District Information Services Control Commands (DISCCs) to conduct a survey in their respective Military Districts of all film production facilities and equipment. Film studios located at Tempelhof in Berlin and at Geiselgasteig near Munich, both Reich properties owned and managed by the UFI (Universum Film GmbH), were taken under control and custodians appointed under Property Control.

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69 MGR, Title 21, C-2 (12 May 46), 21-600
70 Ibid, 21-601
22 UFI assumed control of the German film industry on January 10, 1942. It was called UFI to distinguish it from its decessor.
regulations.\textsuperscript{71} While Tempelhof remained comparatively idle, the official Anglo-American newsreel, “\textit{Welt im Film}” (World in Film), moved in July 1945 from London to the Bavaria Filmkunst studios and thenceforth was produced and edited there.

The second task undertaken by Film Control officers was to screen and process license applications from Germans who wanted to become film producers. License applicants were first scrutinized for technical and artistic qualifications, and then were submitted to a rigid Intelligence investigation, including a three-day examination at the Information Control Screening Center in Bad Orb.\textsuperscript{72}

\textit{3. Rehabilitation of Studios}

Film Control officers in Munich and Berlin were instructed by ICD to proceed, within their limitations, in the rehabilitation of the Berlin and Munich studios. Under Property Control authority, the custodians of the Tempelhof and Bavaria Filmkunst studios began reconstruction and repair of damaged facilities and equipment, prepared inventories of existing equipment and in general reorganized the studios.

The Bavaria Filmkunst studios, comparatively undamaged by the war, were used as a base for Film Control operations for Bavaria. The Film Control Section established its headquarters there, with Film Control officers housed in the villa of the former Nazi director. Film Control offices and offices for the newsreel were located in the former administration buildings.

\textsuperscript{71} MG Law No. 52, “Blocking and Control of Property,” art. 1.
\textsuperscript{72} See Chapter V, par. 5.
The Tempelhof studios, on the other hand, had been badly damaged during the war, and reconstruction work, though greatly hampered by shortages of building materials and vital equipment, had to be undertaken on a larger scale.

In addition to Tempelhof and Geiselgasteig, Information Control requisitioned the facilities of the former Reichsanstalt fuer Film und Bild in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, an institute for audio-visual education which had been part of the Reich's Ministry of Education. Located at 10-12 Kleiststrasse in the U.S. sector of Berlin, the institute had film production facilities for such highly specialized work as micro-photography, X-ray research and ultra-speed photography. The American Film Exchange for Berlin was placed in this building.

In November 1945, Information Control requested the State Department to contact Eric Pommer, well-known U.S. film producer, with the view of recruiting Pommer to guide the reconstitution of a new German film industry. Prior to 1933 Mr. Pommer had been head of the UFA, Universum Film Aktiengesellschaft (Universal Film Corporation) in Germany. Mr. Pommer agreed in June 1946 to become Film Production Control Officer of ICD; however, he did not arrive in Germany until 4 July.

Although no German films other than the official newsreel were produced during the first year of the occupation of Germany, it was anticipated in June 1946 that film production in the U.S. occupied areas could be resumed by the beginning of 1947. Likewise no licenses had been issued, although six applications for film
production licenses were approved by Information control.\footnote{OMGUS, Information Control (Cumulative Review) Functional annex to the Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No. 13 (20 Aug 46), p. 11.}

4. The Official Newsreel, “Welt im Film”

While the Allied Forces were still fighting outside of Germany, the joint OWI/PID newsreel organization was founded in London and was given the task of preparing an Anglo-American newsreel for showing in Germany. When the first cinemas in the U.S. occupied areas were opened, this newsreel, produced in London, was exhibited to the Germans. Most of the film shots came from newsreel cameramen of the U.S. Army Pictorial Service. In July 1945, the newsreel organization was transferred from London to the Bavaria Filmkunst studios\footnote{Issue No. 18 of Welt im Film was the first to be produced within Germany.} where it was still functioning 30 June 1946.

The staff of the newsreel, consisting of British and U.S. personnel, together with German technical personnel, turned out the reel on a weekly basis and in two editions -- one intended for the U.S. and British Zones of Germany, the other for the U.S. and British Zones of Austria. Gradually, late in 1945, newsreel assignment desks were established in Munich, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Bremen and Berlin to cover news events in the U.S. occupied areas.

Practically all international film was procured free of cost through an exchange arrangement by which Welt Im Film supplied German material in exchange for material from other countries. This flow of film particularly from the United States and Great Britain, enabled the Geiselgasteig studios to build up a large
newsreel library, which, with the basic war library brought over from the United Kingdom, became an excellent documentary library.

Production of the joint Anglo-American newsreel was considered of highest importance by ICD and received first priority for all processing and printing. When the Interim International Information Service in Washington suggested that the newsreel be reduced to one reel, General McClure objected on the ground that the newsreel was one of the chief means of presenting Allied views to the Germans, and was fundamentally the right form for obtaining maximum psychological effectiveness. The Political Intelligence Division of the Foreign Office, British counterpart of ICD on the newsreel, held similar views.

_Welt im Film_ was supplemented in December 1945 by the addition of French clips. At the same time, British-American newsreel shots were made available for use in Soviet and French newsreels. Reception of _Welt im Film_ was reported as increasingly good, with newsreel theaters in Berlin usually sold out.

Early in 1946, the weekly output of the Munich studio totalled 214 prints of a single newsreel, averaging 2,000 feet in length. These were delivered to Munich, Frankfurt and Berlin film officers who arranged distribution over a period of several weeks to the approximately 400 motion picture theaters open in U.S. controlled areas. Prints also were sent to Hamburg, Salzburg and Vienna, as well as to Paris, London and Washington.

Approximately 50 percent of the newsreel was devoted to German domestic news, 25 percent to U.S. and British news, and the remaining 25 percent to general
world coverage. Non-German subjects were taken from selected British newsreels, the French Actualities and the United News, the latter a special compilation of news strips prepared by American newsreel companies.

By special agreement with Army Pictorial Service, Welt im Film was able during February 1946 to obtain a copy of films taken at the Nuremberg trials for inclusion in the newsreel.

In June 1946, a meeting was called by OMGUS to draft a basic agreement between the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department (WARCAD) and the British Control Office, setting forth the policies and objectives of the newsreel. The meeting was attended by representatives of OMGUS, the Control Commission for Germany, British Element, and the Control Office for Germany and Austria in London. The agreement stated:

The object of Welt im Film is to contribute to the enlightenment of Germans and Austrians by presenting news in pictures from throughout the world including the four zones of occupation in Germany, and from Austria. In pictures from Allied countries the aim should be to show the Allied purpose, standards and ways of life. In pictures from occupied countries the aim should be to assist the Control authorities and to show reconstruction and restoration, particularly through the efforts of the local population.

5. Documentary Films

The Reorientation Branch of WARCAD in May 1946 appropriated money for the production of 120 reels of documentary films. It was intended that these films would be prepared in the United States and that pilot prints would be shipped to Germany for issue with German commentaries. WARCAD also authorized another
program for the production in Munich of appropriate documentary films on a variety of subjects relating to the mission of U.S. occupation in Germany.


However, none of these films had progressed beyond the planning stage by 30 June 1946.
6. Distribution and Exhibition Problems

Military Government Law No. 191 prohibited the distribution of films and the operation of film exchanges and motion picture theaters in Germany. During the SHAEF period of Information Control, only entertainment that would assist the Military Commander in the accomplishment of his mission was permitted to resume.

Under Information Control Regulation No. 1, it was intended to reopen motion picture theaters in U.S. occupied areas as rapidly as possible. The first step taken in the reopening of German cinemas was a survey conducted by the Film Control officers of each DISCC to determine the number of usable houses in each area, as well as the status of film projectors, sound equipment and other essential apparatus. One of the major difficulties film exhibitors experienced during the entire first year was the acute shortage of all items of electronic equipment.

Since the film industry had been an important medium for propaganda during the Nazi regime, and since connections with the film industry were profitable, approximately 80 percent of all motion picture houses in Germany were in the hands of Party members or followers of Nazi ideology. As such, these owners were not acceptable to Information Control for registration. Information Control officers at lower echelons thus had to investigate thoroughly each cinema that was to open, and where necessary, have the property requisitioned under Property Control authority, a custodian appointed and an ICD registrant installed to manage it.

Initially, cinemas provided good facilities for keeping Germans, especially German youth, off the streets. In order not to create any impression that the
cinemas were being opened merely to entertain Germans, theaters at first were permitted to exhibit only documentary films which had been carefully test-screened.  

Information Control reopened its first cinemas, 15 in all, on 30 July 1945. Four were in Berlin, three in Frankfurt, three in Munich, and one each in Offenbach, Bad Homburg, Friedberg, Bad Nauheim and Wiesbaden. From this date on, Film Control officers were directed to open cinemas in their respective areas as rapidly as feasible, taking into consideration that only a limited supply of approved American feature films and documentary films, plus the newsreel, were at their disposal.

Although in Bavaria alone 495 cinemas were found capable of operating by late August, less than 100 in the entire U.S.-occupied area were actually exhibiting films by the end of September 1945. At that time the Film Control Section had in its possession 33 American feature titles, varying from five to six copies of each; 15 commercial shorts, five copies of each, and about 25 documentaries, averaging six copies of each.

By the end of December 1945, 345 cinemas had been reopened and a few German feature films, approved by Military Government, had been added to the U.S. films. During the first half of 1946 the number of cinemas operating for the German civilian population in the U.S. area of occupation increased to 668, an average of 51 houses being opened monthly during this period. Cumulative

75 These documentary films were test-screened during July 1945 in the University town of Erlangen in Bavaria.
76 Information Control entered Germany with a list of 48 U.S. films that had been approved by OWI in 1944 for showing in Germany.
attendance by 1 July 1946 had reached 23,000,000 in Bavaria, 11,000,000 in Greater Hesse and nearly 3,000,000 in the Bremen Enclave.\textsuperscript{77}

These exhibitors, distributed over the entire U.S. Zone, were serviced by three film exchanges, one in Munich, one in Stuttgart and one in Frankfurt, which were opened by ICD in late June 1945 under supervision of Film Control officers for those areas. Delivery of films from these exchanges to the theaters was in itself a difficult task, particularly during the winter months when transport facilities in Germany were in the worst possible condition.

In addition to the 48 U.S.-produced films, by July 1946 there were 15 German feature films in distribution, all produced prior to the occupation of Germany; 8 German-produced documentary films; and 30 juvenile short-subject films.

The standards for selecting films for the German audiences were outlined by General McClure as “the fixing of German war guilt, demonstrating the values of democratic living, and indicating that the United States is a strong democratic society striving for the realization of full freedom.” The selection and importation of films into the U.S. Zone of Germany was the responsibility of OWI, on recommendations from ICD.

The first group of American films which ICD approved for showing to German audiences consisted of 9 feature pictures and 11 documentary films. Features included “Here Comes Mr. Jordan”, “Shadow of a Doubt”, “Seven


Since there was an initial shortage of American film titles and since ICD had been instructed by the Military Governor to open cinemas more rapidly as the winter season approached, a number of German films had to be released to keep cinemas operating. However, Information Control made it a policy that no house should be opened with a German film, and that no German film should be shown in any cinema unless American films had been shown for at least two weeks prior to that.

Due to the critical shortage of film raw stock, manufacture of new prints of German films was not permitted.

7. Quadripartite Exchange of Films

As a result of quadripartite meetings begun in August 1945, each of the four Powers agreed to make available three of its films to the other Powers for distribution in their respective areas of occupation. The agreement was worked out by the Quadripartite Films Sub-Committee at its meeting on 17 December 1945 and the arrangement was approved 7 January 1946 by the Information Control Committee. This agreement went into effect on 11 February 1946 and was implemented by the immediate exchange of two U.S. films, “Seven Sweethearts”
and “All That Money Can Buy” in the British and Soviet Zones, for which the U.S. Zone received the British feature “Fanny by Gaslight” and the Soviet film “They Met in Moscow”. American authorities agreed in March to lend “It Started With Eve” to the French in return for “Pontcaral”. By bipartite agreement, the number of copies of any film could be increased.

The rental for a complete program was fixed at 50 percent of the gross receipts after taxes were deducted. Money accruing was to be deposited monthly in a banking account to be opened and controlled by the Information Control Division. It was provided that officers of the Finance Division would meet quarterly or semi-annually to arrange transfers of moneys. The choice of films, according to the agreement, would be made in Berlin, and pictures would be chosen on a program basis, that is, a feature and a short. Each Power agreed to supply all advertising material for its pictures.

The following Allied films were being shown in the U.S. Zone by July 1946\(^78\):

In addition, an arrangement was concluded between U.S. Military Government and Praesens Film, A.G., Swiss film producers, by which two films, “The Last Chance” and “Marie Louise”, were to be shown in the U.S. Zone, the income to

be made available to concentration camp victims.\textsuperscript{79}

Audience reactions to programs offered by ICD were not always favorable. Germans were especially opposed to the showing of certain U.S. war films. These had been included when the United States was still waging war against Japan and it was felt that such films would be of psychological benefit to show Germans the machinery that had conquered their own \textit{Wehrmacht}. A number of films were later withdrawn, and in the main, these consisted of purely war subject films.

\textbf{8. Censorship of German Films}

The Directive for Psychological Warfare and Control of German Information Services, Annex J (Sec. 4), issued 6 June 1945 by SHAEP, directed the impounding of all motion picture films throughout the U.S.-occupied territories. Immediately upon entry into Germany, Information Control began, through its DISCCs, the task of impounding all German-produced films. These were brought to two collection points--Frankfurt and Munich. In October 1945, an additional directive was issued by USFET making the local German administration responsible for the impounding, inventorying and storing of all motion picture film, and for reporting such impounded films to the DISCCs.

Simultaneously the ICD film censor was given the responsibility of screening impounded German film and making recommendations for its ultimate disposal. Film passed by the censor was, when necessary, released to supplement the film

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 11
fare for the German public.


By 30 June 1946, approximately 150 German films had been screened and censored by ICD.

Late in December 1945, a quadripartite agreement on censorship of all German films was confirmed. This agreement, which was revised slightly in May 1946, stipulated that no German films would be shown which glorified the ideology of Fascism, Nazism or racial distinction; idealized war or militarism; perverted German history, or glorified or idealized the German army. Banned also were films which seemed derogatory, uncomplimentary, or to ridicule Allied peoples, their Governments or their political or national leaders, or which dealt with German revenge. Movies insulting any religious feelings or attitudes, or propagating Nazi views concerning religion, and movies glorifying thoughts and acts of Nazi leaders were also prohibited.

Further, no film could originate from a book or script by a known Nazi party
member or supporter. Participation of scenario writers, directors or star performers under prosecution by Allied occupation authorities, or who were Party members or proven active supporters, was also forbidden. When other artists and technical workers were known Party members or proven supporters of the Nazis, it was directed that their names should be deleted from the films and from all forms of exploitation and publicity.

Section 2 -- Theater Control

9. Introduction

Historically, Germany has been considered one of the traditional homes of great music. At the time Germany consisted of a number of small states, independent sovereigns promoted an elaborate theatrical and musical culture as a means of presenting the cultural achievements of their principality to the outside world. This explains why German theater and music activities did not centralize in Berlin, as occurred in other European capitals, but that equally important theaters existed throughout all the provinces of Germany. In general, most of the German theaters were heavily subsidized by municipalities, provinces, or the State. Only a few privately owned theaters existed, mostly in the larger cities such as Berlin, Hamburg and Munich. The theater in Germany was not considered purely an entertainment medium, but rather a “moral institution”.

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80 Information contained in Section 3, Music Control, relating to historical background, mission, denazification, shortage of concert halls, and other problems common to both Theater and Music, likewise applies to this section.

81 The name given the German theater by Schiller.
Towns like Darmstadt, with a population of 50,000 to 60,000 persons, had an opera house, an operetta house, a symphony orchestra, and legitimate theaters playing throughout the year. Nearly every town had at least one legitimate theater, and nearly every city with a population of 100,000 or more had at least one opera house performing daily.

With the rise of Nazism, theater and music guilds were abolished and the field as a whole came under the strict jurisdiction of the Reichskulturkammer (Reich Chamber of Culture), headed by Joseph Goebbels. Every person employed in the fields of theater and music had to be approved by the Reichstheaterkammer (Reich Chamber of Theater) or the Reichsmusikkammer (Reich Chamber of Music). Since German theaters had always been subsidized and controlled by government agencies, Hitler found it a simple matter to centralize the entire profession under the personal supervision of his Minister of Propaganda, who devoted considerable attention to theater and music affairs.

Hitler's accomplishments in the theater were largely negative. While he did not succeed in introducing Nazi writers to the German stage, he was able to evict liberals and Jews and replace them with reliable Party members. Some exceptions were made because of the need to maintain the theater as a morale factor for the war machine, but the theater as a whole was made entirely dependent upon politically censored German literature. Famous German and Austrian composers like Hindemith, Toch, and Schoenberg, when driven out of Germany, found refuge in the United States where they continued to write music. Other German musicians found
haven in England and other countries. Those who remained in Germany found themselves isolated from international development and most were engaged in writing music that was “psychologically effective” to the Nazi cause rather than producing something creative and of free expression.

Eight months before the defeat of Germany, a state of total war was decreed by the Nazi government, and on Hitler’s orders all theaters were closed for the first time in their history. By the time the Allies entered Germany, most of the formerly prominent ensembles from the provincial theaters were dissolved and the members scattered, and many of the theater buildings had been destroyed by Allied bombing.

10. Mission of Theater and Music Control

Theater and Music Control, as defined by Military Government Regulations, included control of the publication and distribution of music, the recording and distribution of mechanical reproductions, and control of all theatrical and musical activities such as plays, operettas, musical comedies, plays with incidental music, variety, cabaret, ballet, dance recitals, fairs, circuses, carnivals, concerts, operas, recitals and public music of any kind, and any other “live” entertainment employing actors or musicians. Its principal tasks were to find and recommend suitable Germans to be licensed as theatrical and musical producers, as publishers of music, and as producers of mechanical recordings; to find and recommend suitable

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82 MGR Title 21, Information Control, 21-650
Germans for registration, and to guide and control the reconstitution of German theater and music.83

11. Problem of Theater Shortage

In the first phase of control, as in all other media of information and entertainment, German theaters and German music were banned by MG Law No. 191. However, since both theater and music were an integral part of German cultural life, it was considered necessary that these two media be revived as soon as possible. This task was complicated by a number of problems, the chief of which was a shortage of theaters. German theaters normally were located in the heart of the town, and as a result many theaters had been badly damaged or destroyed during the war. Those which were but slightly damaged and could be repaired quickly were requisitioned by Army Special Services for the entertainment of U.S. troops.

Army Special Services, which provided troops with entertainment, had priority on the use of theaters and its acquisitions frequently conflicted with the Information Control program. Two major points that required early settlement were: (1) whether Special Service's priority on the use of theaters constituted an exclusive right, and (2) whether German entertainers not licensed by Information Control should perform before U.S. troops. Some examples of this conflict of interests follow:

83 MGR Title 21, Information Control, 21-651
a. In Stuttgart, the 100th Infantry Division had requisitioned the *Staatstheater* for troops and the Red Cross had established a club in the foyer. Preliminary arrangements had been made to give concerts there for the German civilian population when the troops were not using the theater, but this agreement was not fulfilled.

b. In Wiesbaden, Dr. Karl Hagemann was licensed by Information Control to produce concerts and operas in the Deutsches Theater, and preliminary steps were taken to start repairs to the bomb-damaged building. The theater, however, was requisitioned by Army Special Services for the Red Cross and for staging plays for U.S. troops. Dr. Hagemann was dispossessed and the Red Cross proceeded to repair the building. A series of negotiations between ICD and the Red Cross resulted in an agreement whereby specific hours each week were to be allocated to orchestral and opera performances for Germans. However, as late as 7 November 1945, the 6871st DISCC reported that its attempts to get the theater for part time use for German civilians had been unsuccessful.

c. In Munich, it was found impossible to begin opera performances because an anti-aircraft artillery unit was billeted in the Prinzregenten Theater.

d. In Frankfurt, a German licenses who had planned a concert in the Radio Broadcasting Hall for 22 July 1945 was refused use of the hall by Special Services officers. They did agree to permit a performance a week later, but refused to allow further ones.

e. In Nuremberg, the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion employed the local opera company, which included many Nazis, to give variety shows for military personnel.

In July 1945, there was in force a Theater directive forbidding German performers to appear before U.S. troops, but Special Services officers in many localities did not enforce it. Persons refused a license by Information Control frequently went to local Special Services officers and received permission to perform before soldier audiences. Some performers, who knew they could not qualify for a license, would by-pass ICD entirely and attempt to make a name for themselves by appearing before U.S. troops.

To compromise these differences, representatives of ICD, the Office of the

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84 USFET Directive No. 24
Chief of Special Services, the Morale Branch of USFET Personnel Division, and the American Red Cross, met on 27 July 1945 and agreed that (1) where cinemas, theaters, or concert halls existed for the entertainment of troops, at least one house would be set aside for civilian use, and (2) where facilities were limited, they would be made available on a part-time basis for troops and for civilians. In addition, U.S. military personnel would be permitted to attend cinema exhibitions arranged for Germans, and would be charged the same admission fee as civilians; Germans, on the other hand, would not be permitted to attend motion pictures arranged by Special Services for soldier audiences. Mixed audiences, however, would be allowed to attend theatrical, operatic, and concert performances.

On the basis of these agreements, Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, ICD Chief, recommended to the Chief of Staff, USFET, on 2 August 1945 that the functions of ICD and the DISCC’s be clearly defined to all commands in the Theater, and the above agreements made mandatory. On 1 September 1945, the agreements were promulgated as Theater Headquarters policy with the exception of the proposal for mixed soldier-civilian audiences in cinemas. Management of performers and participation in performances arranged exclusively for troops by persons unlicensed or black-listed by Information Control was also prohibited by this circular.

12. Problem of Denazification

Any impulse to insure high quality in the German theater at the price of

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85 USFET Circular No. 120. (1 Sept 45)
lowering denazification standards was curbed by Information Control. There were some who felt that an individual who sang on an opera stage or played a musical instrument should not be kept from his work because of his political record. Although there is normally little incidence between personal politics and professional ability, it was felt generally that in the field of entertainment any tendency to excuse certain artists their questionable political behavior because their talent was essential, had to be overcome.

A somewhat unusual situation developed when the theater and music sections of Information Control began operation. Many German artists appeared, looking for opportunities and jobs. Since theater people knew that only a minimum number could be employed because theater facilities were lacking, the task of denazification was simplified - theater people themselves willingly offered information concerning political backgrounds of others of their profession.

The standard applied by Information Control was high: No one was to be employed who had been a Nazi party member or who had profited through the Nazi regime. Since there were few artists who had not profited thereby, it was difficult to find suitable persons to be licensed as producers or to be registered as entertainers. For this reason, a number of German artists and musicians already licensed were being reconsidered in September 1945.

The blacklist, published in October 1945,86 included the names of many Germans to be excluded by Military Government from information services,

86 See Chapt. 5, par. 5.
particularly entertainment, media. The list was a necessary guide to Information Control officers in the transfer of the media from Military Government operation to licensed German operation, and was completed only after long research by ICD intelligence personnel. The inclusion of a number of names well-known in the musical and theatrical world resulted in these persons leaving the U.S. Zone to seek employment in other areas.

In January 1946, additional artists and composers who had been supporters of Nazism were added to the October 1945 list of those barred from making appearances. Among these was Norbert Schulze, whose compositions included “Bombs over England” as well as “Lili Marlene”. Schulze was blacklisted by a quadripartite sub-committee, meeting in Berlin. Several prominent musicians, who previously had cooperated with the Propaganda Ministry, were refused permission to appear in the U.S. Zone.

This same standard was used during February 1946 in deciding the case of Wilhelm Furtwaengler, noted German conductor who had served as conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra during the Hitler regime. It was announced that since Furtwaengler had allowed himself to become a tool of the Nazi Party, he held an office under the Nazis, and had loaned his name to tours sponsored by Goebbels, he would not be permitted to return to a leading position in Germany at this time. As a member of the Prussian Staatsrat and a former vice-president of the Reich Music Chamber, he was automatically barred from holding a leading position in any of the four Zones. The decision by Military Government to reject certain Germans for
employment in the information fields was likewise binding on all German licensees. Thus the blacklisting of Furtwaengler meant that a producer who held an MG license could not arrange a Furtwaengler concert.

Continued inquiry into the backgrounds of artists and other performers showed that between three and four percent of them had falsified their Fragebogen, usually in connection with their former membership in the Nazi Party. Performers guilty of this offense were denied the right to appear before the public and were formally charged in Military Government courts.

13. Theater Trade Unions

Since theater guilds were among the first groups dissolved by the Nazis, the theatrical and musical fields had to be revived by Military Government without the assistance of these guilds. However, the organization of a trade union for those employed in theater and music was considered essential by ICD, and by late 1945 sufficient progress had been made to clear the way for the re-establishment of organizations that could assure a democratic expression of the arts of drama and music. This included a revival of local units of theatrical and musical crafts, development of music libraries, establishment of costume exchanges, and facilities for the interchange of artists.

In December 1945, the German stage union GDB, Genossenschaft Deutscher Bühnenagehoeriger (Brotherhood of German Theater Personnel), was

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87 OMGUS, Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No. 12 (20 July 46), p. 3
88 Founded in 1871 and dissolved by the Nazis.
reorganized in Frankfurt, and similar unions of musicians, actors, and artists were re-established in other major cities. Hamburg and Stuttgart re-established actors' unions as early as October 1945. It was intended that politically reliable artists would form the core of these organizations to guarantee the democratic development of the theater. Unions in Frankfurt and Wiesbaden immediately prepared to screen all applicants to keep out pro-Nazi employees.

14. Licensing of Theaters

Whenever suitable theaters were available and acceptable personnel was found, theater managers were immediately licensed by Information Control. By late July 1945, Carl Hagemann had become intendant (manager) of the Deutsches Theater in Wiesbaden, and in Mannheim, a Stadt intendant was licensed. Although Mannheim's theatrical facilities were meager, the National Theater was preparing to reopen with a series of plays ranging from Shakespeare, Moliere, and Lessing, to Ibsen, Gogol, and O'Neill. In Stuttgart, the Stadt Theater was already being used for weekly concerts by this date, and some of the concerts were transcribed and broadcast from the Stuttgart radio station.

The first U.S. license for a Berlin theater was formally presented to Karl Heinz Martin on 6 November 1945. On that date the Hebbeltheater in Berlin, of which Martin as manager, presented Ardrey's "Thunder Rock", the first modern American play to be shown in Berlin in more than a decade. Also in Berlin during November the famous German producer, Juergen Fehling, was licensed and
presented Eugene O'Neill's *Anna Christie*.

By the end of November 1945, 130 theater and music licenses had been granted. Licensees, with few exceptions, assisted in the denazification program by ensuring that no Nazi or militarist was connected with any presentation, and in general laid the foundation for a sound democratic development of theatrical and musical life.

By mid-December, there were 64 theater licensees in Bavaria, 17 in the Western Military District, and 3 in the U.S. sector of Berlin. In addition, there were some 1,050 registrants of theaters, concert halls, opera houses, and other entertainment facilities. Two circuses had also been licensed in the U.S. Zone.

By 30 June 1946, U.S. theater licenses totalled 244 and theater registrations totalled 11,694, divided geographically as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Theater Licenses</th>
<th>Theater Registrations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>3437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Hesse</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wuerttemberg-Baden</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>11,694</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. *German Examination Boards*

The first step toward German direction of theater and music was taken in March 1946 with the establishment in Stuttgart of a special examination board to conduct preliminary screening of applicants for theatrical work. This board, called
the Prüfungsausschuss (Board of Examination), was similar to several others which had been formed experimentally, but was the first to be allowed any large measure of responsibility.

The Prüfungsausschuss was made up of delegates of the theater and music unions, representatives of the Land and city cultural ministries, and a number of private citizens, all with clean political records. Theater and music producers seeking licenses, as well as concert performers, actors, entertainers, or theater owners wishing to register with Military Government, were required to submit the regular Fragebogen to the Prüfungsausschuss. The board in turn recommended applicants to the field Information Control Unit (DISCC) in the area.

Although the board's decisions were not binding on Military Government, it appeared by the end of March 1946 that most of its recommendations were being made in conformance with Military Government regulations, and on this basis ICD decided to allow the Land governments to select theater intendants for tax-supported institutions, provided those so designated held a proper license, and to discharge an intendant, provided his replacement held or could obtain a U.S. license.

16. German Plays

Theater productions did not get underway in the U.S. Zone until the closing months of 1945. As no recent U.S. or British plays were available in German translation, theaters had to reopen with German plays and operas, or with works that had been translated and adapted for the German stage prior to the war.
On 5 September 1945, Toni Impekoven,23 licensed theater director for the Frankfurt area, presented his first production, the comedy Ingeborg, in the theater hall of Radio Frankfurt. In Kassel, the Staatstheater started its season in November, opening with Goethe's Iphigenia auf Tauris at the Stadthalle. Wiesbaden's Deutsches Theater presented Goethe's Die Geschwister on 18 November.

Giessen's Stadtttheater presented Schnitzler's Liebelei on 25 November, and highlights of the month at Stuttgart consisted of the premiere of Orpheus and Euridice and Shakespeare's As You Like It. Wiesbaden saw the Christmas fairy tale Der Lügenpeter on 24 December, and “Menagerie”, a group of three one-act plays, on 31 December. In Heidelberg, Moliere's “Der Geizige” received its first performance on 17 December. In Ulm, the first theatrical production was “Ingeborg”, followed by Shakespeare's “Taming of the Shrew”.

Kassel's Staattheater presented the premiere of Rotköpfchen on 6 December, followed by Kleist's Der zerbrochene Krug. The premiere of Molnar's Spiel im Schloss was given in Wiesbaden on 8 December. Stuttgart's premiere early in December included Das Gotteskind, a Christmas play, and several French comedies.

Munich, by early December, had already taken on a metropolitan atmosphere: The opera had performed Boheme and Tiefland; the Volkstheater was drawing large audiences; the Münchner Theater, making its home in a converted sports hall, boasted a repertoire of three plays; while the Bürgertheater was running

23 Editor’s Note: He was safe because of his wife’s activities, Frieda IMPEKOVEN, nee KOBLER (1966) Frieda Kobler, who hid Jewish men and women at her home.
five plays.

Although most of the plays were received with enthusiasm by the German audiences, there were a few incidents accompanying the theater program. *Ingeborg*, playing in small towns in the vicinity of Kassel, was prevented from making a scheduled performance in Frankenberg by the *Buergermeister*. He, together with a number of citizens, had decided that the play was immoral and banned it. Information Control officers, however, soon took appropriate action to remove the ban.

Karlsruhe reported an organized disturbance by members and supporters of the Catholic Youth movement on the occasion of the first performance of Bert Brecht's *Dreigroschenoper*. The demonstration started with whistles and shouts and developed into a near riot before civil police ejected and arrested the disturbers. Questioning of the offenders indicated that leaders of the Catholic Youth movement objected to the work as being “immoral.”

17. Non-German Plays

To fill the need for good American drama in Germany, Information Control took steps through the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Dramatists Guild, to bring selected U.S. plays to the German stage. ICD requested OWI to secure the German rights for the plays: *Our Town, Abe Lincoln in Illinois, Yellow Jack, The Time of Your Life, The Patriots, The Voice of the Turtle, I Remember Mama, and Dear Life.*
However, before American plays could be performed in Germany, the conditions under which they could be made available to German producers had to be established. The financial arrangements consisted of royalties in blocked marks being paid into banks designated by Information Control and held in the name of the Dramatists Guild for account of the author concerned.

Securing German rights from the authors, then forwarding the plays to ICD for translation and production, was a long and complicated process. The Dramatists Guild counselled that “this would take time,” and as late as mid-September 1945, the authority to show American plays in Germany had not yet been received, although Information Control authorities had been working through OWI, London, on this project since March.

Since no plays by American authors had been produced in Germany since 1933, it was believed that all rights on American plays had lapsed. Nevertheless, until a basic contract was reached with the Dramatists Guild, it was not considered possible to secure American plays for production in the U.S. Zone.

The first list of American plays to be cleared for production in Germany consisted of: Thunder Rock, Our Town, Yellow Jack, Awake and Sing, Abe Lincoln in Illinois, Three Men on a Horse, Ethan Frome, Knickerbocker Holiday, Uncle Harry, and On Borrowed Time.

On 13 June 1946 the premiere of the first American comedy in Germany, Three Men on a Horse (Drei Man auf einem Pferd) by John Cecil Holm and Georg Abbot, took place in the Deutsches Theater in Berlin. The play proved to be a great
success with the German audience. The performance was directed by Axel Ivers, who also translated the script and played a leading role in the production.

Seven other plays by U.S. authors with German translations were performed during the spring of 1946:

*Thunder Rock* by Robert Audrey was presented in Bad Kissingen, Berlin, Bremen, Erlangen, Frankfurt, Giessen, Hamburg, Heidelberg, Karlsruhe, Kompten, Krumbach, Memmingen, Muenchen, Regensburg, Stuttgart, Suessen, and Ulm.

*Three Men on a Horse* by John C. Holm and Georg Abbot was performed in Berlin and Wiesbaden.

*Awake and Sing* by Clifford Odets gave performances in Berlin, Heidelberg, Mannheim, and Stuttgart.

*On Borrowed Time* by Paul Osborn was presented in Berlin, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Mannheim, Stuttgart, and Weisbaden.


*Our Town* by Thornton Wilder was performed in Augsburg, Berlin, Bremen, Esslingen, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Hersfeld, Karlsruhe, Kassel, Muenchen, Nuremberg, Offenbach, Regensburg, Schwetzingen, Stuttgart, Ulm, and Wiesbaden.

*Skin of Our Teeth* by Thornton Wilder was presented in Berlin,

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89 Film, Theater and Music Branch Report for June 1946.
Darmstadt, Munich, Stuttgart, and Wiesbaden.

In addition to these seven plays being performed on 27 German theater stages, Eugene O’Neill’s *Ah, Wilderness (O Wildnis)* had been translated into German and was available in printed form for the German theaters, and by 30 June 1946 the German translations of seven other U.S. plays were being printed and were expected to be ready in a short time. These included: *My Heart’s in the Highland, Adding Machine, Uncle Harry, The Barretts of Wimpolestreet, Morning’s at Seven, Men in White*, and *Angel Street*.

Twelve other U.S. plays were in the process of being translated: *Abe Lincoln in Illinois, Biography, Ethan Frome, Embezzled Heaven, End of Summer, Family Portrait, Morning Becomes Electra, No Time for Comedy, One Sunday Afternoon, The Patriots, Reunion in Vienna*, and *Why Marry*.

The *Staatstheater* at Dresden was given permission to perform “Our Town”; this was the first performance of an American play in the Soviet Zone. By June 1946, performances of U.S. plays were scheduled for four other towns in that Zone, at Halle, Eisenach, Magdeburg, and Leipzig.

An arrangement was also worked out by U.S. Information Control Branch, OMG port Command Bremen, with British 8 ICU (Hamburg) for the performance of American plays by German licensed theaters in that British areas. Applications were made by the theaters through ICU, and scripts were to be furnished by Information Control Branch, Bremen. It was also planned to make the same arrangement with 30 ICU (Hanover).
Section 3 -- Music Control

18. Basis of Acceptable Music

Music Control Instruction No. 1, issued by PWD/SHAEF, 19 June 1945, prohibited (1) all military marches, including marches habitually used by the German Army (Imperial as well as National Socialist), by the National Socialist party or by formations and affiliated organizations of the Party, and (2) all songs exclusively or primarily associated with the Wehrmacht and Nazism.

Any further attempts at prohibition, the Instruction stated, would involve great difficulties. If, for example, Siegfried's Funeral March from the Twilight of the Gods were prohibited as a separate piece because of its associations with National Socialism, the same argument would apply to the slow movements of Beethoven's Third and Seventh Symphonies. Similarly, if Ein Heldenleben by Richard Strauss was prohibited, the prohibition should extend to Schubert's An Schwager Kronos, which more specifically encourages dangerous tendencies.

Performances of such music should be discouraged by substituting more desirable music, this Instruction recommended. However, it stated, the performance of particular pieces, otherwise harmless, should be prohibited on certain occasions -- for example, the performance of certain works on the anniversary of Hitler's birthday, such as Beethoven's Eroica Symphony or Strauss' Ein Heldenleben. Similarly the Nazi Heldengedenktag must not be celebrated by

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Information contained in Section 2, Theater Control, relating to historical background, mission, denazification, shortage of theaters and other problems common to both Theater and Music, likewise applies to this section.
concerts of solemn music, however harmless this may be in itself, it was pointed out.

Music Control Instruction No. 1 also cited the inflammatory possibilities of non-German nationalist music, suggesting that performances of Sibelius' *Finlandia* or Chopin's *Revolutionary Study* against certain political backgrounds might be intended and used as occasions for anti-Soviet demonstrations. Prohibition in such cases was at the discretion of the local music control officer who was instructed to be alert to the possibilities of “musical sabotage”. Projects for and programs of local musical festivals were to be scrutinized with particular care, and in all cases referred to PWD/SHAEF or its successors.

The Instructions did not attempt to compile a complete index of political music, pointing out the necessity of avoiding any impression of trying to regiment culture in the Nazi manner. “German musical life must be influenced by positive rather than by negative means,” it stipulated, “encouraging the music which we think beneficial and crowding out that which we think dangerous.”

This formula was to be applied in some degree also to German composers, conductors and artists. Personnel to be banned included those who had proved themselves to be ardent Nazis, whether by their Party posts in music or by their non-musical political activities. Although performances containing works by Richard Strauss or Hans Pfitzner were not banned, the instruction stated that such composers should not be publicized by special concerts devoted entirely to their works or conducted by them.
The main endeavor of Music Control was to introduce or re-introduce the German public to the large musical world from which they had been barred under the Nazi regime. Performances of works by composers who had been banned by the Nazis for racial or political reasons, like Mendelssohn, Hindemith, Meyerbeer and Offenbach, and performances of works by composers from outside Germany, were to be encouraged. The performance of lesser-known works of famous German composers, which had not been accepted as part of the Nazi canon of German national culture, such as Haydn's symphonies, Mozart's piano concertos, Schubert's chamber music, was likewise to be encouraged.

19. Instruction to Licensees

Music Instruction to Licensees, No. 1, issued by SHAEF, listed policy instructions which licensees engaging in music activities were to observe:

a. No music may be presented which propagates militaristic ideas, or which is primarily associated with Fascism, the NSDAP, Pan-Germanism or the German Armed Forces, and, in the case of vocal music, no composition may be presented, the words of which attempt to create divisions between, or foster disrespect for any of the United Nations, or which propagates National Socialist or related volkisch ideas, including racism or race hatred, or which constitutes an incitement to riot or disorder, or which interferes in any way with the process of Military Government.

b. No composer, author, manager, producer, impresario, sponsor, showman or director who has been a notorious Nazi or an ardent Nazi sympathizer may administer or supervise any musical activity of the licensee.

c. No actor, singer, musician, conductor, or other personality who has been a notorious Nazi or an ardent Nazi sympathizer may appear in any presentation or otherwise take part in any musical activity of the licensee.

The operating instructions required that “not less than 72 hours before the day of the performance, licensees should deliver to the DISCC from which their
license was obtained a true copy of every program they intended to present.” The program was to list all compositions; alternative compositions which might be played, and the names of the composer and author of each composition. Accompanying each program a report was required giving the date or dates of the performances, and stating whether it was in conjunction with a celebration of any particular occasion, historical or otherwise. Licensees were required also to submit a list of all the major participants in the program and a statement signed by the licensee that no one participating in the performance had been an active Nazi or an ardent Nazi sympathizer.

20. Licenses and Registrations

By 30 June 1946, U.S. licenses granted to music publishers, orchestras, opera companies, producers for musical performances, and phonograph recording manufacturers totalled 69, and music registrations granted to musicians such as vocalists and instrumentalists totalled 7,933,\(^9\) divided geographically as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Music Licenses</th>
<th>Music Registrations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin (U.S. Sector)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen Enclave</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Hesse</td>
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<td>1,918</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wuerttemberg-Baden</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^9\) Weekly Report of the Theater and Film Section, ODIC, for period 27 June - 3 July 1946.
21. Revival of Music in Germany

In some German cities, musical life was revived within a very short time after the cessation of hostilities. The Munich Philharmonic Orchestra gave its first concert 8 July 1945, and on the same day the German licensee Albert Kehm presented a recital of chamber music in the Staatstheater to an overflow audience of 1,500 people. A concert was also given in Stuttgart on the same date. These were the first licensed musical performances in the U.S. Zone.92

In Wiesbaden and Frankfurt concerts began on 29 July 1945. The concert in Frankfurt was in memory of those from Frankfurt who lost their lives in concentration camps. It was held in the auditorium of the Frankfurt radio station. Mannheim's musical life was resumed in August with the presentations of a light operatic concert and Haydn's The Creation. In Heidelberg, the first post-war concert took place on 1 August 1945.

Cultural activities were well on the way in Bavaria by mid-September, and traditional concert groups were making their reappearance in communities throughout that Land. Orchestras were being established in all the large cities. The capital maintained two: The Munich Philharmonic and the Bavarian State Opera Orchestra. Munich's famous Brunnenhof concerts were again being given, but were shifted to the Grottenhof because of bomb damage to the original site. An orchestra was giving symphony concerts in Ingolstadt, another in Wurzburg, and a third was being formed in Bayreuth. Symphony orchestras also were performing in

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Nuremberg and Augsburg. The trend among all orchestras was toward programs of classical music. Munich's first attempt at modern music proved a failure -- only three hundred people attended it. In Bad Nauheim, the Oberhessische Symphony Orchestra gave the first of a series of concerts on 16 September. Directed by Hans Blumer, former conductor of opera at Mainz, the orchestra played compositions of Beethoven and Tschaikowsky to a capacity audience.

The directors of Frankfurt's Börsensaal, with the exchange floor converted into an opera house, displayed great ingenuity by producing five operatic works with little or no technical equipment. Their first performance, Tosca, was presented on 29 September; on Sunday, 21 October, a revival of Mozart's Figaros Hochzeit was presented. In Heidelberg, a large hall in the University was made available to Germans on a full-time basis, compensating for the Seventh Army requisitioning of the Stadthalle for use of troops.

By arrangement with the local Military Government authorities and Army Special Services, the Stadthalle in Kassel was set aside as a civilian cultural center for theatrical and musical performances. While the hall was undergoing extensive repairs, the city's Staatstheater performed on the makeshift stage of the badly damaged Cafe Reiss.

In Wiesbaden, the premier of Madame Butterfly was given on 9 November in a hall made available to the company. In Bad Homburg, Dr. Paul Brehm, operating under a provisional license, organized a concert series with a symphony orchestra he formed at his own expense. The premiere of Wiener Blut was given 11
November and met with the largest audience response to that time. The Frankfurt Symphony was at the same time rehearsing its first concert series. Early in December, *Fidelio* opened a Beethoven festival in the *Börsensaal*.

Music Control also encouraged the organization of choral societies, urging subordinate echelons to initiate and aid amateur choral groups. Historically, *Liedergesangsvereine* and *Liedertafeln* had a long and popular tradition in German musical life, and since such groups presumably sang for their own enjoyment and not for audiences, licensing was not required. As part of the reorientation of German youth, Information Control urged the organization of youth orchestras and singing, dancing and theatrical groups.

Musical programs for displaced persons also received attention. Realizing the importance of providing persons at such assembly centers with means for theatrical and musical entertainment, the DISCCs were advised that where displaced persons had developed a theatrical or musical program and requested the use of a theater, accommodation would be made available to them.

### 22. Use of American Music

Since the supply of printed music was meager in Germany due to war destruction and Nazi banning of the works of many composers, OWI was requested by ICD to clarify the problem of importing music into the U.S. Zone and the problem of protecting copyrights, particularly of American compositions. ICD felt that Military Government should not assume responsibility for protecting the interests of any
particular copyright owner, but did recognize that copyrights should be protected, and suggested that the German Performance Rights Society (STAGMA) be re-established to collect fees for performances.

The first printed music from the United States arrived in the fall of 1945 and consisted of Quincy Porter's *Music for Strings*, Virgil Thomson's suite, *The Plow that Broke the Plains* and Douglas Moore's *Village Music*.

Contemporary American music, which had not been available to the Germans since 1933, was included in German concerts on an increasing scale during 1946. Among the first works to be heard were Howard Hanson's *Third Symphony*, presented in Wiesbaden, Walter Piston's suite from *The Incredible Flutist* in Heidelberg and Mannheim, and Samuel Barber's *Adagio* and Charles Ives' chamber music played in Berlin. By 30 June 1946, 71 concert performances of 33 musical works of U.S. composers93 had been given in Germany since the occupation started. In addition, more than 100 American musical works had been released for performance in Germany.

The Berlin Philharmonic's music library, which had been stored in Bayreuth during the war, was transported to Berlin in April through the assistance of the Information Control Division in Munich. In addition, complete materials to 84 American chamber music and orchestral music works were being held by Music

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93 *Adagio, Capricorn Concerto, Essay, Essay No. 2, School for Scandal Overture, Symphony No. 2 and Violin Concerto* by S. Barber; *Clarinet Sonata* by L. Bernstein; *Schelomo Rhapsody* by E. Bloch; *Holiday Overture* by E. Carter; *Appalachian Spring, Outdoor Overture, Symphony and Violin Sonata* by A. Copland; *Quintet* by D. Diamond; *Symphony No. 3* by H. H. Hanson; *Trio* by R. Harris; *Adagio and Violin Sonata* by Charles Ives; *Concertino, String Quartet No. 1, The Incredible Flutist Suite, Symphony No. 2, Trio No. 1 and Violin Sonata* by W. Piston; *String Quartet No. 4 and Ukrainian Suite* by Quincy Porter; *American Festival Overture, String quartet No. 2, Symphony for Strings and Symphony No. 3* by W. Schumann; *String Quartet* by R. Sessions; and *Symphony No. 2* by R. Thompson.
Control in April 1946. There was a great demand for such works for performance in the U.S. Zone. This material ICD planned to turn over to the Inter-Allied Music Lending Library when it became established.

23. German Performance Rights Society (STAGMA)

Shortly after VE-Day, several officers of the German Performance Rights Society (STAGMA) applied for and received permission from the British Military Government authorities to start functioning again.\textsuperscript{94} Unfortunately the complete files of STAGMA were not available, having been evacuated during the war from Berlin to a point now located in Polish occupied territory.

In December 1945, a custodian was appointed for STAGMA in the U.S. Zone. This meant that STAGMA could resume the task of collecting fees for the performance of all copyrighted works in Germany, thus opening the way for performances and protection of additional U.S. and Allied music. STAGMA held membership in the Confederation Internationale of Performance Rights Societies, and was federated with the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), a society for the protection of rights of American authors, composers and publishers. Hans Aldenhoff, a German lawyer, was suggested by ICD and subsequently appointed by Property Control as custodian for U.S. interests in STAGMA. In March 1946, he was appointed by the French authorities as custodian of the French interest in STAGMA, and later by the British authorities as custodian

\textsuperscript{94} Offices of STAGMA were located in the British Sector of Berlin.
for British interests in the organization.

By April 1946, STAGMA agents had permission of the Deutsche Zentralverwaltung (German Central Government) in the Soviet Zone of Germany to collect performance fees in Land Sachsen, Province Sachsen, Land Thueringen, Land Mecklenburg, Vorpommern and Province Brandenburg. Thus by the end of June 1946, STAGMA agents were collecting performance fees in all four zones.

Collected fees were kept in the various zones, but no payments to owners of performance rights had been authorized by 30 June 1946, pending a quadripartite decision on this matter.

24. Inter-Allied Music Lending Library

At the close of June 1946, plans were being made to open an Inter-Allied Music Lending Library in Berlin. Suitable and experienced German personnel had been chosen as librarians and were to be paid by the Magistrat of the City of Berlin. The main purpose of the Library was to introduce into Germany the most representative works of Allied composers, and to encourage German composers to express their art in the best traditions of Germany’s musical culture.

By 30 June 1946, approximately 600 British, 200 Soviet, 100 French and 100 American music works had arrived in Berlin for the library. Photostat copies of 47 musical scores and parts on micro-film formed a part of the U.S. contribution. A mimeographed catalog of all American works in the library was prepared by ICD. The catalog also contained brief biographical sketches in German of American
composers. The Library was to be open to all Allied personnel, but the borrowing of music was restricted to Germans.

Under the library plan, rental fees for American musical works performed in Germany were to be collected by the Inter-Allied Music Lending Library, the fees to be turned over to the Information Control fiscal officer and to be credited on blocked-mark accounts to the copyright owners.

25. Revival of German Opera

Opera had always occupied a prominent place in German cultural life and was soon revived. By the end of 1945, opera houses had been reestablished and licensed by Information Control in the following cities in the U.S. Zone: Munich, Augsburg, Nuremberg (and Fuerth), Coburg, Wiesbaden, Kassel, Stuttgart, Mannheim and Heidelberg. Between 1 January and 30 June 1946, Regensburg, Darmstadt, Karlsruhe, Ulm, Gmuend and Schwetzingen were added to the list. A boon to opera revival in Germany was the discovery, in a salt mine near Heimboldshausen, of a large cache of costumes belonging to the Berlin State Opera Company. These costumes were confiscated and distributed to opera companies in the four zones of occupation.

The first opera to be presented in the U.S. Zone was Puccini's Tosca, performed in Frankfurt on 29 September 1945. This was followed in October by performances of Rossini's Barber of Seville in Mannheim, Verdi's Il Trovatore in Kassel, The Magic Flute by Mozart in Nuremberg (and Fuerth), Fledermaus by
Johann Strauss in Stuttgart and *Hänsel und Gretel* by Humperdinck in Heidelberg.

While Wagner's music was never prohibited by Information Control, his operas were not performed during the period ending 30 June 1946. The Germans thought that Wagnerian performances, in view of their wide usage by Hitler, might not find favor with the Allies. Also it was impossible for many of the German opera houses, which had been damaged during the war, to present such operas with their inadequate technical facilities. Special singers and good woodwind players also were scarce.

By the end of June 1946, 17 cities throughout the U.S.-occupied areas had their own opera companies and 445 performances of 30 different operas had been performed in Bavaria, 300 performances of 27 operas in Greater Hesse, 190 performances of 12 operas in the Bremen Enclave, and 449 performances of 23 operas in Wurttemberg-Baden. There was no opera in the U.S. sector of Berlin, but the *Staatsopera*, located in the Soviet sector, and the *Stadische* Opera in the British sector, were operating by this date.

Chapter 4 -- Radio Control

1. Introduction

From the beginning, radio broadcasting in Germany was a state responsibility. Before the Nazis came into power, the German broadcasting corporation, *Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft* (RRG), was a network of regional stations

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95 A total of 59 German opera houses was destroyed by the war.
whose fixed capital was held in trust by the German Post Ministry. Broadcasting and administrative policies, however, were to a certain extent provincially and locally determined.

By 1932 Nazis had dominated the important Radio Listeners' Society and after assuming control of Germany, proceeded to set up an elaborate party organization designed to extend and tighten the controls over the broad masses of listeners, as well as controlling the administration and operation of radio broadcasting. The Nazis claimed they were the first to realize the great potentialities of broadcasting for the purposes of propaganda and control of public opinion. They regarded the radio as their most powerful instrument for educating the German people along Nazi lines.

In 1933, upon creation of the Propaganda Ministry with its special division for radio broadcasting, Goebbels reorganized the entire system of radio transmission and reception. These lines of control remained substantially unchanged throughout the Nazi rule.

In 1940 the proportion of licensed sets to population in Greater Germany\(^{96}\) was exceeded only by those in the United States, Sweden, Denmark, New Zealand and Great Britain. Although the quality of the best German radio receiving sets was excellent, the average radio owner had only a simple instrument on which he could hear long and medium wave transmissions. It was estimated that less than one-third of the sets in use could receive short wave broadcasts. A large part of the

\(^{96}\) 157.2 sets per 1,000 population.
population had only the *Volksempfänger*, a 3-tube set, and the *Kleinempfänger*, a 2-
tube set. These were of little use for other than receiving local German stations or
powerful long wave or medium wave foreign stations located near the German
frontier.

The *Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft* became the administrative organization for
the Greater German Wireless, which consisted of the *Deutschlandsender*, the 13
*Reichssender* (regional stations), and the *Gleichwellen* (synchronized groups of
provincial and local stations). The *Deutschlandsender*, a powerful long wave
transmitter with its studios in Berlin and its transmitters at Herzberg, was the center
of nation-wide broadcasts.

Throughout most of the day, all stations were linked to the
*Deutschlandsender* for news broadcasts, readings of communiques, political talks,
music, entertainment and feature programs. Some variations permitted features of
provincial and local interest. All forms of radio music were popular with the
Germans, from major classical works to jazz, with most of the music in the light
classical vein. Folk music and war songs also were common.

News and comment generally were merged and at least once daily the
German radio listener could hear an anonymous political talk on whatever subject
the Propaganda Ministry selected for current treatment. Hans Fritzsche, Goebbels'
deputy, broadcast regularly, and Goebbels' weekly article in *Das Reich* was read
over the air. These talks were important since they provided material for lesser Nazi
propagandists everywhere. Military commentaries were given by such high-ranking
individuals as Lt. Gen. Kurt Dittmar.

The European Service of the RRG broadcast daily in a score or more languages over a special network. Known as Europasender, this special network utilized the facilities of various conquered and “collaborating” stations, along with those of Germany proper. More important than the European Service, however, was the Overseas Broadcasting Service which operated through a network of short wave transmitters with its center at Zeesen, near Berlin. This service presented programs in approximately 50 languages and dialects, and insofar as possible, nationals of the countries to which the broadcasts were beamed wrote the scripts and did the speaking, closely following Nazi directives.

After 1933, the operation of a secret radio station in Germany which voiced anti-Nazi views, constituted high treason. After 1 September 1939, it was illegal either to listen to a foreign broadcast or to circulate any information or opinions broadcast by a forbidden foreign station.

With the exception of news, practically all German radio programs were recorded by the magnetophone system. The RRG operated the studio centers and provided all program material. The transmitters, together with the lines and associated equipment, were operated by the Reichspost.

2. Mission of Radio Control

Radio Control, according to Military Government Regulations, included the control of all German broadcasting media which could be heard by the general
German public, and control of wired radio transmission, television stations and systems, and audio-frequency distribution systems. It did not include transmissions in code, transmissions by correspondents intended for broadcast or publication for any country other than Germany, or transmissions specifically for the entertainment of Allied occupation troops.97

No facilities within the scope of Radio Control could be placed in operation without prior approval of the Information Control Division,98 and no broadcast transmitter could be placed in operation until it had been allocated a frequency by the Chief Signal Officer of USFET.99

ICD's principal task was to guide and control the reconstitution of German broadcasting. It was responsible for formulating the policies governing radio control in Germany and for issuing the necessary instructions for the execution of these policies. ICD was further charged with designating essential programs to be carried by all German stations, act on behalf of the combined stations with other branches of Military Government and other headquarters, conduct all negotiations concerning any station with persons and organizations outside the U.S. Zone, act as supply channel for material procured in the United States and as procurement agency for technical equipment and materials not on the open market and requiring the action of higher authority, and act as central engineering authority on all technical matters.100

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97 MGR, Title 21, C-2 (12 May 46), 21-500.
98 MGR, Title 21, C-2 (12 May 46), 21-520
99 Ibid, 21-521
100 Ibid, 21-522.1
Operational and supervisory responsibility for German radio stations was vested in the Information Control officers of the appropriate Offices of Military Government of the *Länder*, under policy instructions issued by ICD. Locally originated programs and schedules were subject to review, scrutiny and concurrence by ICD.\textsuperscript{101}

### 3. Radio Luxembourg

Radio Luxembourg, a powerful 150 kilowatt transmitter considered one of the most important pre-war transmitters in all Europe, served as the key station for U.S. radio operations from September 1944 to November 1945. Radio Luxembourg's connection with the Allied war effort dated back to 22 May 1944, when the Luxembourg-Government-in-Exile agreed to permit Allied use of the station. In September of the same year, the U.S. 5th Armored Division captured the transmitter, and the station went on the air for the Allied cause. It was operated by a staff from the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF.

When the U.S. Army reached Germany it found nearly all radio stations heavily damaged and virtually unusable. Technicians were assigned to make repairs and to set up land lines connecting the German stations into a network. At the outset, Radio Luxembourg served as the key station for the *Süddeutsche Rundfunk*\textsuperscript{102} (South German Radio). Regular relays from Luxembourg to Munich were begun on 12 May 1945; Radio Frankfurt was added to the network on 2 June

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\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, 21-523
\textsuperscript{102} British Zone counterpart was *Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk* (Northwest German Radio).
and Radio Stuttgart on 3 June.

At first programs consisted mainly of brief, factual local and world news; proclamations and instructions of Military Government; Sunday religious broadcasts representing all denominations; talks by local and regional officials, and music. Musical interludes at first were considered necessary only to maintain audience interest. Since then, however, music has formed an increasing proportion of the radio schedule.

Until 11 November 1945, the bulk of the programs carried by the three stations in the U.S. Zone originated at Radio Luxembourg. On that date Radio Luxembourg was turned back to the Duchy of Luxembourg and land lines connecting Munich, Frankfurt and Stuttgart were placed in operation. Thenceforth radio programs originated inside Germany and were produced by Military Government Information Control teams.

4. Revival of German Radio

The first radio station in Germany proper to go on the air under U.S. Military Government supervision was Radio Munich (100 kilowatts). When the Bavarian capital fell to U.S. troops late in April 1945, the 6870th DISCC's Radio Section was sent from France to Munich, arriving on 5 May, three days before the capitulation of the German Army. The radio transmitter was found comparatively intact, although land lines connecting studio and transmitter had been destroyed. The studio building, located on Rundfunkplatz, was also heavily damaged from air raids, with
only one or two studio rooms usable. While emergency repairs were being completed, test broadcasts were made from a temporary studio at the transmitter site. The first of these were made at intervals during the day of 10 May, utilizing relays of world news from Radio Luxembourg coupled with brief Military Government announcements. Regular broadcasts began 12 May.\(^{103}\) By the end of the first thirty days of operation, a period devoted to cleaning up debris and investigation and employment of Germans as radio technicians and announcers, broadcast time had been increased to 10.5 hours daily.

By the end of the SHAEF period, 13 July 1945, Radio Munich had an active news department in operation with reporters covering Military Government and local news sources. It was also conducting regular and special broadcasts such as weekly church services, concerts by the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra and such features as “For the Farmer” and “The Mayor Speaks.” Locally originated programs continued to increase until by the end of August 1945 Radio Munich was broadcasting its own programs as much as 40 hours weekly. Because of the poor quality of the land lines linking Radio Munich to *Sueddeutsche Rundfunk*, the station ceased carrying network programs on 18 November 1945 and became an independent station. By December the station had increased its time on the air to 66 hours a week, and by 30 June 1946 it was broadcasting 100 hours a week.\(^{104}\)

When the U.S. forces seized Frankfurt in April 1945, the studios of Radio

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Frankfurt also were found in badly damaged condition, and the transmitter was found demolished. Psychological Warfare units used mobile broadcasting vans stationed just outside the city to transmit news programs and Military Government instructions to the populace. These vans served as studios for the new Radio Frankfurt until July 1945, when operations were transferred to temporary studios at Bad Nauheim, pending repairs to facilities in Frankfurt. Radio Frankfurt began operating on 2 June 1945 with power of 1 kilowatt. In August, after a captured German Army transmitter had been installed, the power was increased to 20 kilowatts.

In mid-February 1946, after eight months of broadcasting from Bad Nauheim, Radio Frankfurt returned to its original home and resumed broadcasting from its newly renovated studios.\(^{105}\)

Radio Stuttgart (100 Kilowatts) was the last of the three larger German stations to go on the air. A radio team from the 6871 DISCC, when it first inspected the station in April 1945, found the transmitter badly damaged by German demolition squads, and for a number of weeks the main task consisted of physical repairs to the plant. Serious shortages of building materials made progress slow. Repairs to power and control circuits were especially difficult, and improvisations of all kinds were required. The first broadcast under U.S. supervision took place 3 June 1945.

Initially, the city of Stuttgart was under French Military Government

administration. Since the French supplied all Military Government bulletins, Radio Stuttgart, although operated by U.S. personnel, refrained from making any announcements of an official nature to the German people. The entire broadcasting picture, however, underwent a radical change once the U.S. Army assumed control of Stuttgart on 8 July 1945. Col. William Dawson, Chief of Military Government for Wuerttemberg-Baden, immediately instituted a regular Military Government program. A German editorial and announcing staff, headed by Joseph Eberle, Swabian poet and writer, and Alfred Braun, widely known commentator of pre-Nazi days, were employed to work under Information Control supervision.

The nearness of Stuttgart to the French Zone of occupation led to the installation in December 1945 of a program line between Stuttgart and Strasbourg. This enabled the French to use Stuttgart's program lines for French reports on the War Crimes Trials being held in Nuremberg.

Before becoming a part of Sueddeutsche Rundfunk, Radio Stuttgart originally offered only 18.5 hours of local programs each week. When it became an independent station in November 1945, programs of local origin had increased to a weekly total of 40 hours.

During the period ending 30 June 1946, three more stations were added to the U.S. total: a relay station at Nuremberg, synchronized with Radio Munich; a station at Bremen to provide Military Government with radio service for the Enclave, and Drahtfunk (wired radio) in the U.S. Sector in Berlin. A relay station was contemplated for Kassel to be synchronized with Radio Frankfurt, but it had not
been placed in operation by the end of June 1946.

Originally it had been planned not to activate the Bremen station as the British were responsible for major Military Government matters within Bremen, and the area was covered by Radio Hamburg. Closer study, however, revealed the necessity for the U.S. Bremen Port Commander to have a radio outlet as a means of communicating with the local population. The first broadcast from the Bremen station (1 kilowatt) took place 23 December 1945, with the Bürgermeister and the U.S. Port Commander speaking at the opening ceremonies. The opening broadcast also included selections by the Bremen cathedral choir. In the beginning, Radio Bremen was on the air two hours daily, 1900 to 2100 hours, and all programs originated locally.

Drahtfunk broadcasts in the U.S. Sector of Berlin began 7 February 1946, with a daily broadcast schedule from 1700 to 2400 hours. Instruction sheets were distributed throughout the Sector explaining how radio owners could use this service. According to figures there was a potential of 165,700 radio sets in the U.S. Sector over which Drahtfunk programs could be heard.

Studios for Drahtfunk were constructed by the Deutsches Post, which likewise provided necessary technical maintenance. The original staff for Drahtfunk was composed of four U.S. and approximately 80 German employees. Some programs originated in Berlin, while others were magnetophone tape transcriptions

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107 British licensed.
108 Drahtfunk operated by sending long wave transmissions over telephone lines. Reception was achieved by connecting a radio set to a telephone instrument or telephone wire, and tuning to the proper wave length. Such transmissions did not interfere with ordinary commercial telephone service over the same lines.
of programs originated in the U.S. Zone. Preliminary surveys conducted by ICD's Intelligence Branch two weeks after the opening of the station indicated that 65 percent of radio owners living in the U.S. Sector had heard *Drahtfunk* programs, although reception was sometimes faulty owing to disrepair of telephone facilities. While the number of telephones authorized for civilian use in Berlin was limited, many houses which had formerly possessed telephones and were still wired for service could receive the broadcasts.

Plans for an exchange of *Drahtfunk* programs between the U.S. and British Sectors of Berlin were put into effect during May and June 1945, thus giving listeners in those two sectors a choice of two *Drahtfunk* programs in addition to the Soviet station, Radio Berlin. Originally it had been planned to make *Drahtfunk* city-wide, but the Soviets objected and the exchange of programs became a bi-lateral arrangement between the U.S. and British stations.

5. Policy

Radio under the Propaganda Ministry was the most potent psychological weapon the Nazis employed to sway the minds of the German people, therefore it was essential that the Allies rid all radio services within Germany of Nazi influences. Qualified German operating personnel was found almost unavailable since the vast use of such people by the Nazi propaganda machine made them politically unacceptable to Military Government.

The three major stations in the U.S. Zone -- Munich, Stuttgart and Frankfurt -- were begun as military operations with the assistance of the few acceptable
German technicians who could be found. Training of German personnel to take on operating responsibility was begun as part of the plan for reconstituting the broadcasting stations as German corporations. Radio Control officers advised on matters of production and programming, and exercised control responsibilities for all phases of broadcasting.

In addition, a Network Control Office was established in Frankfurt to coordinate network programs, give policy guidance and provide technical aid to Sueddeutscher Rundfunk. While control officers at the independent stations scrutinized all scripts before broadcasts, it was to be a function of the Network Control Office to maintain post-broadcast scrutiny.\textsuperscript{109} This office also maintained two-way radio communication with the Voice of America (Die Stimme Amerikas) for coordinating programming and policy instructions.

While the Voice of America broadcasts were the direct responsibility of OWI, and later of its successor, the Interim International Information Service of the State Department, Military Government policy as reflected in the content of these programs was of primary concern to Information Control. These programs originated in New York City and were sent overseas by short wave where they were picked up and rebroadcast by the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), Radio Luxembourg, and stations in the U.S. Zone.

Special reports and commentaries on the War Crimes trials were transcribed at Nuremberg for broadcast by Radio Munich and by relay over all other U.S.

\textsuperscript{109} A lack of personnel prevented the Network Control Office from carrying out this particular function, however, additional post-broadcast scrutiny and spot monitoring was conducted by a Content Analysis unit which also surveyed German language broadcasts beamed to Germany from outside the U.S. Zone.
licensed stations. Other programs of a commentary nature which advanced Military Government policy in a positive way were also ordered by ICD to be broadcast by all stations. Negotiations with the other occupying powers produced cooperative working arrangements which resulted in interzonal exchanges of programs.

Although all stations were still operating in June 1946 as Military Government organs, preliminary work on the formation of German radio corporations had been accomplished by the Länderrat. The Länder agreed to set up independent corporations which would operate the present studio and transmitter facilities and would cooperate on network matters and technical questions. Charters for the corporations were being drawn so as to eliminate the possibility of political interference in broadcasting, and to insure that radio would represent all elements of the population fairly. Radio stations in U.S. areas of occupation were operated on the principle of freedom of expression within the scope of Military Government policy directives. The democratic custom of round-table discussion, so popular in the United States and Great Britain, was encouraged. An expression of democracy in the purely political sense was the allocation of equal time to all political parties for the expression of their views and platform, particularly during elections.

6. Problems of Equipment and Personnel

One difficult problem that Radio Control had to solve was the short supply of radio equipment. Tubes for broadcasting transmitters were critical, and those for receiving sets were practically non-existent. To meet equipment demands, a radio technical workshop was established at Bad Homburg, under the direction of a
German specialist, to supervise the manufacture of studio equipment, to make repairs which were beyond the scope of individual radio stations, and to test and inspect new equipment. The workshop was also capable of constructing magnetophone recording and reproduction heads and of modifying obsolete models in accordance with newer designs. A plant of the I.G. Farben Industrie, operating under a U.S. custodian, was turning out thousands of rolls of magnetophone tape and supplying them to Information Control.

In addition to poor land lines and shortages of equipment, there was a great need for qualified personnel, both U.S. and German. Re-deployment, and the inability to find suitable Germans quickly enough, caused operational difficulties. Nevertheless, by mid-December 1945 there were more than 600 German employees working in all radio stations in the U.S. Zone, and U.S. military and civilian personnel were gradually being restricted to executive positions.

Progress in the rehabilitation of German radio up to 30 June 1946, as denoted by the increase in weekly transmission time of the stations during the year, is as follows:\textsuperscript{110}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radio Station</th>
<th>Weekly Hours at Outset</th>
<th>Weekly Hours 30 June 1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuttgart</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Drahtfunk} (Berlin)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These increases were effected by stages at each station as production

conditions permitted. It was anticipated that each of the stations except Radio Bremen would continue to increase its transmission time until a full service of about 18 hours daily was achieved. Radio Bremen was expected to increase its air time to a maximum of 11 hours daily, which was considered sufficient for Military Government purposes in the Bremen enclave.

7. Programs

During the first year of operation, considerable progress was made in rehabilitating the German radio. Balanced schedules were inaugurated in order to maintain the entertainment value of radio and at the same time to carry out occupation aims. An analysis of Radio Munich programs illustrates this balance: Music occupied slightly over 52 percent of the broadcasting time; 21 percent was devoted to news and public affairs, and the remaining 27 percent was devoted to programs for women, youth and children; literary, dramatic and educational programs; and, in the early months, Polish language broadcasts for displaced persons.

Some of the early programs of Radio Munich included an English lessen series and a program of unpublished historical facts about Bavaria. Some of the programs presented in September 1945 were: “English macht Spass” (English is Fun), “Vor und Umschau” (Preview and Review), “Intermesso” and several musical shows. A special feature was a program dedicated to the celebration of the Jewish New Year.
By the end of October, Radio Munich had increased its local programs to 45.5 hours a week. New programs included “Ein Blick Zurück” (Looking Back), on Sundays; “Die Jugend und die Welt” (Youth and the World), bi-weekly; and “Der Hörer hat das Wort” (The Listener has a Word). Special broadcasts included the licensing of the newspaper SÜddeutsche Zeitung, Beethoven’s opera “Fidelio,” the Bavarian Minister-President’s declaration of the government, and an address by the Minister of Agriculture.

Prominent programs during November included “Ulk und A,” a new comedy series broadcast on Sunday evenings; “Serenade fur Dich” (Serenade for You); American folk tunes sung by an American soldier; “Film im Funk” (Film in the Radio); and “This is America.” Special broadcasts included a memorial program from Dachau, which featured songs sung by a U.S. Army chorus, and the opening speech of Justice Robert H. Jackson, chief U.S. prosecutor, at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial.

A program popular with German radio listeners during the winter months was “The Ten of the Week”, a half-hour of popular music similar to the “Hit Parade”. The program included the ten most popular American songs chosen on the basis of the listeners’ votes. Each German who cast a ballot received a copy of the words to the ten songs chosen for that week. The balloting, conducted by mail, increased steadily, and many Germans considered it a good means of developing a taste for American popular music, offsetting the anti-jazz propaganda campaign initiated by Goebbels.
Radio Frankfurt originated the first postwar broadcast by a German from Germany to the United States, a short wave speech by Dr. Gustav Bergstrasser, Social Democratic leader, to the New York Herald-Tribune Forum in New York on 30 October 1945. He spoke for six minutes on the introduction into Germany of a democratic way of living and thinking. Another of Frankfurt’s “firsts” was the inauguration in November of a new workers’ program, the first of its kind in occupied Germany. Frankfurt’s local news broadcasts, devoted chiefly to political, administrative and economic matters, provided news coverage from Fulda to Wiesbaden and from Mannheim to Kassel.

Christmas broadcasts over Radio Stuttgart included special programs by the Brucknercher, the Kinderchor and a number of guest artists. President Truman’s special Christmas Eve message also was broadcast. Preparations were made in December 1945 for inaugurating a weekly program devoted to world-wide progress in medical science. Short biographies of General Eisenhower and Generalissimo Stalin were given on the information program “Menschen, von denen man spricht”. During this month also a two-hour program of Beethoven’s music was given, honoring his 175th anniversary. Other timely and successful programs begun by Radio Stuttgart were “For our Workmen”, “Japan on the Way to Democracy” and “Information, Please”.

Radio stations were used widely in locating United Nations nationals who were lost to their families. The lists of missing persons that were announced on the radio stations were the “hopeless” cases about whom little information was available
through any other means. Youth programs were also presented over all stations and were considered quite successful from both listener and Military Government points of view.

The bulk of programs at Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Munich and Bremen originated locally, a development due in large measure to the disrepair of land lines for network programs. By January 1946, all U.S. licensed stations except Bremen were broadcasting a schedule of 50 to 75 hours per week.

During January all stations devoted increased time to programs of social and educational value. Prior to the elections, talks by political leaders of recognized parties were carried over each station in the Zone, and statements on methods of voting and the responsibility of the population for voting also were emphasized. Returns were broadcast as they were received on election nights, in the manner familiar to U.S. radio listeners.

Munich placed more emphasis on programs for agricultural workers, Frankfurt included special workers' programs and Stuttgart and Frankfurt both broadcast talks by medical authorities on public health matters. The first in a series of Sunday broadcasts by the Radio Stuttgart Symphony Orchestra was heard on 20 January.

Radio Frankfurt instituted a continuous Sunday schedule from 0630 hours to 2400 hours during March, and added a new 15-minute news program which offered detailed reports on local German and world news at 1730 hours six days a week. Regular evening information programs were inaugurated by Radio Stuttgart during
March, including a review of the licensed press and a special broadcast on medical news. Radio Munich carried Sunday noon programs designed to offer practical advice to back-yard gardeners. Radio Bremen presented a series of round-table discussions on principal local problems.

In April, Radio Frankfurt began to broadcast "March of Time"-type programs and monitored the Voice of America's direct broadcast of Security Council sessions, translating them immediately into spot news stories.

Arrangements were made between U.S. and British Military Government authorities for weekly 3-minute radio news transmissions from the Sueddeutscher Rundfunk (U.S.) to the Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk (British). These transmissions from the U.S. Zone were to be incorporated in a regular news roundup program to be presented over Radio Hamburg.

During May and June 1946, the stations devoted a considerable amount of time to explaining the new German tax law. In general, although the percentage of music and other forms of entertainment remained high on radio programs, increasing attention was given to discussion of current problems such as reconstruction, planting of vegetable gardens and juvenile delinquency.

8. Listener Reactions

A survey of listener reactions conducted in July 1945 in Hessen-Nassau on all programs that were heard in the U.S. Zone revealed the following facts: Over

[111 Letter, ICD/USFET, Subject: A Preliminary Reports on Radio Listening in Hessen-Nassau (9 Aug 45).]
one-third of the population did not listen to the radio at all; of those who did listen, one-half tuned in mostly to Radio Frankfurt, one third to Luxembourg, about one in ten to the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), and about one in twenty-five to Radio Berlin, the station operated by Soviet occupation authorities. Signal strength appeared to be a primary factor in determining which station was favored. There was little of competitive listening -- Radios Frankfurt and Luxembourg dominated the field, though there was some dissatisfaction with them. Among the programs objected to were: Swing music, the large number of programs in foreign languages, the short periods of news of Germany and the too-long periods of international news.

In Bavaria, radio listeners by December 1945 revealed increased listening to Radio Munich, as opposed to other stations, although Berlin and Graz (Austria) showed signs of popularity because of the considerable amount of German music they broadcast. Reception of “Die Stimme Amerikas” (Voice of America) and other Luxembourg relays was usually poor. Listeners frequently requested light music. Polish language programs for displaced persons were unpopular. Sports commentaries were favorably received, and young listeners enjoyed the “Jazz Hour.”

A survey of public opinion taken early in 1946 indicated that a majority of Germans in the U.S. Zone accepted the radio presentation of news as truthful and were attempting to hear the broadcasts insofar as facilities were available. The survey was conducted by ICD’s Intelligence Branch in 964 homes throughout the Zone, chosen to obtain a cross-section of listeners from all social, economic and
educational classes.

Although nearly half the regular listeners thought that the broadcasts were censored, 65 percent believed that news was being presented accurately and only 13 percent labelled it propaganda. Persons who owned radio receivers stated that radio was their main source of news. Among both regular and occasional listeners the U.S.-operated stations were popular. However, it was difficult for many persons to hear the broadcasts, since less than half the population had radios in good working order, and one-third of the serviceable radios were 3-tube \textit{Volksempfaenger}. In addition, 37 percent said they were restricting their radio listening to conserve electricity.

As for program preferences, over half of all those interviewed named music as first. German folk music was mentioned most frequently, followed by light music and waltzes, opera, operetta, German dance music, classical music and chamber music. American “jazz” was favored by only two percent. A chart reflecting the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Musical programs (all types)</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News programs</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In general</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeches, discussion</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political commentary</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official information</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News re Prisoners of War</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dramatic programs or plays</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variety Shows</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Programs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Don't know”</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
comparative program preferences follows:  

In each of the Länder, the U.S.-operated station covering the areas was favored, with Radio Stuttgart and Radio Munich preferred by more than 70 percent of listeners in Wuerttemberg-Baden and Bavaria, and Radio Frankfurt by 60 percent of those in Greater Hesse. Others named were the Soviet-controlled stations in Berlin and Leipzig. Over the entire U.S. Zone, Munich was heard most often by the largest group of listeners, principally because of its location in the Land with the largest population.

More than 50 percent of the radio listeners were hearing regularly the “Stimme Amerikas” (Voice of America) broadcasts beamed from New York by the U.S. State Department. When asked what they would like to hear on the radio about America, listeners requested reports on democratic practices; economic news; particularly concerning food; outlines on future plans for Germany; political news, and reports on cultural developments.

Surveys of audience reactions in May and June 1946113 showed that music remained the most popular of all programs, and that serious and light classical music was preferred to dance music. There was increasing demand for American folk-music, which had recently been reintroduced to German audiences. Reactions to broadcasts about the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials were still predominantly  

112 The percentages add to more than 100% because some respondents gave more than one answer.  
negative, though there was a decrease in the scepticism and suspicion with which the public regarded the proceedings.

Chapter 5 -- Intelligence Branch

1. Introduction

During the combat phase of the war with Germany, the Intelligence Section of the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF was responsible for the collection of Psychological Warfare intelligence, and for reporting on the attitude of German soldiers, and later of German civilians, as learned through interrogation and document research and analysis. Following the dissolution of SHAEF on 13 July 1945, the work of the Intelligence Section of PWD was assumed by the Intelligence Branch of the Information Control Division USFET. In addition to adapting the intelligence functions performed by PWD, the work of the Intelligence Branch was expanded in October 1945 with the creation of a Surveys Unit, and the allocation to ICD in February 1946 of responsibility for political intelligence reporting for Military Government.114

2. Mission

The mission of the Intelligence Branch was four-fold:115

a. To investigate German applicants for licensing or employment in German information media;

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114 MGR, Title 21, C-2 (12 May 46), 21-127.1.
115 Ibid, 21-134.
b. To provide ICD media branches with intelligence on facilities and personalities in each medium;
c. To obtain intelligence on German attitudes and reactions, especially with respect to all phases of Military Government, and
d. To collect, evaluate, and disseminate political intelligence.\textsuperscript{116}

3. Organization

The Intelligence Branch operated through three sections: The Reports and Analysis Section, the Denazification Section, and the Surveys Section. The Reports and Analysis Section was responsible for reporting on German political trends and on opinions and attitudes of German community and political leaders; the Denazification Section, which later became the Personnel Control Section, was responsible for the elimination of Nazis from German information services, and the Surveys Section was responsible for conducting special surveys to determine the state of mind, attitude, and opinions of the German public on questions of interest to Military Government.

Subordinate Information Control Units at Land Military Government level\textsuperscript{117} likewise contained intelligence sections over which ICD's Intelligence Branch exercised policy, but not operational, control.

4. Reports and Analysis Section

\textsuperscript{116} Political intelligence was defined as obtaining and reporting information on German reactions and attitudes toward U.S. Military Government and German civil government; German political activity in the U.S. Zone and throughout Germany, including purposes, programs, and leaders; evidences of trends toward nationalism, militarism, Pan-Germanism, or Fascism; separatist movements; and political effects on refugee movements.” (MGR, Title 21, C-2 (12 May 46), 21-127).

\textsuperscript{117} District Information Services Control Commands (DISCCS)
The Reports and Analysis Section divided its activities into four types:

a. It determined what intelligence targets were of importance, provided periodic and special guiding briefs to the ICD Länder intelligence teams, and advised them which targets to exploit and the manner in which the operation should be performed;

b. It consolidated all intelligence received from the Länder in response to periodic and special briefs, and disseminated such intelligence through channels to interested agencies, including publication in the Information Control Intelligence Summary and the Daily Intelligence Digest;

c. It examined intelligence reports from other sources and made further investigations and reports on subjects falling within the realm of ICD's mission, and

d. It scrutinized, in conjunction with the Denazification Section, the products of the information media fields, with particular emphasis on the licensed German press.

Studies of the licensed German press served not only to establish the attitude and political pattern of those under U.S. Military Government control, but scrutiny of the press in other occupied areas produced information reflecting political and other developments in the remainder of Germany.

In addition to study of German media, a small staff of experienced interrogators in the field made weekly reports on developments in German politics. Their reports covered the activities of the four main political groups in Germany. These special investigations also attempted to measure the reactions of German politicians to the actions of Military Government.

5. Denazification Section

In the beginning, the Denazification Section had as its primary objective the

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118 Communist Party (KPD), Socialist Party (SPD), Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
elimination of all Nazis from German information services. On the positive side it was the task of the denazification staff to screen and classify all applicants for licenses and registrations to insure that no Nazis, militarists, dangerous nationalists, or subversive elements obtained employment with information services.

A close relationship was maintained between the Denazification Section, the Public Safety Branch, and the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC). It was a consistent policy of ICD to grant no licenses without prior clearance with these two agencies. In the same way, registrants had to be cleared by Public Safety before ICD would issue registration certificates. In no case was any German employed in an ICD-sponsored enterprise against the recommendation of either Public Safety or CIC.

By the end of June 1946, the primary mission of eliminating Nazis from German information services was considered achieved, at which time the name of the section was changed to the Personnel Control Section and the effort of the section was concentrated on selecting the most suitable applicants for licensing or employment. Active opponents of fascism and positive democratic-minded Germans were sought, and when found, received preference over passive non-Nazis. In general, the task of examining German applicants was carried out by field detachments of ICD. Personal history questionnaires (Fragebogen) were submitted by license and job applicants, and this information was supplemented by interrogating both the individual concerned and his friends and associates. Some examining, often referred to as vetting, was done also by staff headquarters of

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24 Editor’s Note: See the case study of Artur Brauner in the introduction to this book.
119 Editor’s Note: Emphasis in the original.
When the study of a candidate's record was completed, a decision was reached as to his eligibility for employment and his name was placed on one of the following lists:

a. If his political record was clean, his name was placed on “White” list (A), and he was considered eligible for a leading position in any of the information fields for which he was professionally qualified.

b. If investigation disclosed that he was a member of minor affiliated Nazi Party organizations, but had not collaborated actively with the Nazis, his name was placed on “White” list (B), which qualified him for certain types of leading positions, but in a probationary status.

c. If he was considered a less desirable person, his name was placed on “Grey” list (C, acceptable), which qualified him for employment with German information services, but not in policy-making, executive, or creative positions.

d. If he was a Nazi Party member who held only nominal membership, his name was placed on “Grey” list (C, unacceptable), which restricted him to employment at ordinary labor.

e. If he had held high office in the Party, or in any of its affiliated organizations, or had shown himself an active Nazi, his name was placed on the “Black” list (D), which prevented him from being employed in any capacity.

Periodically a compilation of ICD's denazification records was issued in the form of a comprehensive “Black, Grey, and White” list. The Intelligence Branch released its first combined list on 10 October 1945 as a guide both to Information Control personnel and to German licensees and registrants engaged in the employment of Germans. Early in December, a supplemental list of some 700 additional names was published. By 30 June 1946, the personality files, kept in dossier form, numbered nearly 10,000.120

120 With the promulgation of the “Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism” in March 1946, ICD made information in its personality dossiers available to Public Prosecutors whenever a
High standards of personnel selection were maintained by ICD despite differences of opinion, some within ICD itself. Media sections, eager to carry out their mission of restoring German information services, sometimes supported the candidacy of a key person in their own field who possessed desired professional qualifications, but whose political record was subject to criticism. Seldom, however, did the Intelligence Section temper its judgment with expediency, and as a result of this strong policy, information services were sometimes criticized for not using the ablest Germans available.

It was not until the ICD Screening Center was established at Bad Orb in October 1945, that it became possible to select with certainty the most desirable individuals for key positions within German information media. The Screening Center, utilizing the services of a psychiatrist, a political interrogator, and a psychologist, subjected German applicants to comprehensive political and psychological examinations which went far beyond the normal Fragebogen or questionnaire type of denazification scrutiny. Judgment was made not only of the candidate's political reliability, but also of his basic personality profile insofar as it helped evaluate his democratic potential. His stay at the Screening Center normally lasted three days during which time he was subjected to six types of examination. On completion of the tests, members of the staff compared their findings and made recommendations as to the employability of the applicant. In some instances,
persons acceptable for their political reliability were rejected because of undesirable traits of character.

In the closing weeks of 1945, redeployment of U.S. Army personnel so drastically reduced the servicing staff that the Screening Center was abandoned as a fixed institution, and the staff specialists were therefore organized into travelling teams to conduct denazification examinations on a modified scale in the U.S. Zone, using Munich as a headquarters. The Screening Center was reestablished at Bad Homburg in the spring of 1946, however, and continued to operate through 30 June 1946.

During this period from VE-Day through 30 June 1946, the exchange of information among the four occupying powers on personalities in the field of information services posed a serious problem. There existed no machinery by which persons black-listed in the U.S. Zone were automatically black-listed in the French, British, and Soviet areas. ICD furnished its blacklist to the other occupying powers, but received no such lists in return. Furthermore, the lists compiled by ICD were not binding upon the other powers.

6. Surveys Section

Information Control, like its predecessor PWD/SHAEF, was directed to investigate and report the state of mind and opinions of the German population on all questions of interest to Military Government. In the initial phase of the occupation, it was found necessary to devise some means of learning the current
attitudes of the German people. Impressionistic methods, as well as small scale sampling, were employed during the summer months following V-E Day. Principal grievances and attitudes were collected and studied by a small force of interrogators; surveys were made to determine what percentage of the population was being reached by MG newspapers and radio broadcasts, and to see whether the desired results were being obtained by these media.

As German-operated information services resumed operation, the reaction of the population to these was also tested, as well as the reactions to and knowledge of principle MG pronouncements and actions. Inquiries along the latter lines frequently uncovered areas of ignorance, which were then corrected by suitable broadcasts and news releases directed to these areas. The first signs of political activity were also followed closely, and the response of the population to new political programs and leaders was constantly checked.

In October 1945, scientific sampling surveys of the entire U.S. Zone were inaugurated. Conducted by the Surveys Unit, these surveys were made weekly on the same basis as scientific polls made in the United States. Originally a sample of 400 interviews was used, but this was expanded steadily to permit more detailed and more reliable probing of public opinion. The compilation of results was handled by U.S. personnel while interrogations in the field were done by German civilians carefully supervised by Americans.

By the end of January 1946, a balanced picture of public opinion and political trends in all areas under U.S. Control was being obtained on the basis of
approximately 1,000 interviews a week, in 70 representative urban and rural localities.\textsuperscript{123} Persons to be interrogated were selected on a scientific sample basis, in order to give a true picture of the opinions of all socio-economic, political, religious, sex, and age groups in the population. Tests indicated that answers to any given question obtained by U.S. interrogators in uniform did not vary significantly from the answers obtained by German interrogators.

Interviews usually took place in the home of the person being questioned, and normally lasted from 30 minutes to one hour. All results were channelled to the Surveys Unit Headquarters at Bad Homburg where they were tabulated, evaluated by a staff of public opinion specialists, and made available to interested agencies in consolidated form.

Other intelligence investigators, organized separately into a Special Intelligence Unit, supplemented these public opinion studies by frequent interrogations of political leaders, professional men, church dignitaries, and other opinion leaders. These investigators, whose reports also were centrally evaluated and disseminated, attended public meetings, read the local press, collected rumors, and in general, maintained familiarity with the localities in which they worked. All studies of public opinion and attitudes of community leaders were carefully coordinated.

Weekly opinion surveys made it possible for Military Government to follow trends and attitudes on important problems. To show changes in attitudes, the

\textsuperscript{123} OMGUS, \textit{Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone} (Information Control) No. 7 (20 Feb 46) p. 12
same question was often used by the interviewers in successive surveys. The value of this type of questioning was shown when a strong majority of the German public continued over a period of many months to feel that the Nazis on trial at Nuremberg for war crimes were receiving a fair trial and that news accounts of the proceedings were complete and trustworthy. Other so-called “trend” questions were periodically asked to note any changes in the public's attitude toward the occupation, National Socialism, democracy, politics, relations among the Allies, and Germany's economic future.

By 30 June 1946, the number of persons interviewed in each survey had been increased to 3,000. However, surveys could no longer be made on a weekly basis because of the larger sample, coupled with a serious reduction in the amount of transportation available to interrogators. Topics covered by ICD included nearly every question of major interest to Military Government, and during the period had sounded out the Germans on their major concerns, their political party preferences, attitudes toward reconstruction, opinions on the denazification programs, reactions to the Nuremberg trials, reactions to the film Mills of Death, opinions about price trends, radio listening habits, the “black market” and its effects, and the destruction of war industries. Some of the major findings of these investigations showed:

a. **Major Concerns**: Missing relatives and the scarcity of food were of equal concern to the Germans until the food cut of 1 April 1946 when the proportion of people worrying about food approximately doubled. In general, material well-

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125 Ibid.
being was consistently of more immediate concern to the populace than anything else.

b. **Denazification:** This was approved by about half the adults polled; the German public wanted the occupying Power to retain ultimate responsibility for impartial handling of the program, leaving operation and individual decisions to Germans.

c. **The Nuremberg Trials:** These were thought to be conducted in an orderly manner. Most Germans felt that all the accused would be found guilty, and generally agreed that they were guilty and deserved punishment.

d. **Concentration Camps:** Most Germans in the U.S. Zone who had seen the atrocity film *Mills of Death* were convinced of its veracity; a small minority considered it propaganda.

e. **Fear of Rising Prices:** Most Germans thought that with proper measures price rises could be controlled

f. **Radio Listening Habits:** Germans on the whole were found to approve the US controlled radio, and were particularly interested in programs which explained the American democratic system.

g. **The Black Market:** Most Germans felt that the occupation authorities were doing all in their power to curb the Black Market.

h. **Destruction of War Industries:** Most Germans disapproved of the Level of Industry Law and failed to understand that one of its chief intents was to destroy Germany's war potential.
i. **War Guilt:** In general, most Germans did not accept the proposition that the German nation at large was guilty of the war and the crimes committed under Nazi leadership, and felt that neither they nor their friends were personally responsible for such matters. They were inclined to blame their former leaders, particularly those now dead.

j. **Nazism:** The majority of Germans believed that the underlying idea of Nazism was good, but was badly carried out in practice. While some of the populace held opinions generally similar to those prevalent in democratic nations, the majority was still infected with ideas resulting from 12 years of Nazi indoctrination and German militaristic tradition.